Leongini v. Nat'l Ass'n of Water Cos.

MARYBETH LEONGINI, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WATER COMPANIES, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-02502 (CJN)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 25, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CARL J. NICHOLS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Marybeth Leongini brought this suit in D.C. Superior Court, alleging that her former employer and its Chief Executive Officer discriminated against her based on her marital status and then retaliated against her after she complained. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendants removed the case to federal court and shortly thereafter moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Leongini began working for the National Association of Water Companies, a non-profit corporation representing regulated water and wastewater companies throughout the United States, in 2012. Compl.¶ 17.^[1] Initially, she served as the Association's Director of Communications at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. Id. Six years later, the Association's Board of Directors asked Leongini to serve as interim Executive Director. Id. ¶ 19. Leongini alleges that while serving as interim Executive Director, the Association asked her to take on the duties of the Executive Director while also continuing to perform the tasks she performed as Director of Communications. Id. According to the Complaint, Leongini excelled in her new role, so much so that the then-Chairman of the Association's Board told Leongini that she would receive a raise and a new title (Vice President), and that when the Association's headquarters moved to Philadelphia, she could continue to work out of the Washington, D.C. office. Id. ¶ 22. But, Leongini alleges, the Association reneged on those promises.

The trouble for Leongini started in August 2018 when the Association hired Robert Powelson as its Chief Executive Officer. Compl ¶ 22. Powelson, according to the Complaint, “[a]lmost immediately” subjected Leongini “to hostile and disparate treatment”-treating her less favorably than her married colleagues. Id. ¶ 24. For instance, Powelson increased Leongini's workload while lightening the load for her married peers, Compl. ¶ 35; blamed Leongini for shortcomings while her married coworkers avoided criticism, Compl. ¶ 38; and denied Leongini permission to leave work early, while granting her married colleagues' requests for extended leave or to work from home, Compl. ¶ 49.

Leongini voiced concerns about this treatment. Less than a year after the Association hired Powelson, Leongini complained to him and pointed out that “she was the only one on the team that he regularly screamed at, and that she never heard him raise his voice to Christina Costello or April Ballou”-two of Leongini's married colleagues. Compl. ¶ 53. Two weeks after this conversation, Powelson “inexplicably zeroed out” Leongini's accrued paid time off. Id. ¶ 56. When Leongini inquired, Powelson informed her that there had been a change in the Association's paid time off policy. Id.

Two months later, Powelson criticized Leongini for not turning in expense reports in a timely manner. Compl. ¶¶ 75-80. Leongini alleges that Powelson contrasted this performance with that of her married colleagues, saying that Leongini's married colleagues had no trouble getting their own reports in, despite having responsibilities to spouses and children at home. Id.

Shortly thereafter, Powelson told Leongini that she would no longer be able to work from the Washington, D.C. office and would instead need to relocate to the new headquarters in Philadelphia. Compl. ¶ 82. Every other staff member in the Washington office-all of whom were married-was permitted to continue working from the Washington office. Id.

In January 2020, the Association terminated Leongini. Compl. ¶ 84. Although the rationale for the termination was not fully explained to her, Powelson did say that her failing timely to complete her expense reports was the “last straw.” Compl. ¶ 85. Leongini alleges that, at the time of her termination, she was entitled to 26 weeks of severance pay, Compl. ¶ 90; 18 earned vacation days, Compl. ¶ 91; 200 hours of paid time off, Compl. ¶ 91; and her 2019 year-end bonus, Compl. ¶ 92.

Eight months after her termination, Leongini filed this suit against the Association and Powelson in the D.C. Superior Court, alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation (and aiding and abetting of discrimination and retaliation) under the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”); and claims for unpaid wages under the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law (“DCWPCL”). See generally Compl. Defendants removed to this Court and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See generally Defs.' Mot.

II. Standard of Review

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). Although the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of [its] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The claim to relief must be “plausible on its face, ” and a plaintiff's pleadings must “nudge[ the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 570.

III. Analysis

A. Discrimination Claims

Defendants begin by challenging Leongini's discrimination claims. For a discrimination claim (and an aiding and abetting discrimination claim) under the DCHRA to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege well-pleaded facts from which a reasonable finder of fact could infer that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. Stella v. Mineta, 283 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Parties agree that the Complaint properly alleges that Leongini is a member of a protected class under the DCHRA. Yet they disagree about whether the second and third elements have been properly alleged. Defs.' Mot. at 11-15.

Defendants first argue that the Complaint does not properly allege that Leongini suffered an adverse employment action. Defs.' Mot. at 11. To make out this second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Walden v. Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Inst., 304 F.Supp. 123, 133 (D.D.C. 2018). While an adverse employment action covers actions that may not result in “readily quantifiable losses, ” it is not so broad as to encompass every action that makes an employee “unhappy.” Russell v. Principi, 25 F.3d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The key question is whether the employee experienced a “tangible change in the duties or working conditions constituting a material employment disadvantage.” Walden, 304 F.Supp. at 133-34.

To be sure, as Defendants note, Leongini's Complaint contains numerous examples of alleged actions which alone did not result in a tangible change of Leongini's duties or working conditions. For example, the Complaint alleges that Powelson screamed at Leongini, Compl. ¶ 71; accused her of soliciting compliments from member companies, Compl. ¶ 40, 45; told her that her colleagues did not like her, Compl. ¶ 52; and failed to respond to her emails, Compl. ¶ 70. These actions, even when taken in conjunction, do not represent an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Walden, 304 F.Supp.3d at 134 (holding that a laundry list of perceived slights including several negative performance reviews and assessments, denied paid-time-off requests, and an increased workload did not constitute an adverse unemployment actions); Peters v. District of Columbia, 873 F.Supp.2d 158, 190 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding allegations that supervisor treated plaintiff “like a whipping boy” by “scream[ing] at, talk[ing] down to, and point[ing] her finger” at plaintiff did not rise to the level of adverse action); Russ v. Van Scoyoc Assoc., Inc., 122 F.Supp.2d 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2000) (“[I]t is clear that being yelled at by your supervisor does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.”).

But the Complaint contains more than just these “scattershot” allegations. Walden, 304 F.Supp.3d at 133. For instance, the Complaint alleges that Powelson fired Leongini and “zeroed out” the paid time off she had accrued. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 84. Defendants fail to truly grapple with this contention, and instead concede in a footnote that the termination of employment and elimination of Leongini's accrued paid time off “may amount to an adverse employment action.” Def.'s Mot. at 11 n.4. There's no serious question that such steps constitute adverse employment actions. See Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (listing paradigmatic examples of adverse employment actions as “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in...