Leon v. Phillips

Devon Swan Leon 2017-0218036, Plaintiff, v. Officer Phillips, Defendant.

No. 19 cv 4352

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 20, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

John Robert Blakey United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Devon Swan Leon, a detainee in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC), sued Defendant Officer Phillips under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly failing to protect him from an assault by a fellow detainee. [1]. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. [26]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants Defendant's motion.

I. Background

This Court takes the following facts from Defendant's statement of facts [28], to which Plaintiff responded, [31]. Plaintiff, however, only responded to paragraphs 14, 21-23 27, and 28 of Defendant's statement of facts see [31] at 2, so this Court deems the remainder of Defendant's facts admitted, see [28] at ¶¶ 1-13, 15-20, 24- 26, 29; Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2012).

A. The Altercation

Plaintiff has been detained in CCDOC custody since February 18, 2017. [28] at ¶¶ 1, 7. Defendant has at all times relevant served as a correctional officer at CCDOC for the Cook County Sheriff's Office. Id. at ¶ 2.

On April 2, 2019, Plaintiff was awaiting a court appearance in a CCDOC bullpen when he got into a physical altercation with a fellow detainee, Shawn Stubblefield. Id. at ¶ 9. According to the incident report from this altercation, the video footage documenting the altercation showed that Stubblefield walked toward Plaintiff and began hitting and kicking him repeatedly. [28-2] at 2. The incident report also lists Defendant Officer Phillips as a witness, and states that when Defendant went to pull Plaintiff from the bullpen for court, he noticed that Plaintiff “had bruises and a bone sticking out.” [28-2]. Officers took Plaintiff for medical treatment following this altercation. [28] ¶ 10.

Two days later, on April 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the altercation. Id. at ¶ 11; [28-3] at 17. On the grievance form, Plaintiff stated:

When I was going to court on 4-2-18, I was assaulted by another Inmate. All which happen in the receiving bullpin waiting to go to the bridge. (view the camera) I was in so much pain, all I wanted to do was see a doctor. But I would like to press charges, on the man who assaulted me on my way to court. I'm asking that someone please help me. Thank you.

[28-3] at 17. In a box labeled “name and/or identifier(s) of accused, ” Plaintiff wrote “Officer Phills [sic] knows the Inmate Name and the camera show [sic] Inmate who Assaulted me.” Id. In another box labeled “name of staff or inmate(s) having information regarding this complaint, ” Plaintiff wrote “Officer Phills [sic] was there.” Id.

On April 10, 2019, Plaintiff received a response to his grievance on an Inmate Grievance Response/Appeal Form. [28] at ¶ 12; [28-3] at 18. The response stated that investigators had been notified and a disciplinary report had been forwarded. [28-3] at 18. Plaintiff did not appeal the grievance. [28] at ¶ 13.

B. Grievance Process

CCDOC implements a formal grievance process, which requires inmates to file a grievance within fifteen days of the conduct or incident giving rise to the grievance and then appeal the grievance within 15 days of receiving a response. [28] at ¶ 16; [28-4] at 3. Instructions stating this information appear on the grievance and response forms themselves, as well as in the CCDOC's Inmate Information Handbook. [28] at ¶ 18. Plaintiff received the handbook in 2017 upon entry into CCDOC, id. ¶ 24, and he admits that he had the opportunity to read the handbook but did not do so, [28-6] at 17.

Plaintiff testified that he was diagnosed during third grade with a learning disability that makes reading and writing difficult for him; he received Social Security assistance as a result of this disability. Id. at 9. Plaintiff said the disability also makes it hard for him to focus such that he tends to lose interest when reading books after a couple of pages. Id. at 14. Plaintiff does, however, read books about entrepreneurship. Id. at 9. Plaintiff has never taken medication for the alleged learning disability. Id. at 14. Nor has he ever requested anything along the lines of special education from CCDOC concerning the disability. Id. at 26. He testified that he has mentioned the disability to a CCDOC counselor, Ms. Mitchell, but did not discuss the details of the disability. Id. at 14-15.

Before the April 2019 altercation, Plaintiff filed other grievances and availed himself of the appeal process. For example, on October 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed a grievance about his mattress. [28-3] at 4. Plaintiff filed an additional unrelated grievance dated October 20, 2018. [28-6] at 13. On October 30, 2018, he received a response to his October 14 mattress grievance, after which he then filed a timely and proper appeal as necessary to exhaust his administrative remedies. [28-3] at 5. Plaintiff filed another grievance regarding a different matter on November 18, 2018, to which he received a response on December 6, 2018. Id. at 11-12.

Even though Plaintiff had previously filed and appealed grievances properly, he claimed that he did not appeal the grievance about his altercation with Stubblefield because he was unfamiliar with the appeals process. [28-6] at 13. Nevertheless, Plaintiff also testified that, after submitting the Stubblefield grievance, a fellow inmate called “Old School” informed him that he had to appeal the grievance. [28-6] at 14. When asked at his deposition whether he attempted to appeal the grievance after being told by “Old School” that he had to, Plaintiff responded that he did not feel it was necessary. Id.

Between May 2019 and September 2020, Plaintiff wrote and properly appealed seven grievances related to other issues. [28] at ¶ 26.

C. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in June 2019. [1]. His complaint alleges that Defendant failed to protect him by acting with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm while Plaintiff was incarcerated under conditions posing such a risk, a violation of his right to be protected from violence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.; see also [31] at 3-4. Plaintiff's original complaint also sued CCDOC for failure to protect and Sheriff Thomas J. Dart as the “head” supervisor, [1], but this Court dismissed these defendants when screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because CCDOC is not a suable entity and because § 1983 does not allow respondeat superior liability, [9] at 2-3.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine disputes of material facts. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court construes all “facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 840 (7^th Cir. 2016) (citing Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 2015); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2006)).

Where the non-moving party seeks to assert a genuine dispute of fact, the party “must support its assertion with particular materials in the record.” Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2014). A party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact by merely contradicting his previous sworn testimony. Cleveland v. Pol'y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07 (1999) (collecting cases). The non-moving party must show a genuine issue for trial rather than simply introduce “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87; see also Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 2018).

III. Analysis

Defendant has moved for summary judgment based upon Plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in this Court. [26]; [27]. Plaintiff opposes the motion. [31]. This Court first provides an overview of administrative exhaustion before moving to the merits of the parties' arguments.

A. PLRA Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)-(h) prohibits a prisoner from initiating any action related to prison conditions under § 1983 “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).^[1] Failure to exhaust administrative remedies constitutes an affirmative defense for which Defendant bears the burden of proof. Id.

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a prisoner “must take each of the steps prescribed” by the relevant correctional facility's rules governing grievances. Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 983 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2020); Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016 1025 (7th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court has emphasized that prisoners must “take advantage of all procedures that are actually available.” Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 957 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2020) (first citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); then citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001)). A prisoner's subjective...