Lemmons v. Evcon Indus. Inc.

JAMES L. LEMMONS, Plaintiff,

v.EVCON INDUSTRIES, INC., ET. AL, Defendants.

Case No. 09-1232-JTM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

Dated: July 14, 2011

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is a diversity action involving the application and interpretation of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act (KWCA). Plaintiff brought suit alleging premises liability against defendants. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 58) and Plaintiff's Motion to Partially Strike Defendant's Reply (Dkt. No. 66) are before the court. As provided below, the court grants the defendant's motion and denies the plaintiff's motion.

I. Findings of Fact

The following facts are uncontroverted for purposes of this motion.

Defendant, York International Corporation (York) manufactures and sells HVAC equipment at several locations including the Wichita facility at issue here. Plaintiff, James L. Lemmons, claims he was injured when he fell into a hole covered by a grate in the parking lot while attempting to hook up a loaded trailer. At the time of the accident, Lemmons was employed by Ryder as a yard driver. York and Ryder contracted for Ryder to provide freight transportation, hauling, and otherdelivery services for York at its Wichita facility. Lemmons was a full time Ryder yard driver and worked exclusively at the York facility. York contracted with other trucking companies to deliver its products to its distributors.

York's Wichita plant is nearly a mile long. The plant has at least 28 separate buildings, each of which serves a distinct function in York's manufacturing operation. The nature of this business and the size of the plant requires York to have yard trucks operating during business hours to transport products at different stages of the manufacturing process from one part of the plant to another. This type of intra-facility transport is known as "yard shuttling." Without yard shuttling, York would be unable to manufacture, assemble, prepare for distribution, or sell any completed HVAC equipment made at the Wichita facility.

The contract between York and Ryder obligated Ryder to provide trucks and drivers on a full time basis to engage in yard shuttling at the plant. Further, it required Ryder to "accept and shuttle the Commodities promptly and efficiently at [York's] discretion." Dkt. No. 59, Ex. C., para. 10. Ryder's yard shuttling services were limited to the Wichita plant. York's other HVAC manufacturing plants did not use third party yard-shuttling providers. York's other facilities located in Norman, Oklahoma and Apodaca, Mexico use their own employees for such work. In fact, prior to hiring Ryder, York used its own employees for yard shuttling in Wichita.

Under the contract, Ryder agreed to comply with all applicable workers compensation laws and agreed to provide workers compensation and employer's liability insurance for its employees working at York. The cost of this insurance was factored into the price York paid Ryder for yard shuttling services. York also paid Ryder an hourly wage for Lemmons's services, and Ryder paid Lemmons directly.

Like all other Ryder drivers at the York facility, Lemmons followed orders from York employees or representatives. York specified the coverage and hours of the yard drivers and defined their tasks. Orders were typically given to a Ryder dispatcher who has a permanent office at the York plant. The dispatcher relayed the orders directly to the drivers, including Lemmons. However, it was not uncommon for York employees or representatives to directly contact or instruct Ryder yard drivers to perform certain tasks. York did not have the power to fire plaintiff, but it did have discretion to remove any Ryder employee, including plaintiff, from the facility if it chose to do so.

On May 11, 2009, plaintiff filed his Original Petition in state court against York. He then filed an essentially identical Amended Petition acknowledging his claim was brought on his own behalf as well as the workers compensation carrier who paid plaintiff's workers compensation benefits. Additionally, plaintiff sued Johnson Controls, Inc., (York's parent company) and Evcon Industries, Inc. Evcon is a prior subsidiary of York that held title to the York facility at the time of the alleged injury. Both Johnson and Evcon have been voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 5. In their Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, the parties agreed to the following things:

WHEREUPON, pursuant to K.S.A 60-241(a)(1)(ii), the parties to this action stipulate to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against defendants Evcon Industries, Inc., and Johnson Controls, Inc. without prejudice. The parties further stipulate that on July 28, 2007, defendant Evcon Industries. Inc. was the owner of the real property that is at issue in Plaintiff's Petition according to the records of the Register of Deeds, but that Evcon, Industries, Inc. was subsequently merged into Evcon Holdings, Inc. later that year. The same day, Evcon Holdings, Inc. was then merged into York International Corporation. Thus, Evcon Industries, Inc. would not be a necessary defendant in this action. The parties further stipulate that as a result of the merger, should there be any liability attributable to Evcon Industries, Inc. in this case for events that occurred on the real property at issue in this litigation previously owned by it, that York International Corporation has assumed such liability as a result of the mergers detailed above. . . .

WHEREUPON, having received and examined the record and having been fully advised of the premises herein, the Court finds that the defendants, Evcon Industries, Inc. and Johnson Controls, Inc. should be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants Evcon Industries, Inc. and Johnson Controls, Inc. are dismissed from this action without prejudice.

Dkt. No. 5 (emphasis added). On July 28, 2009, York removed the case to this court on grounds of diversity and filed an Answer and an Amended Answer explicitly raising the exclusive remedy provision of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act as a defense.

II. Conclusions of Law

A. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 58)

1. Legal Standard

"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Id. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). The moving party need not disprove [nonmovant's] claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987) (alterations added).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Id. Summary judgment may be granted if the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. Id. at 250-51. Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita).

Finally, the court reminds the parties that summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). It is an important procedural vehicle "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Id. One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Id.

2. Exclusive Remedy Provision of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act

First, defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff's suit is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the KWCA. Generally, under Kansas law, an employee may not sue his employer for injuries sustained by the employee in the course of employment. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(b) (2010). Section 44-501(b) provides:

Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no employer, or other employee of such employer, shall be liable for any injury for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act nor shall an employer be liable to any third party for any injury or death of an employee which was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against a third party and for which workers compensation is payable by such employer.

Id. "The remedy provided in the Kansas Workers Compensation Act is exclusive and a worker may not maintain a common-law action for damages founded upon negligence against a party from whom he or she...