Lefebvre v. State

313 A.3d 1156

Danielle LEFEBVRE

v.STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 2020-167-M.P.

(PM 19-3924)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 21, 2024

Providence County Superior Court, Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel

Angela M. Yingling, Rhode Island Public Defender, for Appelant.

Christopher R. Bush, Department of the Attorney General, for Appellee.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to a writ of certiorari, seeking review of a Superior Court decision that denied an application for postconviction relief filed by the applicant, Danielle LeFebvre (LeFebvre). LeFebvre filed her application for postconviction relief on the grounds that she was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and, thus, she should have been afforded a new trial. LeFebvre faults her trial counsel (defense counsel) for failing to consult, and present at trial, an expert in the medically complicated child abuse prosecution and for purposefully disclosing harmful information that was damaging to her case. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

The facts from LeFebvre’s jury trial are detailed in State v. LeFebvre, 198 A.3d 521 (R.I. 2019) (LeFebvre I). We set forth below the relevant facts.

On October 18, 2011, LeFebvre brought her almost seven-week-old infant son¹ to her grandmother’s home for an overnight visit. LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 523. The next morning, on October 19, 2011, LeFebvre returned to work from maternity leave. Id. While LeFebvre was at work, her grandmother "noticed that James was not acting normally." Id. LeFebvre’s grandmother made two telephone calls to LeFebvre to communicate her concerns regarding James’s unusual behavior; however, rather than immediately leaving to check on her son, LeFebvre remained at work, and left an hour early. Id. Upon arriving at her grandmother’s home, LeFebvre observed her son’s behavior and realized he needed medical attention. Id. Rather than immediately proceeding to Hasbro Children’s Hospital (Hasbro), LeFebvre returned to her apartment, packed a few items, and then drove to Hasbro’s emergency room. Id.

When LeFebvre and James arrived at the emergency room, medical staff performed several tests including a head CT and a skeletal survey of the infant’s body—which Dr. Amy Goldberg explained were "x-rays of two views" and included a "front and a side view of every bone in the body." These tests revealed that James had suffered life-threatening injuries, which caused serious permanent damage. These injuries included complex skull fractures, subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhages, and brain contusions. James was admitted to Hasbro, where he remained inpatient for several days. On November 3, 2011, James’s x-rays revealed that he suffered rib fractures that were consistent with having sustained the injury on or around the time of his admission at Hasbro (October 19, 2011)—the day after LeFebvre recalled her son having accidentally fallen off the bed.

While Hasbro was conducting multiple medical tests on the child, LeFebvre revealed to the attending physician that, "the day before [i.e., October 18, 2011], she had been sitting on the edge of her bed with James * * * trying to lull him to sleep for a quick nap, when she herself fell asleep." LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 522. LeFebvre explained that when she woke up, she found James crying on the floor by the bed. Id. LeFebvre also told the attending physician about her grandmother’s observations that "James appeared listless, was not eating, had rapid eye movements, and that his limbs were twitching." Id. at 523. Based on James’s extensive injuries, Hasbro notified the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF). Id.

On May 10, 2012, LeFebvre was charged by way of criminal information with one count of first-degree child abuse, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-9-5.3(b)(1). See LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 523. Defense counsel and the state entered into plea negotiations, and as part of the parties’ discussions, defense counsel provided the state with LeFebvre’s medical records (medical records) from Butler Hospital, regarding her mental health treatment. Id. Defense counsel offered this material to the prosecution as part of LeFebvre’s mitigation package in hopes that it would convince the state to reduce the charge brought against her. Nonetheless, as noted by the trial justice, "[t]he prosecutor had not provided [defense] counsel with any assurances or promises that she would amend the charge if she received mitigation material." The prosecutor subsequently reviewed the medical records but did not amend the charge; by that point, the state had already made its best offer at pretrial—the mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree child abuse. LeFebvre rejected this offer.² After LeFebvre rejected the plea offer, trial ensued.

At trial, LeFebvre testified to her version of the events that transpired on October 18, 2011; specifically, that James fell off the bed and onto the floor when she dozed off. LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 523. The trial justice—who also presided over LeFebvre’s application for postconviction relief—later found in her written decision on the application that in light of several witnesses’ trial testimony and LeFebvre’s tes- timony,³ she deemed LeFebvre to be "not credible, and the [c]ourt and likely the jury discounted [LeFebvre’s testimony] and rejected her claim that the baby suffered his * * * injuries in an accidental short-fall from her bed."

On March 24, 2015, LeFebvre was convicted of first-degree child abuse as a result of the permanent injuries to her seven-week-old infant son. LeFebvre filed a motion for a new trial, which the Superior Court denied. The trial justice subsequently sentenced LeFebvre to twenty years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with eighteen years to serve, and the balance suspended, with probation. LeFebvre appealed from the judgment of conviction, which we affirmed. See LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 528.

Subsequently, LeFebvre filed an application seeking postconviction relief. After considering the parties’ memoranda and testimony at the postconviction-relief hearing, the trial justice issued a written decision denying LeFebvre’s application. The trial justice noted LeFebvre first contended that "[defense] counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by going to trial without presenting an expert witness and without consulting with [an expert] before cross-examining Dr. Goldberg * * *." (Emphases added.) Second, the trial justice noted that LeFebvre argued in her application that defense counsel "voluntarily produc[ed] mental health records to the prosecution, incorrectly believing them to be inadmissible at trial."

During the postconviction-relief hearing, the trial justice had the opportunity to evaluate the testimony of an expert, Dr. Joseph Scheller (Dr. Scheller). In her decision, the trial justice noted that "[i]n an effort to provide * * * Le[F]ebvre with a broad and complete opportunity to pursue her post-conviction relief application, the [c]ourt provided requested funds to her post-conviction relief attorney to engage the services of an expert." Accordingly, "the [c]ourt analyze[d] the proffered testimony of Dr. Scheller and decide[d] [LeFebvre’s] petition as though [defense] counsel had obtained funds and had consulted, with and presented an expert such as Dr. Scheller at trial." (Emphases added.) The court evaluated "whether [Dr. Scheller’s] opinions would be admissible at trial as legally sufficient, having evidentiary reliability, scientific validity and relevance." In the event that Dr. Scheller’s expert opinion was deemed to be admissible, the court would then proceed to determine "whether [Dr. Scheller’s] credibility was so poor that no reasonable jury would have accepted his opinions and that failure to present him at trial failed to meet the prejudice prong * * *." The trial justice determined that Dr. Scheller failed in both respects.

Mindful of the proper standard for the use of medical expert opinions, the trial justice noted several concerns with Dr. Scheller’s proffered opinion. For example, the trial justice observed that "it [was] unclear whether [Dr. Scheller’s] testimony would have survived a Daubert challenge."⁴ Doctor Scheller, although Board Certified in pediatrics and pediatric neurology, did not hold certifications in child abuse pediatrics, radiology, or neuroradiology. The trial justice also found Dr. Scheller’s testimony to be concerning when he stated that he did not believe that a person "without a history of a serious psychological problem or a serious behavior problem * * * would violently shake a child just simply out of frustration * * *." The court later engaged in the following colloquy to clarify its concerns:

"THE COURT: Is it your testimony, just so I understand it, that you haven’t seen a confession yet in one of those cases that you found to be reliable?

"[DOCTOR SCHELLER]: I use the word ‘credible.’ * * * I have not found one that’s credible."

Significantly, the trial justice also observed that Dr. Scheller "spoke not only in terms of possibilities, but * * * rare possibilities. He never quantified his opinion that it was possible for the injuries to have been sustained in an accidental short-fall." For example, Dr. Scheller testified that "it is possible that [James’s] injuries documented at the end of October, 2011, did happen from a short fall even though they are very dramatic and very serious." (Emphasis added.) The court interjected and reminded counsel that the "case law is exceptionally clear that ‘possible’ is not a basis for an expert opinion * * *."

Thus, the trial justice determined that Dr. Scheller’s testimony "failed to provide a scientifically valid and reliable opinion to challenge the strength of Dr. Goldberg’s contention that the infant did not...