Lemaster v. Lawrence Cnty.

BILLY LEMASTER, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. LAWRENCE COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-12-DLB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY NORTHERN DIVISION AT ASHLAND

October 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. # 11). The Motion has been fully briefed, (Docs. # 14 and 36), and is now ripe for the Court's review. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion is granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Billy Lemaster and Amanda Lemaster, owners and operators of Lemaster Towing and Recovery ("Lemaster Towing"), bring this action against Lawrence County, Kentucky and Phillip L. Carter, both in his individual capacity and official capacity as Lawrence County Judge Executive. (Doc. # 1 at 1). Lawrence County maintains a list of towing companies that it utilizes on a rotating basis to cover emergency towing needs. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-3). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Carter removed Lemaster Towing from the County's towing service call list in retaliation for a Facebook post Billy Lemaster made that reflected poorly on Judge Carter. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 28, 37).

In January 2019, Plaintiffs expressed concerns to Judge Carter that Lemaster Towing was receiving "very little" or no calls pursuant to the County tow call list. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9). In response, Judge Carter indicated that he would investigate the situation and ensure that Plaintiffs began receiving more calls. (Id. at ¶ 10). Then, in April of 2019, Billy Lemaster made a post on Facebook criticizing the County's recent firing of an emergency-services employee. (Id. at ¶ 11). Judge Carter allegedly contacted Billy Lemaster and requested that he remove the post, as it reflected poorly on Defendant as County Judge Executive. (Id. at ¶ 12). According to the Complaint, Billy Lemaster agreed to remove the post, and, in exchange, Judge Carter agreed to ensure Plaintiffs began receiving more towing calls. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14). Plaintiffs received a "steady volume" of calls during the summer of 2019. (Id. at ¶ 16).

However, in early September 2019, Judge Carter allegedly instructed Lawrence County Emergency Management ("Dispatch") not to call Lemaster Towing, specifically "directing the dispatch caller to skip Lemaster Towing and call the next company on the list." (Id. at ¶ 28). In addition, Judge Carter allegedly instructed Dispatch not to call the Cherryville Fire and Rescue Department, which Billy Lemaster headed at the time. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18). The Complaint further alleges that Judge Carter called the Kentucky Fire Commission to request an audit of the Cherryville Fire and Rescue Department, (id. at ¶¶ 21-23), and contacted the state police to request an inspection of the Cherryville Fire Department's premises, (id. at ¶¶ 24-25).

In September 2019, following Judge Carter's alleged interference with the tow call list and the Cherryville Fire Department, Plaintiffs experienced a "sudden drop" in the number of towing calls made to Lemaster Towing via operation of the rotating service calllist. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). As of the filing of the Complaint on February 7, 2020, Plaintiffs were allegedly continuing to receive an average of zero to one towing calls per month, down from their typical rate of five to six calls per month. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-30). Based on these facts, Plaintiffs' Complaint sets forth a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), a claim of retaliation under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act ("KCRA"), KRS § 344, et seq. and/or the Kentucky Constitution (Count II), and a state-law claim of tortious interference with economic relations (Count III). (Id. at ¶¶ 33-58). Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees. (Id. at 8-9).

In their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, presently before the Court, Defendants seek dismissal of all Plaintiffs' claims against Phillip Carter in his official capacity as redundant of the claims against Lawrence County. (Doc. # 11 at 5-6). Defendants also seek dismissal of Count II brought pursuant to the KCRA and/or Kentucky Constitution for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 6-7). Further, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' tortious-interference claim under Count III as to Phillip Carter in his official capacity and Lawrence County on the basis of sovereign immunity. (Id. at 7).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, in order to survive a Rule 12(c) motion, "a complaint mustcontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A complaint does not have to show that liability is probable but must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

When considering whether a complaint has adequately pled a claim for relief, the Court accepts all allegations in the complaint as true and considers them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 203 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court need not, however, "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting in parenthetical Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Merely stating the elements of a claim is insufficient; while "legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In sum, "[f]or purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting S. Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)).

B. Official Capacity Claims against Judge Carter

Defendants first move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against Phillip Carter in his official capacity as Lawrence County Judge Executive. (Doc. # 11 at 5). Defendants specifically argue that the official-capacity claims against Judge Carter are redundant of the claims against Lawrence County, because a claim against a government official in his official capacity is essentially a claim against the government entity itself. (Id.). The Court agrees.

The Supreme Court has recognized that "official-capacity suits 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)); see also Shorts v. Bartholomew, 255 F. App'x 46, 49 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Official-capacity suits are, for all intents and purposes, treated as suits against the municipality . . . .") (citing Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25). Thus, when a plaintiff names both the municipality and agent of the municipality in his official capacity, the official-capacity claim is redundant and should be dismissed. See Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App'x 322, 327 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding official-capacity claim properly dismissed as "superfluous" where complaint also named municipality as defendant). Unsurprisingly, district courts in the Sixth Circuit "regularly dismiss as redundant claims against agents in their official capacities when the principal entity is also named as a defendant in the suit." Johnson v. Washington Cnty. Career Ctr., No. 2:10-cv-76, 2010 WL 2570929, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2010); accord Gilley v. Bd. of Educ. of Trimble Cnty., Ky., No. 3:12-40, 2013 WL 3154130, at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 19, 2013) (collecting cases).

As is relevant to Plaintiffs' state-law claims against Judge Carter in his official capacity, the same principle applies under Kentucky law. See Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Ky. 2001) (finding official-capacity claims against jailer to be "in essence" claims against the county) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66); see also Yates v. Benningfield, No. 2012-CA-154, 2013 WL 781098, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2013) (finding official-capacity claims against jailer and judge executive to be "essentially claims against the county").

In this case, Plaintiffs bring damages claims against Lawrence County, Kentucky and Phillip Carter, both in his official capacity as County Judge Executive and in his individual capacity. (Doc. # 1 at 1). Because the official-capacity claims against Defendant Carter are, in practical terms, claims against Lawrence County, Plaintiffs' official-capacity claims are dismissed as superfluous. See Faith Baptist Church, 522 F. App'x at 327; Yates, 2013 WL 781098, at *2.

C. Claims under the KCRA and/or the Kentucky Constitution

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under either the Kentucky Civil Rights Act ("KCRA") or the Kentucky Constitution. (Doc. # 11 at 6-7). Under Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Billy Lemaster was engaging in constitutionally protected speech when he posted a message on Facebook that was critical of the County, and that Judge Carter retaliated against Plaintiffs for exercising their civil rights by interfering with the tow call list in an effort to deter them from ...