Leppert v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

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MORGAN AMANDA LEPPERT, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

No. 3:21-cv-292-MMH-LLL

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

March 27, 2024

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Status

Petitioner Morgan Amanda Leppert, an inmate of the Florida penal system is proceeding through counsel on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1) with a supporting memorandum (Pet. Memo.; Doc. 3). Leppert initiated this action in the Ocala Division, but because she challenges a Putnam County, Florida judgment of conviction the assigned judge transferred the case to this Court. See Order (Doc. 10). Respondents submitted a response to the Petition (Response; Doc. 12) with exhibits (Exs.; Docs. 13-1, 18-1, 18-2).^[1] Leppert filed a reply (Reply; Doc. 14). This action is ripe for review.

II. Relevant Procedural History

On May 22, 2008, a Florida grand jury returned an indictment against Leppert, who was then only 15 years old, charging three felony offenses: first-degree murder; burglary with assault or battery; and robbery with a deadly weapon. Ex. A at 1-2. Specifically, the State of Florida charged Leppert with the murder of James Thomas Stewart, who Leppert allegedly “beat[], stabb[ed] . . . with a knife, and suffocat[ed]” on April 25, 2008, while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a burglary or robbery. Id. at 1.

On August 7, 2009, Leppert proceeded to a jury trial in Putnam County Case No. 08-1171-CF-53. Ex. K. According to trial testimony, which included two recorded statements by Leppert, she wanted to run away with her 22-year-old boyfriend, Toby Lowry, but they did not have a vehicle or money, so they planned to steal both from a random person. Id. at 737. With that intention, they snuck into Stewart's home, and ultimately Lowry, with Leppert's assistance, beat, stabbed, and suffocated Stewart. Id. at 720-22. Leppert and Lowry were taken into custody on May 3, 2008, in Texas, where they had driven in Stewart's truck after the murder. Id. at 530-31, 731. Initially, Leppert was held in a juvenile detention center as a victim/witness because Leppert's mother had reported to authorities that she had been missing since April 22, 2018, and an Amber Alert eventually had been issued. Id. at 537-38, 542, 560, 568, 647. The scope of the investigation changed after investigators interviewed Lowry, who implicated Leppert in the crimes, including Stewart's murder. Id. at 718-19.^[2]

The jury found Leppert guilty on all charges. Id. at 985; Ex. M. The trial court sentenced her in open court on September 29, 2009, to life without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder and to concurrent life sentences for burglary and robbery, Ex. O at 14, and entered a written judgment that same day, Ex. P. Leppert appealed, and during the pendency of her appeal, filed a counseled motion to correct a sentencing error under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Ex. Q. In doing so, she argued that the sentences for the nonhomicide convictions violated Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).^[3] See generally id. The trial court granted the motion and resentenced Leppert to concurrent 50-year terms on the nonhomicide convictions, Ex. S at 12, and entered an amended judgment on July 30, 2010, nunc pro tunc to the date of the original judgment, Ex. T. The court left the sentence on the homicide conviction unchanged. See id.

On direct appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed Leppert's convictions and sentences without a written opinion. Ex. X (case number 5D09-3462). After denying Leppert's motion for rehearing, the Fifth DCA issued the mandate. Ex. Z; Ex. AA. Thereafter, Leppert filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth DCA alleging the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Ex. BB, which the Fifth DCA denied, Ex. CC (case number 5D13-3628).

Proceeding through counsel, Leppert next filed a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 3.850, Ex. FF,^[4] and a motion to correct illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a), Ex. VV (Amended Rule 3.800(a) Motion). As grounds for resentencing, Leppert cited Supreme Court precedent and Florida's recently enacted juvenile sentencing legislation. Id. at 2 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012);^[5] Fla. Stat. §§ 775.082, 921.1401, 921.1402). See also Ex. DDD at 3-4 (brief on appeal in case number 5D16-2238, detailing the procedural history of Leppert's sentencing).

Also in accordance with Florida's new juvenile sentencing legislation, specifically section 775.082(1)(b), Leppert filed a motion seeking a jury determination of whether she “killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.” Ex. TT at 1.^[6] Leppert's counsel explained in the motion that an affirmative factual finding on this issue would result in a minimum mandatory sentence of 40 years with a review after 25 years per subdivision (b)1., while a negative finding would dictate no minimum mandatory sentence with a review after 15 years per subdivision (b)2. See generally id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 90 (2013)).

The trial court denied Leppert's request for a jury determination, Ex. UU, but conducted three hearings on the postconviction motions, including an evidentiary hearing, Ex. HH, Ex. SS at 4; Ex. ZZ at 4-6. The postconviction court ultimately denied Leppert's Rule 3.850 Motion following an evidentiary hearing. Ex. HH; Ex. II. The Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed without a written opinion, Ex. NN (case number 5D16-2795), and issued the mandate after denying Leppert's motion for rehearing, Ex. OO; Ex. PP; Ex. QQ.

The postconviction court, on the other hand, granted Leppert's Amended Rule 3.800(a) Motion (announced in open court and in a written order), finding that she was entitled to resentencing “according to the procedures set forth in Sections 921.1401, 921.1402, [and] 775.082.” Ex. ZZ at 6-7; Ex. AAA at 2. The postconviction court also ruled both orally and in writing that the evidence “clear[ly]” established Leppert “intended to kill the victim, attempted to kill the victim, and in acting [sic] concert with Toby Lowry, did in fact kill the victim.” Ex. ZZ at 9-10; Ex. BBB. The postconviction court resentenced Leppert to the same term of years as previously imposed on each conviction (life on the homicide conviction and concurrent terms of 50 years on the nonhomicide convictions) but with a “possibility of release after a review hearing after 25 years.” Ex. ZZ at 10-11; Ex. CCC.^[7]

Through counsel, Leppert appealed her resentencing. Ex. DDD (case number 5D16-2238). In a per curiam written opinion, the Fifth DCA reversed and remanded only so that the trial court could enter an amended sentencing order reflecting that Leppert was entitled to “a review of her robbery and burglary convictions after twenty years,” not twenty-five years, per Florida Statutes section 921.1402(2)(d). Ex. HHH at 1-2. With respect to the sentence on the homicide conviction, the Fifth DCA concluded its decision in “a strikingly similar case” dictated affirmance but, as it did in that similar case (Williams v. State, 211 So.3d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)),^[8] certified the following question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court:

Does Alleyne v. United States ^[9] . . . require the jury and not the trial court to make the factual finding under section 775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), as to whether a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim?

Id. at 2-3. The Fifth DCA issued the mandate on May 11, 2017. Ex. III.

The Florida Supreme Court granted Leppert's petition for review, quashed the Fifth DCA's decision, and remanded the matter to the Fifth DCA for reconsideration in light of its recent decision answering the Fifth DCA's certified question in the affirmative. Ex. JJJ (citing Williams v. State, 242 So.3d 280 (Fla. 2018)). In Williams, the Florida Supreme Court held:

Because a finding of actual killing, intent to kill, or attempt to kill ‘aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences,' Alleyne, 570 U.S. [at 115], by increasing the sentencing floor from zero to forty years and lengthening the time before which a juvenile offender is entitled to a sentence review from fifteen to twenty-five years, this finding is an ‘element' of the offense, which Alleyne requires be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.

242 So.3d at 288.

The Fifth DCA subsequently withdrew its original opinion and mandate and issued a new opinion. Ex. KKK; Ex. LLL. The Fifth DCA affirmed on the claims not affected by the Florida Supreme Court's Williams decision (those on the nonhomicide sentences) but reversed the sentence imposed on the homicide conviction because the jury had not made a finding under Florida Statutes section 775.082(1)(b) whether Leppert “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim,” an error the Fifth DCA held was not harmless. Ex. LLL at 2-3. Accordingly, the court remanded the conviction on that charge for resentencing. Id. at 3. The court issued the mandate on August 6, 2018. Ex. MMM.

On remand in the trial court, Leppert filed a motion to declare Florida Statutes sections 921.1402(2)(b) and 775.082(1)(b)2 to be unconstitutional. Ex. NNN. The trial court denied that motion. Ex. QQQ. However, in accordance with the Fifth DCA's remand order, the trial court resentenced Leppert on the homicide conviction pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. Ex. OOO. The court again sentenced Leppert to a life term of imprisonment but with an opportunity for review after 15 years, per the statute. Id...