Leon v. United Indus. Corp.

1

CARMELO LEON JR., ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants.

No. 21-cv-5174 (JGK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

August 2, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge

The plaintiffs -- Carmelo Leon and Wanda Leon -- brought this action against the defendants -- United Industries Corporation (“UIC”), Spectrum Brands, Inc. (“SBI”), Cutter, and Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Home Depot”) -- in New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County. Compl. at 8, ECF No. 1-1. Mr. Leon asserted claims for strict products liability and negligence for design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn as well as claims for breach of various express and implied warranties. Id. at 12-15. Mrs. Leon asserted a claim for loss of consortium. Id. at 15. The plaintiffs' claims arise from burn injuries Mr. Leon sustained during an incident involving a mosquito-repelling candle manufactured and sold by the defendants.

On June 10, 2021, Defendants UIC and SBI removed the action to this Court. See Notice of Removal at 1, ECF No. 1. On October 6, 2023, the defendants moved to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony and for summary judgment. ECF No. 42. For the following reasons, the defendants' motions are granted.

I.

The following facts are based on the parties' Rule 56.1 statements, counterstatements, and supporting papers, and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

On or about May 2020, the plaintiffs' daughter, Alexandra Leon purchased a mosquito-repelling candle called the “Cutter CitroGuard Candle” (the “Cutter Candle”) at a Home Depot location in the Bronx. Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 1, 5, ECF No. 43-1. The plaintiffs argue that SBI designed and manufactured the Cutter Candle. Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 4, ECF No. 49-2. SBI denies it designed or manufactured the Cutter Candle. Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 4. Alexandra Leon then stored the Cutter Candle uncovered in an outdoor shed, where it remained until August 1, 2020. Id. ¶ 6.

On August 1, 2020, the plaintiffs attended an outdoor gathering at Alexandra Leon's home. Id. ¶ 7. The Cutter Candle was burning on the ground next to Mr. Leon, who was sitting at an outdoor table. Id. ¶ 8. The match used to light the Cutter Candle was in the container near the flames. Id. ¶ 9. The Cutter Candle suddenly started to “sizzle” and caught fire. Id. ¶ 10. Another guest at the gathering, Howell Woods, tried to move the Cutter Candle by pushing it with his foot. Id. ¶ 11. As a result, the Cutter Candle tipped over and spilled hot wax onto Mr. Leon, causing burn injuries to both of Mr. Leon's legs. Id. ¶ 12.

At the time Mr. Leon was injured, the Cutter Candle's label, including its warnings, was approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) and complied with FIFRA's labeling requirements. Id. ¶¶ 3, 14-17. The label provides, among other things: “Keep candle free of matches or other foreign matter, which may present a fire hazard” and “Do not move candle while burning or before wax hardens.” Id. ¶ 18.

II.

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”^[1]Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the materials in the record that “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts that are material and, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

III.

A.

The defendants initially move to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, Courtland Imel. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs' Mot. to Exclude Courtland Imel's Test. and for Summ. J. (“Mot. for Summ. J.”) at 13-14, ECF No. 44.

A trial judge's duty under the Federal Rules of Evidence is to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). In determining whether to allow expert testimony, the Court considers (1) the qualifications of the proposed expert, (2) whether each proposed opinion is based upon reliable data and reliable methodology, and (3) whether the proposed testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact. See Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Fed.R.Evid. 702. In this case, the defendants challenge Imel's testimony on the second factor:

whether the proposed expert opinion is based upon reliable data and methodology.

Reliability requires a “sufficiently rigorous analytical connection” between the methodology used and “the expert's conclusions.” Nimely, 414 F.3d at 396. Even if an expert is qualified based on specialized experience, the expert must still base the expert's opinion on “sufficient facts or data, and must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts[.]” Emig v. Electrolux Home Prods. Inc., No. 06-cv-4791, 2008 WL 4200988, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2008). While testing is not an absolute prerequisite for admitting an expert opinion, it is usually critical to show that an expert “adhered to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their professional work.” Jinn v. Sig Sauer, No. 20-cv-1122, 2023 WL 5972507, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2023).

Imel's expert report contains four general “possible causes for candle fires.” Imel Expert Report at 3, ECF No. 43-13. However, the report does not contain an opinion as to the cause of the candle fire in this case. In fact, “Imel testified . . . that he can test his hypothesis in his lab but had not yet.” Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 51. In Imel's deposition, he confirmed that he “ha[d] not done any work in this case to rule in or rule out any of those . . . possible explanations[.]” Imel Dep. at 4, ECF No. 43-9. Therefore, Imel's opinions are not based on reliable data and methodology.

The plaintiffs argue that Imel “can still test his theories before the time of trial and render an opinion.” Pls.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.' Opp'n”) at 7, ECF No. 49. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) provides that an expert “disclosure must be accompanied by a written report . . . [that] must contain: a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; [and] the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Moreover, for a court to determine whether an expert opinion is admissible, that “opinion requires some explanation as to how the expert came to his conclusion and what methodologies or evidence substantiate that conclusion.” Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 127 (2d Cir. 2006), aff'd, 552 U.S. 312 (2008). Therefore, it is at this stage of the litigation that the Court requires information about the tests and data underlying Imel's testimony. The time for discovery in this case has passed, and Imel cannot now go back and conduct the testing to support his hypotheses.

Accordingly, the defendants' motion to exclude Imel's expert testimony is granted.

B.

i.

The defendants also move for summary judgment on the plaintiff's^[2]strict products liability claim for design defect. See Mot. for Summ. J. at 18-19.

Under New York law, “to establish a prima facie case in strict products liability for design defects, the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer breached its duty to market safe products when it marketed a product designed so that it was not reasonably safe and that the defective design was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury.” Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983).

The design of a product is “not reasonably safe” if “a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of the product did not outweigh the risk inherent in marketing a product designed in that manner.” Id. “This standard demands an inquiry into such factors as (1) the product's utility to the public as a whole, (2) its utility to the individual user, (3) the likelihood that the product will cause injury, (4) the availability of a safer design, (5) the possibility of designing and manufacturing the product so that it is safer but remains functional and reasonably priced, (6) the degree of awareness of the product's potential danger that can reasonably be attributed to the injured user, and (7) the manufacturer's ability to spread the cost of any safety-related design changes.” Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (N.Y. 1995) (quoting Voss, 450 N.E.2d at 208-09).

“The plaintiff . . . is under an obligation to present evidence that the product, as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner.” Voss, 450 N.E.2d at 208.

The defendants argue that the plaintiff's design defect claim fails because the plaintiff fails to satisfy his burden to present expert...