Lee v. State

874 N.W.2d 631

Tina Elizabeth LEE, Appellee,

v.STATE of Iowa and Polk County Clerk of Court, Appellants.

No. 14–1386.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 12, 2016.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor General, and Jeffrey C. Peterzalek and Meghan L. Gavin, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.

Paige Fiedler and Brooke Timmer of Fiedler & Timmer, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for appellee.

WIGGINS, Justice.

An employee successfully obtained a judgment against her employer for prospective injunctive relief under the self-care provision of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court entered a judgment awarding the employee attorney fees and costs. The State appeals. We hold state sovereign immunity bars awards of attorney fees and costs incurred in seeking retroactive monetary relief in actions brought against state officials under Ex parte Young¹ to remedy violations of the self-care provision of the FMLA. However, we hold state sovereign immunity does not bar awards of attorney fees and costs incurred in seeking prospective relief in such actions. Thus, we reverse the district court judgment awarding the employee attorney fees and costs incurred in seeking both retroactive and prospective relief and remand the case to the district court with instructions to determine an appropriate award of attorney fees and costs in a manner consistent with the principles expressed in this opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The Polk County Clerk of Court employed Tina Lee until November 2004, when the clerk terminated her employment with the state judicial branch after she took leave to treat her anxiety disorder. In January 2006, Lee filed suit against the State of Iowa and the Polk County Clerk of Court,² alleging violation of her statutory rights under the self-care provision of the FMLA found at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The State asserted the affirmative defense of state sovereign immunity. The district court denied summary judgment, finding Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity in enacting the self-care provision of the FMLA.

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Lee on her claims of wrongful termination and retaliatory discharge in violation of the FMLA. In October 2007, the district court entered judgment in favor of Lee, awarding her money damages for the wrongful discharge, liquidated damages, reinstatement, and $78,844.21 in attorney fees and costs. The court also ordered the State to train its employees on FMLA compliance. The State filed a notice of appeal and moved to stay the judgment pending appeal without filing a supersedeas bond. Lee agreed to stay collection of the monetary judgment but resisted the motion to stay as to the reinstatement. The district court denied the motion as to the reinstatement, noting Lee would suffer substantial harm if the court further delayed her receipt of salary and benefits. Lee moved for an award of the attorney fees and costs she incurred in resisting the stay. The district court granted Lee's motion in March 2008, ordering the State to pay $8303.40 to cover the attorney fees and costs Lee incurred between October 2007 and February 2008.

The State then requested this court to stay the judgment pending the appeal. We granted the State's request and transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court. We granted the State's application for further review but held the case in abeyance pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,

––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012).

In considering the State's appeal, we determined the State preserved its sovereign immunity arguments but incorrectly identified the Eleventh Amendment as the source of its sovereign immunity. Lee v. State (Lee I ), 815 N.W.2d 731, 738–39 (Iowa 2012). After noting the Supreme Court held in Coleman that Congress failed to validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in passing the self-care provision of the FMLA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we proceeded to consider the other ground upon which the district court had denied the State's sovereign immunity defense. Id. at 739–43 (citing Coleman, ––– U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 1332–33, 1335, 182 L.Ed.2d at 300–04 ). Though we determined the State had not constructively waived³ state sovereign immunity, we noted state employees may nonetheless seek injunctive relief in suits against state officials responsible for violations of the self-care provision of the FMLA under Ex parte Young. Id. at 743. We concluded,

In this case, the judgment entered by the district court was predicated on legal error. Accordingly, the noninjunctive relief granted in the judgment cannot stand, and we must reverse the district court. We remand the case to the district court to determine what relief granted in its judgment is still available to Lee within the framework of this lawsuit, findings of the jury at trial, and the cloak of immunity protecting the State. The district court shall permit the parties to be heard on this issue and enter a new final judgment for such relief.

Id. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for determination of what relief was still available to Lee. Id.

On remand, Lee moved to enforce the October 2007 award of reinstatement, arguing in the alternative that the State had waived sovereign immunity by stipulating it would pay her lost wages and benefits if the appellate court affirmed the reinstatement order on appeal when it moved to stay the judgment. See Lee v. State (Lee II ), 844 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Iowa 2014). The State resisted, arguing Lee had not named any state official in her original action, challenging the characterization of lost wages and benefits as prospective relief, and arguing the State had not waived its immunity in seeking the stay because it agreed to pay lost wages and benefits only if the district court order was affirmed, rather than reversed, on appeal. See id. at 673.

In October 2012, the district court granted the motion, ordering the State to reinstate Lee and pay her lost wages and benefits from the date of the October 2007 judgment with postjudgment interest. The State appealed. In Lee II, we affirmed the district court and determined the date of the October 2007 reinstatement order was the date from which prospective relief should properly be determined. Id. at 684.

Thereafter, Lee learned the State did not intend to pay her attorney fees and costs and moved for attorney fees and costs in the district court. Specifically, she requested the court to order the State to pay the attorney fees and costs it awarded her in its October 2007 and March 2008 orders. She also sought an award of the attorney fees and costs she incurred during both appeals.

The district court concluded it was required to award Lee reasonable attorney fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) because she had been awarded relief in an FMLA action. Thus, on June 27, 2014, the court entered judgment ordering the State to pay Lee the attorney fees and costs it found she was entitled to in its October 2007 and March 2008 orders and $145,942.65 to cover the attorney fees and costs she incurred between February 2008 and June 2014. The State appeals.

II. Issues.

This appeal presents three issues for us to consider. First, we must determine the source of authority for the award of prospective relief to Lee. Second, we must determine whether state sovereign immunity bars an award of attorney fees and costs to Lee. Third, we must decide whether Lee is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under the FMLA.

III. Scope of Review.

"We generally review decisions concerning attorney fees for an abuse of discretion...." Fennelly v. A–1 Mach. & Tool Co., 728 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Iowa 2007). However, when we review a ruling on a motion, the scope of our review depends on the grounds raised in the motion. See, e.g., Clinton Physical Therapy Servs., P.C. v. John Deere Health Care, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 2006). Whether a particular remedy is available under Ex parte Young is a question of law. Lee II, 844 N.W.2d at 674. Accordingly, we review the district court's decision to award attorney fees and costs in an Ex parte Young action for correction of errors at law. See id.

IV. The Source of Authority for the Award of Prospective Relief to Lee.

The State alleges the source of authority for the award of prospective injunctive relief to Lee is unclear, but it acknowledges the source of authority for the award must be Ex parte Young, the FMLA, or both. Regardless of the source of authority for the award, however, the State contends it is not liable for attorney fees because Lee is not a "prevailing party" under the FMLA and Ex parte Young cannot authorize an attorney fee award in Iowa.

We begin our discussion by clarifying the source of authority for awarding Lee prospective relief in her FMLA action brought under Ex parte Young. The district court concluded the FMLA authorized the prospective relief awarded to Lee.

The constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity reflects fundamental implications of our federal constitutional design and recognizes that inherent in the nature of sovereignty is some degree of immunity from suit. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728–30, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2254–55, 144 L.Ed.2d 636, 662–63 (1999). Because the principle of state sovereign immunity reflects fundamental aspects of state sovereignty affirmed by, rather than originating from, the Eleventh Amendment, states may invoke sovereign immunity in both federal and state courts.⁴

Id. at 713, 728–29, 754, 119 S.Ct. at 2246–47, 2254, 2266, 144 L.Ed.2d at 652, 662, 678.

State sovereign immunity is not absolute. On the contrary, it is subject to several implicit limits or exceptions. Id. at 755–57, 119 S.Ct. at 2267–68, 144 L.Ed.2d at 679–81 ; Lee II, 844 N.W.2d at 677 (acknowledging exceptions recognized in federal court...