Leng v. Southern Connecticut State University

Dai-Yeng Leng v. Southern Connecticut State University

No. CV156053581S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

January 18, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#103)

Robin L. Wilson, J.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 31, 2015, the plaintiff, Dai-Yeng Leng, filed a five-count complaint against the defendant, Southern Connecticut State University, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief, based on his expulsion from the defendant university. The plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully expelled by the defendant on or about October 31, 2012, for allegedly threatening his roommate with physical harm, which the plaintiff denies, and alleges the following facts. The university police investigated the matter and found no evidence that the plaintiff had engaged in threatening behavior. Prior to being admitted to the defendant university, the plaintiff was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, a mental condition that impacts cognition and emotion, and the defendant was aware of this condition when it admitted the plaintiff. At a meeting held on October 17, 2012, the plaintiff informed the Director of Judicial Affairs of his condition and that he was suffering from a lack of mental clarity and memory problems. The plaintiff was not informed during the meeting that there was going to be an expulsion hearing based on this alleged incident or that he would be receiving an important email on his university e-mail account. An expulsion hearing was scheduled for two weeks following this meeting and notice was sent to the plaintiff's university e-mail account which he rarely used. The plaintiff was unaware that notice of the hearing had been sent and did not appear at the hearing, but was subsequently expelled by the defendant.

The plaintiff appealed his expulsion and submitted a letter dated January 25, 2013, from Branford Harbor Health that confirmed his condition and stated that as of November 13, 2012, he presented in control of his emotions and did not pose a danger to himself or others. On March 18, 2013, the plaintiff and his parents met with the Director of Judicial Affairs to ask that the defendant reconsider his case and readmit him. On or about November 26, 2013, the parties negotiated a settlement in which a statement would be prepared that was mutually agreed upon, to be issued in the event another institution were to inquire about the plaintiff. The plaintiff accepted all the material terms of the settlement via a letter dated and sent December 11, 2013, which included a proposed statement. The defendant rejected the proposed statement by a letter dated December 13, 2013, and since that date, the defendant has refused to honor the settlement agreement in its entirety.

The plaintiff asserts claims for violations of: his procedural due process rights under the fourteenth amendment (count one) and article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution^[1] (count two); Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (count three); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (count four); and for breach of an alleged settlement agreement (count five). On July 24, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss with a supporting memorandum of law, and the affidavit of Christopher Piscitelli, the Assistant Dean of Students and Director of Student Conduct.^[2] On November 16, 2015, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss with a supporting memorandum of law. The defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's objection on December 14, 2015 and the, motion was heard at short calendar on October 31 2016.^[3]

DISCUSSION

" [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dimiss] are: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . (4) insufficiency of process; and (5) insufficiency of service of process." Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985) citing Practice Book § 143, which is now § 10-30.

" [T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic R.R. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs. 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). " Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4-165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). Accordingly, " a motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise a claim that sovereign immunity [or statutory immunity] bars the action." Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006).

" Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 10-31(a)(1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case . . . [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

" [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute . . . It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2015).

The defendant has moved to dismiss counts one, two, and five on the ground that they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The defendant additionally moves to dismiss the claims for money damages under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act on the ground that punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits and the plaintiff has not alleged an intentional violation, which is required for compensatory damages. Each argument will be addressed in turn.

I

The defendant argues that the plaintiff's claims for violations of his procedural due process rights are barred by sovereign immunity because no exception to sovereign immunity applies. The defendant additionally argues that the plaintiff's claim in count five for breach of the settlement agreement fails to allege that any constitutional interest was implicated and, therefore, is also barred by sovereign immunity. " The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law . . . Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Servs. v DOT, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

" The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects state officials and employees from lawsuits resulting from the performance of their duty." Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 620, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002). " [T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not [however] absolute. There are [three] exceptions: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 349. " In the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so." Id., 351; see also Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 317, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).

In the present case, the complaint is silent as to whether the action was ever brought before the claims commissioner, and the plaintiff concedes in his objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss that there is no applicable statutory waiver of immunity. The court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction for the plaintiff's claims for money damages against the defendant. The plaintiff further concedes in his objection that the third exception to sovereign immunity, wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose, is not applicable. Accordingly, the court will...