Len v. Sec'y of Illinois

APRIL LEN, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF STATE OF ILLINOIS, ET AL, Defendants.

Case No. 3:19 -CV-00742 -MAB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

May 18, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff April Len brings this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for adverse employment actions beginning in March 2017 when she was employed by the State of Illinois Secretary of State ("SOS") until June 2018 when she was fired (Doc. 43). Presently before the Court is Defendants Randy Blue, Michael Mayer, and Jay Morgan's second motion, and supporting memorandum, to dismiss (Docs. 44, 45). For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed her complaint on July 9, 2019 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for issues related to her employment with and termination from the Office of the Illinois Secretary of State ("SOS") (Doc. 1). On December 23, 2019, Defendants filed a motion, and supporting memorandum, to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Docs 18, 19). Plaintiff filed her response on April 23, 2020, where she attempted to include more details of the timeline of events leading up to and after her firing, but none of these details can be found within the complaint (See generally Doc. 30). Defendants filed a motion for leave to file supplemental authority on April 24, 2020, which Plaintiff did not oppose (see Docs. 31, 32). In their motion for leave, Defendants argued that a recent Seventh Circuit case, Vargas v. Cook Cnty Sheriff's Merit Bd., is applicable to the present matter as it affirms a motion to dismiss a plaintiff's due process claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 in a similar employment termination case (Doc. 31). See Vargas v. Cook Cnty Sheriff's Merit Bd., 952 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2020).

On September 16, 2020, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the Secretary of State of Illinois and the State of Illinois with prejudice (Doc. 38). The Court dismissed Plaintiff's other claims against the remaining three individual Defendants without prejudice, and allowed Plaintiff leave to file her first amended complaint. Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on November 5, 2020 (Doc. 43). Soon after, Defendants filed their motion and supporting memorandum to dismiss (Docs. 44, 45). Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss on January 8, 2021 (Doc., 47).

The amended complaint details that on or around March 8, 2017, a phone call was placed to the SOS that triggered an investigation into Plaintiff and her continuedemployment (Doc. 43, pp. 2-3).¹ Plaintiff had been employed by the SOS since 2000 and, at this time, she was employed as a Public Service Supervisor for the Department of Driver Services (Doc. 43). On March 21, 2017, Defendant Randy Blue, employed by the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), and a non-party investigator, Megan Morgan, interviewed Plaintiff and Plaintiff provided a written statement to them that same day (Id. at pp. 2-3). On March 30, 2017, Plaintiff provided an additional written statement to the investigators (Id. at p. 3). On April 19, 2017, the SOS Inspector General forwarded a summary of his office's investigation into Plaintiff's conduct to Stephen Roth, the SOS Director for the Department of Personnel (Id.).

Over a year later, on May 11, 2018, Plaintiff received written notice that the SOS was suspending her, pending discharge. This letter contained a statement of charges (Id.). In response, Plaintiff submitted a rebuttal letter to the SOS on May 16, 2018 (Id.). On May 25, 2018, Plaintiff and her union representative participated in a "pre-discharge" hearing via telephone (Id.). On June 1, 2018, Plaintiff received written notice that the SOS was terminating her from her position, effective the same day, and notifying her that she could appeal to the Merit Commission (Id.).

Plaintiff was represented by an attorney during the Merit Commission hearing (Id. at p. 4). At some point before the hearing, Plaintiff and her attorney requested copies of the documents being used by the SOS at the hearing (Id. at p. 4; Doc. 45, p. 3). Plaintiffreceived the documents "minutes before" the hearing began and upon a brief review, Plaintiff and counsel discovered several emails between Defendants Randy Blue, Michael Mayer (Director of Driver Services with the SOS), and other administration staff about Plaintiff (Id. at p. 4).

Plaintiff discovered that these emails included "biased and unprofessional behavior" that indicated coordinated efforts between the investigative and authoritative parties to terminate her (Id. at p. 4).² For example, around November 15, 2017, Defendant Jay Morgan, regional manager, emailed an employee in driver services asking if there was "any word" on Plaintiff because he thought "she was leaving" (Id. at p. 6).³ On July 25, 2018, Megan Morgan (non-party who helped investigate Plaintiff) exchanged emails with Ellen Sfikas (assistant general counsel for the SOS) about Plaintiff, in which Ms. Sfikas stated, "She's a loony bird," in reference to Plaintiff (Id.).

On November 14, 2018, the SOS Merit Commission adopted the Hearing Officer's Proposal for Decision and terminated Plaintiff from her position with the SOS (Doc. 54, p. 5). Plaintiff argues she was never given a true opportunity to be heard during the investigation, pre-discharge telephone conference, or post-discharge Merit Commission Hearing (Doc. 43, p. 7).

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) addresses the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim for relief, not the merits of the case or whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and draw all possible inferences in the plaintiff's favor. E.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The complaint will survive the motion to dismiss only if it alleges facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff does not need "detailed factual allegations," but must plead more than "labels and conclusions" and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Determining whether a complaint plausibly states a claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The structure outlined here for the complaint will ensure that the defendant receives "fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 1959.

Discussion

In their second motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support her due process claim, as she has not alleged inadequate pre- and post-deprivation procedures (Doc. 45, p. 4). Defendants argue that since Plaintiff has not properly alleged her first due process claim, her other claims fail, as she has not properly alleged proof of a constitutional violation, which is required for her failure to intervene (Count II) and conspiracy (Count III) claims (Id. at p. 9). Finally, since Plaintiff has failed to properly plead that she has suffered a constitutional violation, Defendants argue the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims (Counts IV-V) (Id. at p. 10). Defendants are correct that Plaintiff's success at this stage hinges on her due process claim, so the Court will begin its analysis there.

I. Plaintiff's due process claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983

Defendants argue in their second motion to dismiss, as they did in their first, that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged pre- or post-deprivation procedures and, therefore, cannot maintain her due process claim under §1983 (Doc. 19, pp. 6-8; Doc. 45, pp. 4-9). Plaintiff disagrees, asserting that she has sufficiently stated a due process violation under 42 U.S.C. §1983, as she has described biased pre- and post-deprivation procedures that amounted to "sham" opportunities, depriving Plaintiff of her due process rights throughout the employment termination process (Doc. 47)

Public employees have a property interest in continued employment and it is well-established that they may not be deprived of that interest without notice and anopportunity to be heard. See Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985); Carmody v. Bd. Of Trs. Of Univ. of Ill., 747 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2014). In general, "the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). Prior to termination, or "pre-deprivation," the public employee must be provided with notice of the proposed deprivation, a statement of reasons, and an opportunity to be heard in response. Bradley v. Vill. Of Univ. Park, 929 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 ; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). State and local governments can add additional procedural protections, outlined by local ordinances or state statutes, but non-compliance with these additional protections does not automatically equate to a federal due process violation. Bradley, 929 F.3d at 883; Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231, 236 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that "it is not the task of this [federal] court to enforce in every procedural detail the elaborate...