Lee v. Saltzman

JOHN YANG LEE, Plaintiff,

v.ALAN R. SALTZMAN, ELLEN P. RICH, and STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO, Defendants.

10-CV-103S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: November 18, 2011

DECISION AND ORDER

1. On February 28, 2011 pro se plaintiff John Yang Lee filed an Amended Complaint in the Western District of New York claiming violations by Defendants Alan R. Saltzman, Ellen P. Rich, and the State University of New York at Buffalo ("SUNY") of 42 U.S.C § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290-296 et seq., as well as state law claims for breach of contract and tortious interference. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants racially discriminated against him throughout his first year residency course and continue to deny him first year credits necessary for issuance of a medical license. Presently before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted.

2. On February 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against Defendants Saltzman and Rich. (Docket No. 1.) At that time, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Docket No. 4.) Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his Complaint and add SUNY as a defendant. (Docket No. 11.) Plaintiff's motion was granted, and this Court denied as moot Defendants' first Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint onFebruary 28, 2011. (Docket No. 15.) Defendants, now joined by SUNY, again move to dismiss. (Docket No. 16.) Along with their motion, Defendants filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 17.) Plaintiff filed a Response (Docket No. 19) on April 4, 2011, and Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum (Docket No. 20) on April 11, 2011. Plaintiff filed his own second Response Memorandum on July 5, 2011. (Docket No. 21.)

3. For purposes of adjudicating the present motion, this Court assumes the truth of the following factual allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint. See Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1997). In approximately 2004, Plaintiff was offered a 3-year residency position with SUNY's internal medicine residency program. (Complaint ("Comp."), Docket No. 1, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff's performance was found satisfactory for the first three months of the program. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff then learned that Defendant Saltzman, the chairman of SUNY's department of medicine, had claimed to dislike Chinese persons. (Id. ¶ 9.) Saltzman was also part of a two-week-rotation which included Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was the only member in the residency program of Chinese origin. (Id.) Defendants' conduct following this initial incident may be summarized as follows. Between January 3, 2005 and January 16, 2005 Saltzman remarked that Plaintiff was in the wrong field because of his accent and that his Chinese medical education was inferior to that of even a third year medical student. (Id.) On January 10, 2005 Saltzman sent a letter, of which Plaintiff came aware only in September 2007, to Defendant Rich, the residency program director, asking him to terminate Plaintiff's residency. (Id. ¶ 10.) On January 24, 2005, Rich put Plaintiff on probation. (Id. ¶ 11.) Saltzman then canceled Plaintiff's mid-term evaluation by the Intern & Residency EvaluationCommittee and began to manipulate Plaintiff's evaluation forms. (Id. ¶ 14.) On March 14, 2005 Rich informed Plaintiff that his contract would not be renewed and that he would need to find a second year position elsewhere. (Id. ¶ 16.) However, Defendants did not release Plaintiff's first year credits, preventing Plaintiff from securing a second year position. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff accused Saltzman of influencing his evaluations and, in response, Defendants compelled one of Plaintiff's supervisors to fabricate a bad record that would assist Defendants in immediately terminating Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff sought an appeal, but was denied on June 13, 2005. (Id. ¶ 20.) Eventually, Defendants did terminate Plaintiff, awarding him only 10.5 credits, instead of the usual 12 because of an unsatisfactory rotation during his first year of residency. (Id. ¶ 21.) On June 19, 2005 Plaintiff requested, and was denied, a training extension and was also denied transfer to an alternative specialty. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.) Defendants also refused Plaintiff's later request in July 2005 that the program allow him to make up the last two months of residency. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff was also denied the right to a special appeal. (Id. ¶ 26.)

Plaintiff continued speaking out against Defendants. In April 2006 he reported the alleged discrimination to the Director of Graduate Medical Education, Associate Dean Roseanne C. Berger. (Id.) Plaintiff was then permitted to complete a standardized patient exercise. (Id. ¶ 28.) But, despite performing well, Defendants continued to reject his requests to return to the residency program. (Id.) Most recently, on February 5, 2009, the Committee on the Professions of New York determined that Plaintiff had satisfied his pre-professional education requirements for licensure. (Comp. ¶ 32.) However, Defendant Rich denied Plaintiff credit for his residency, preventing issuance of the Plaintiff's New York Medical license. (Id.)

4. In July 2006, Plaintiff reported Defendants' actions to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC found that his claims were time-barred. (Id. ¶ 29.) A similar result followed when Plaintiff reported his case to the state human rights department. (Id.) Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought redress by securing legal representation between June 2007 and October 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.) Ultimately, Plaintiff proceeded pro se and, in October 2010, submitted a new complaint to the EEOC. (Id. ¶ 33.). On June 24, 2011 the EEOC sent Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, finding that it was unable to conclude that any statutes had been violated. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 21, Dismissal and Notice of Rights.)

5. Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Federal pleading standards are generally not stringent: Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). But the plain statement must "possess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must construe it liberally, accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007); Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008). Legal conclusions, however, are not afforded the same presumption of truthfulness. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) ("[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id.at 1945 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Labels, conclusions, or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility is present when the factual content of the complaint allows for a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The plausibility standard is not, however, a probability requirement; the pleading must show, not merely allege, that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Well-pleaded allegations in the complaint must nudge the claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Furthermore, this Court is aware of the distinct disadvantage at which pro se litigants are placed, and recognizes that federal courts routinely read submissions by pro se litigants liberally, interpreting them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).

6. Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C § 1981, Title VII, the NYHRL, and state law. At the outset, this Court notes that the majority of these claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. It is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states and state agencies. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-02, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908-09, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984); Jones v. New York State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1999). This Court is barred from "exercising jurisdiction over lawsuits against a state unless [the state] waive[s] sovereign immunity or Congress has expressly and validly abrogated that immunity." A.A. v. Bd. of Educ., Central Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 196 F. Supp. 2d 259, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S. Ct. 955, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866(2001)). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment's protection extends to state officials being sued in their official capacities. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986). "[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] [a]s such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself." Harris v. Queens County Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 08-CV-1703 (CBA)(LB), 2009 WL 3805457, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2009) (quoting Will...