Legum v. David Lloyds, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.

STEVEN G. LEGUM, Plaintiff, v. DAVID LLOYDS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.,and WEBSTER BANK, N.A., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-01864 (VLB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

September 23, 2015

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. 18, Dkt. 42] AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. 44]

I. Introduction

The Plaintiff, a New York resident appearing pro se, brought this diversity action in a four-count Complaint filed December 11, 2013 seeking a declaratory judgment against David Lloyds, a Connecticut resident, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), a Delaware corporation, and Webster Bank, N.A. ("Webster Bank"), a Connecticut bank. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants' mortgages are subject and subordinate to a mortgage and a judgment lien held by Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that, although he obtained a mortgage after the registration of a valid lis pendens, subordination of his lien denied him due process because it was legally impossible for him to intervene in the underlying dissolution action in which the iis pendens was filed. The Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor on all counts, for the reasonthat the Plaintiff's purported liens against the subject property were extinguished pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Sections 46b-80(a) and 52-325(a) by virtue of a conveyance ordered in a judgment of marital dissolution entered by the Superior Court before plaintiff acquired his purported interest in the property.

Currently pending before the Court are the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

II. Factual Background

The parties agree that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts in this case, and thus, the following facts relevant to the action are assumed to be true. The subject of the action is a parcel of property located at 1 Stallion Trail, Greenwich, Connecticut (the "Property"). Peter D. McKenna ("McKenna") and his wife, Roberta Delente a/k/a Katherine Copperfield ("Delente") acquired the property jointly and severally by a warranty deed dated July 21, 1999. [Dkt. 34, Ex. 15]. In April of 2004, McKenna commenced a marital dissolution action in the Stamford Superior Court and promptly recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens dated April 21, 2004 asserting his interest in the Property. [Dkt. 30, Ex. 11]. At his deposition, Plaintiff Steven G. Legum acknowledged that he and Delente were having an affair and that he learned of the dissolution action shortly after Delente was served with process in that action. [Dkt. 23, Legum Dep. 65:3-7].

More than two years after McKenna filed for divorce and filed his lis pendens, in May of 2006, the Plaintiff gave Delente and her son, Robert Schwertner, unsecured loans in the amount of $42,900 to purchase two automobiles (the "vehicle loans"). [Id. 39:1-24]. Delente failed to repay the vehicle loans and in 2007 Plaintiff commenced a civil action against both Delente and Schwertner to enforce his right to repayment. [Dkt. 27, Ex. 6].

On December 20, 2007, the Stamford Superior Court entered a judgment of dissolution awarding "all right, title and interest in and to [the Property] to [McKenna] the husband" and ordered Delente "to immediately sign a quitclaim deed to [McKenna] the husband." [Dkt. 32, Ex. 13, ¶12]. The Superior Court ordered that the Property be sold "free and clear of any liens, mortgages, attachments, and encumbrances." [Id.] Delente was entitled to receive one half of the net proceeds from this sale, subtracting various carrying costs, mortgage repayments, and repayments of loans owed by Delente to McKenna. [Id. ¶ 15]. However, the Superior Court also ordered Delente to immediately pay, from her one half share of the net proceeds of the sale, a list of sixteen different liens, mortgages and claims. [Id. ¶20(a)-(p)]. The Superior Court specifically listed Plaintiff's pending civil suit against Delente as one such claim. [Id. ¶20(j)]. Finally, the Superior Court held that McKenna "filed, served and recorded a lis pendens against the wife's interest in [the Property]" and that "all liens, mortgages, attachments and/or encumbrances filed in the Greenwich Land Records against the wife after April 22, 2004 are subject to the husband's prior right." [Id. ¶21].

One month after the entry of the judgment in the dissolution action, Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Delente and Schwertner in his civil suit. [Dkt. 32, Ex. 6]. On March 11, 2008, four months after the judgment in the dissolution action had awarded McKenna "all right, title and interest in and to [the Property]" to McKenna, Plaintiff recorded a judgment lien for $43,395.56 "against Katherine Copperfield, a/k/a Roberta Delente . . . and Rudson Schwertner." [Id.] The lien gave Plaintiff a "security interest upon the property owned by the judgment debtor" and listed the address of the Property. [Id.]

Delente did not immediately execute a quit claim deed as ordered by the court. [Dkt. 35, Ex. 16]. Seven months after the Superior Court order of dissolution conveying to McKenna all interest in the Property and three months after Plaintiff recorded a judgment lien against her, on June 16, 2008, Delente signed a $50,000 note, secured by a mortgage of the Property in favor of the Plaintiff [Dkt. 29, Ex. 10, Dkt. 23, Legum Dep. 54:1-20]. The mortgage note apparently reflected $50,000 in additional unsecured loans, unrelated to the vehicle loan, that Plaintiff claimed to have provided Delente over the prior three years. Two weeks after signing over this mortgage note to Plaintiff, on June 30, 2008, Delente quitclaimed the Property to McKenna. [Dkt. 32, Ex. 16].

On July 22, 2011, McKenna conveyed the Property to defendant Lloyds by warranty deed; defendant Lloyds subsequently mortgaged the Property to defendants Webster Bank and MERS. [Dkt. 36, Ex. 17; Dkt. 37, Ex. 18; Dkt. 39, Ex. 20; Dkt. 40, Ex. 21]. Two years after McKenna's conveyance to Lloyds, Plaintiffinitiated this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants' mortgages are subject and subordinate to his own mortgage and lien

Legal Standard

Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no factual issues exist. Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). "In determining whether that burden has been met, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). "If there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied." Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Hapag Lloyd Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

"A party opposing summary judgment cannot defeat the motion by relying on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible. At the summary judgment stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs are required to present admissible evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence toback them up, are not sufficient." Welch-Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No.3:03cv481, 2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Martinez v. State of Connecticut, No. 3:09cv1341 (VLB), 2011 WL 4396704 at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 21, 2011). Where there is no evidence upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it and upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, such as where the evidence offered consists of conclusory assertions without further support in the record, summary judgment may lie. Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearance Co., 604 F.3d 712 (2d Cir. 2010).

III. Discussion

At the outset, Plaintiffs claims draw perilously close to triggering the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction, which strips the federal courts of the authority to hear cases brought by persons seeking "the granting or modification of a divorce or alimony decree." Williams v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1275, 1283 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700-02 (1992)). To the extent the "declaratory" relief Plaintiff seeks from this Court concerning his purported mortgage would have the effect of modifying the judgment of the Superior Court awarding the Property to McKenna "free and clear" of any and all encumbrances, the Court may lack the authority to hear such a claim. An action to modify the Superior Court judgment would also seemingly implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, requiring the Court to abstain from the action, as "no federal court, other than the Supreme Court, can consider a claim to reverse ormodify a state court judgment." Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)).

In effect, Plaintiff is ultimately asking the Court to modify the Superior Court judgment, albeit disguised in an action for declaratory relief grounded in a due process claim. The relief Plaintiff seeks, declaring that he holds a valid mortgage to the Property that is superior to those held by Defendants, would have the effect of burdening McKenna - and Defendants Llloyds and Webster, his successors in interest to the Property - with a liability...