Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church of Pittsburgh

903 F.3d 113

Rev. Dr. William David LEE, a/k/a W. David Lee

v.SIXTH MOUNT ZION BAPTIST CHURCH OF PITTSBURGH, d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Timothy Ralston, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Nathaniel Young, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Geoffrey Kevin Johnson, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Rochelle Johnson, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Alexander Hall, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Raymond Jackson, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; James Grover, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Arthur Harris, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Jerome Taylor, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Tommie Nell Taylor, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; Roy Elder, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church

Rev. Dr. William David Lee, Appellant

No. 17-3086

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued July 12, 2018

Filed: September 5, 2018

Gregg L. Zeff [ARGUED], Zeff Law Firm, LLC, 100 Century Parkway, Ste 305, Mount Laurel, NJ 08054, Counsel for Appellant.

Alan E. Cech, Adam K. Hobaugh, Murtagh, Hobaugh & Cech, LLC, 110 Swinderman Road, Wexford, PA 15090, Daniel Blomberg [ARGUED], Eric Rassbach, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 1200 New Hampshire Ave, NW Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036, Counsel for Appellee.

Andrew G.I. Kilberg, David W. Casazza, Brian M. Lipshutz, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, Counsel for Amici Curiae Church of God in Christ, Inc., mPact Churches, Plymouth Brethren, and Bishop William H. Stokes.

Todd R. Geremia, Jones Day, 250 Vesey Street, New York, NY 10281, Victoria Dorfman, Mark R. Kubisch, Daniel D. Benson, Jones Day, 51 Louisiana Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001, Counsel for Amici Curiae Douglas Laycock, Michael W. McConnell, Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Richard W. Garnett, and Robert F. Cochran.

Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Reverend Dr. William David Lee was terminated from his position as pastor of the Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church ("the Church") and sued the Church for allegedly breaching his employment contract. The District Court granted summary judgment in the Church’s favor because the adjudication of Lee’s contract claim would impermissibly entangle the Court in religious doctrine in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. We agree and will affirm.

I

A¹

In December 2012, the Church’s Deacon board recommended, and the Church voted unanimously to accept, Lee for the position of church pastor. In March 2013, Lee and Church officials executed an employment contract ("the Agreement") establishing that Lee would serve as the Church’s pastor for a twenty-year term, beginning December 2012 and subject to for-cause early termination. If the Church removed Lee without cause before the twenty-year term expired, it would be required to pay Lee the salary and benefits he would have received for the unexpired term of the Agreement, subject to additional reductions. The Agreement specified that Lee could be terminated for cause if he "commits any serious moral or criminal offense ("serious offense")—including but not limited to adultery, embezzlement, or fraud—is convicted of a felony, or commits any other act which is a violation of applicable law" or if he became incapacitated through illness or injury. App. 39 (Agreement § 12.3).

The Agreement also allowed either party to terminate upon "material breach" of the Agreement and specified that the enumerated rights of termination existed in addition to "any other rights of termination allowed ... by law." App. 39 (Agreement § 12.3). Under the Agreement, Lee agreed to "abide by the employment policies and procedures existing or established by the Church from time to time," App. 37 (Agreement § 7c) (capitalization altered). This provision incorporated the Church’s constitution and bylaws and was a "material term" of the Agreement. App. 38 (Agreement § 11). Furthermore, the Agreement required Lee to "lead the pastoral ministries of the Church and ... work with the Deacons and Church staff in achieving the Church’s mission of proclaiming the Gospel to believers and unbelievers." App. 35 (Agreement § 2.5) (capitalization altered).

All executing parties understood that the congregation was required to approve the Agreement for it to become effective. During an April 2013 congregation meeting, Lee acknowledged that his failure to perform his job "would constitute cause for termination under the Agreement." App. 165 ¶¶ 25-27. He also said that "just cause" would occur if the Church "[was] not growing ... [was] stagnant, ... [or was] not a better place," and that "if [he did not] perform [his] duties well, [he would be] out." App. 166-67 ¶¶ 28-32. Based on these statements, the congregation approved the Agreement.

Twenty months later, in December 2014, Church leaders gathered the congregation and recommended that the Church "vacate the pulpit immediately," "void the pastor’s[ ] employment contract," and approve the severance terms. App. 101 ¶ 16; App. 164 ¶ 16. They presented three reasons for their recommendation: (1) "Failures in Financial Stewardship," (2) "Failures in Spiritual Stewardship," and (3) "Failure[s] to Respond to Church Leaders." App. 45. Specifically, the Church reported that from 2013-14, there was a 39% decline in tithes and offerings, a 32% drop in Sunday morning worship attendance, a 61% decrease in registered members, a doubling of Church expenditures, and a decline in the quality of the Church’s community outreach. Furthermore, according to the Church, Lee scheduled but then cancelled several meetings to discuss these financial and ministerial issues between June and December 2014. Based on the recommendations of Church leaders, the congregation voted in January 2015 to terminate Lee’s employment.

B

Lee filed a complaint against the Church and eleven of its deacons, alleging breach of contract due to termination without cause and seeking $2,643,996.40 in damages. The District Court dismissed Lee’s claims against the individual deacons because they were not parties to the Agreement.

Lee moved for summary judgment on his breach of contract claim against the Church and both parties submitted briefs, with the Church asserting several defenses,² including that Lee committed material breach of contract. Lee did not file a reply brief. After briefing, the District Court "became skeptical" that the case could proceed under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and ordered both parties to file additional briefs addressing whether the "ministerial exception," grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, prevented the court from adjudicating Lee’s contract claim. Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Church of Pittsburg, Civ. No. 15-1599, 2017 WL 3608140, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2017). After receiving supplemental briefs, the District Court determined that (1) the Agreement could be terminated by one party upon the other party’s material breach, (2) Lee failed to respond at all to the Church’s defenses, and (3) the matter could not proceed due to the application of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which restricts government involvement in religious affairs. Id. at *15, 22, 37. The District Court therefore denied Lee’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the Church. Id. at *37. Lee appeals.

II³

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is warranted if a party shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

A court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party, as long as the opposing party has notice and an opportunity to respond. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) ("After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may: (1) grant summary judgment for a nonmovant; (2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or (3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute."). In fact, with notice to the parties, a court may enter summary judgment in favor of a non-moving party sua sponte. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("[D]istrict courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence" (emphasis omitted) ); Gibson v. Mayor of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing authority "to allow a court to grant summary judgment to a non-moving party" but requiring that the other party is "on notice that the court is considering a sua sponte summary judgment motion" (emphasis and citation omitted) ).

Here, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Church, a non-moving party, after the District Court gave notice to the parties that it was considering the applicability of the ministerial exception and receiving supplemental briefing regarding "whether and to what extent the ... exception ... affects further adjudication of this matter." Lee, 2017 WL 3608140, at *9. The District Court’s order seeking arguments on the ministerial exception specifically referenced Rule 56(f), which allows courts to grant judgment to a non-moving party or grant judgment on grounds not raised by a party, thereby providing notice that it was considering entering summary judgment based on the ministerial exception. Under these...