Lenk v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc.

KENNETH L. LENK, Plaintiff, v. MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02625-BLF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION

January 19, 2018

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC.'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

[Re: ECF 86, 121]

Before the Court is Defendant Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.'s ("MPS") motion for attorneys' fees and costs. See ECF 86 ("Mot."). Plaintiff Kenneth Lenk ("Lenk"), proceeding pro se, opposes the motion. See ECF 95 ("Opp'n"). Lenk has also filed a "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, challenging a supposed judgment entered on November 27, 2017. See ECF 121. However, no judgment was entered on that date in this case. Rather, Lenk appears to be challenging the Court's November 27, 2017 Order granting MPS's administrative motion for leave to file a supplemental declaration in support of its motion for attorneys' fees and costs. See ECF 117.

Although Lenk did not respond to MPS's administrative motion within the time provided for by Civil Local Rule 7-11(b), the Court construes Lenk's "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment" to be a request to file a supplemental opposition to MPS's motion for attorneys' fees. Therefore, the Court will consider Lenk's declaration along with MPS's supplemental declaration in its determination of whether to award attorneys' fees and costs. See Declaration of Kenneth Lenk ("Lenk Decl."), ECF 121-1.¹

For the reasons that follow, MPS's motion for attorneys' fees and costs is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are well-known to the Parties and to the Court, and are discussed at length in this Court's Order Adopting Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF 76, as well as its Order Denying Lenk's Motions for Relief from Judgment, ECF 112. The Court briefly summarizes the proceedings in this action.

Lenk originally filed a lawsuit on March 11, 2015 against his former employer, MPS, for employment discrimination and wrongful termination. See Case No. 15-cv-01148-NC ("Lenk I"). That case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Nathanael M. Cousins, who granted MPS's motion to dismiss Lenk's Third Amended Complaint without leave to amend for failure to statute a claim. See Lenk I at ECF 87. In dismissing the action with prejudice, Judge Cousins found that "Lenk has filed three complaints, several oppositions to motions to dismiss, and attached voluminous additional documentation with his complaints and motions." Id. at 5. Therefore, amendment of Lenk's claims would be futile because Lenk had no further facts that could remedy the deficiencies outlined by the court, and Lenk had been provided with several opportunities to amend his complaint. Id. Judgment was entered in favor of MPS and against Lenk in that action on March 31, 2016. See Lenk I at ECF 88.

On May 16, 2016, Lenk filed the instant action against MPS as well as Lenk's former supervisor at MPS, Maurice Sciammas, for discrimination and wrongful termination. See Case No. 16-cv-02625-BLF ("Lenk II"), ECF 1. It appears that the filing of the second action may have been triggered by Lenk's receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on March 2, 2016, upon the dismissal of Lenk's EEOC charge for lack of evidence. See ECF 1-1 at 13. The Lenk II Complaint alleges that Lenk was subject to a hostilework environment at MPS due to racial discrimination, which led to his resignation. The Lenk II Complaint contained two counts for discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

MPS and Sciammas moved to dismiss the Complaint in Lenk II, ECF 47, and this Court referred the matter to Judge Cousins for a Report and Recommendation, ECF 67. Judge Cousins issued a Report and Recommendation that this Court grant defendants' motion to dismiss, because the issues were fully and fairly litigated in Lenk I, and Lenk's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See R&R, ECF 71. Judge Cousins found that despite the addition of Sciammas as a defendant and the repackaging of the suit as a discrimination case, the claims in Lenk II arose from the same nucleus of fact as those previously dismissed with prejudice in Lenk I, and thus there existed (1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between parties as required for res judicata to apply. Id. at 4-6. Moreover, Judge Cousins held that the delayed EEOC right-to-sue letter did not impact the determination. Id. at 5-6.

Although the Court considered Lenk's timely objections to the R&R, the Court adopted Judge Cousins' recommendation to grant defendants' motion to dismiss the Lenk II Complaint because Lenk's claims were barred by res judicata. See ECF 76. In reviewing the R&R de novo, the Court overruled Lenk's objections on multiple grounds, and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend. Id. The Court emphasized Ninth Circuit authority holding that "Title VII claims are not exempt from the doctrine of res judicata where plaintiffs have neither sought a stay from the district court for the purpose of pursuing Title VII administrative remedies nor attempted to amend their complaint to include their Title VII claims." Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Lenk did not seek a stay in Lenk I for the purposes of pursuing his claim with the EEOC—indeed he did not even mention the EEOC letter although Lenk I remained pending at the time he obtained the letter—this Court rejected Lenk's argument that his Title VII claims could not have been litigated in Lenk I. See ECF 76 at 2-3.

After dismissing MPS's counterclaims against Lenk without prejudice to re-filing in state court, ECF 82, this Court entered judgment in favor of MPS and Sciammas, and against Lenk onJuly 14, 2017. See Lenk II, ECF 84. Shortly thereafter, MPS moved for attorneys' fees and costs against Lenk, arguing that MPS is entitled to $66,913.07 in fees incurred in defending the allegations in Lenk II. See generally Mot. After the attorneys' fees motion was filed, Lenk appealed the judgment to the Ninth Circuit, ECF 92, but he also filed three consecutive motions for relief from judgment in this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. See ECF 89, 99, 113. MPS opposed all three motions, and the Court ultimately denied two of Lenk's motions pursuant to Rules 60(a) and (b). See ECF 112. Lenk voluntarily withdrew his third Rule 60 motion. See ECF 119.

On December 4, 2017, with leave of Court, MPS filed a supplemental declaration in support of its attorneys' fees motion, requesting an additional $30,812.50 in fees and costs for opposing Lenk's Rule 60 motions. See Supp. Decl. of Hope Anne Case iso Mot. for Atty Fees ("Supp. Case Decl."), ¶ 23, ECF 118. As discussed above, Lenk then filed a motion to alter or amend judgment challenging MPS's supplemental declaration, which, although improper under Rule 59, shall be considered as a supplemental opposition to MPS's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. See ECF 121, 121-1.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

According to the "American Rule," in the absence of legislation that provides otherwise, litigants must pay their own attorneys' fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2), a party may make a claim for attorneys' fees and related nontaxable expenses when authorized by statute. Here, MPS moves for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Title VII and Section 1981, as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See Mot. at 5.

Title VII provides for the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in the district court's discretion. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k). The standard for awarding attorneys' fees and costs under Section 1988(b) is identical to the Title VII standard. See Mitchell v. Office of Los Angeles Cty. Superintendent of Sch., 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that Title VII provides for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party and that "[p]arallel provisions are included in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for cases brought under...section[] 1981."); see also Moosa v. Dolan Foster Enterprises,Inc., No. 95-03099 MHP, 1998 WL 30060, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 1998) ("The standard for awarding attorneys' fees under section 1988(b) is identical to that under federal employment discrimination law, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(k)").

In a Title VII case, a district court has the discretion to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); see also Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir.1995); EEOC v. Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir.1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). In Christiansburg, the seminal case establishing the standard for awarding attorneys' fees and costs to prevailing defendants in Title VII cases, the Supreme Court explained that because Congress intended to promote vigorous enforcement of Title VII, a district court must exercise caution in awarding fees to a prevailing defendant in order to avoid discouraging legitimate suits that may not be "airtight." 434 U.S. at 422; see also Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d at 287. Because "the course of litigation is rarely predictable," district courts must "resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22; see also Knadler v. Furth, No. C04-01220 CRB, 2005 WL 2789223, at *1 (N.D. Cal....