Leshore v. Comm'r of Long Beach P.D.

VERNON LESHORE Plaintiff,

v. COMMISSIONER OF LONG BEACH P.D., THOMAS R. SOFIELD, SR.,DET. JOHN SHARPE, SGT. HOWARD DOMITZ, DET. C. WALSH, DET. JOSE MIGUEZ,SGT. HAYES, NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY KATHLEEN M. RICE,ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY BRIAN J. HARAN, MITCHELL BARNETT, DET. WALTER MONSTERMAN,NASSAU COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT. CORRECTION CENTER MEDICAL/NUMC/MAIN CORE/SATELITE [SIC],DET. G. PICUCCI, P.O. P. BRATHWAITE, NEW YORK STAT DIVISION OF PAROLE, CHIEF ALAN PRESTON,P.O. KARE JONES-MORGAN, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,COMMISSIONER BRIAN FISCHER, WINTHROP UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, S.P.O. G. LEIFER,JUDGE JOHN L KASE, CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM C. DONNINO, NASSAU COUNTY COURT, Defendants.

10-CV-6067 (SJFVARL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: March 21, 2012

ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

Presently before the Court is the amended complaint of incarcerated pro se plaintiff Vernon Leshore ("plaintiff). The amended complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), is accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis and an application for the appointment of pro bono counsel. Upon review of plaintiff's declaration in support of his application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that plaintiff's financial status qualifies him to commence this action without prepayment of the Court's filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Accordingly, plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is grantedHowever, for the reasons that follow, the amended complaint is sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff's application for the appointment of pro bono counsel is denied at this time.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on December 30, 2010, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. By letter dated April 11, 2011, plaintiff inquired with the Court's Pro Se Office as to whether he would be permitted to amend his complaint. By letter dated May 3, 2011, the Court's Pro Se Office provided instructions for filing an amended complaint.

On May 19, 2011, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and on June 15, 2011, he filed a supplement to his amended complaint. By letter dated July 7, 2011, plaintiff requested guidance from the Pro Se Office concerning a further amendment to his complaint. By letter dated July 19, 2011, the Pro Se Office again provided instructions for filing an amended complaint. On October 17, 2011, the Court issued an order granting plaintiff leave to amend his complaint within thirty (30) days from the entry date of the order, and stating that plaintiff sin forma pauperis application would be held in abeyance until the amended complaint was filed. By undated letter received by the Court on October 24, 2011, plaintiff moved to extend the deadline for filing his amended complaint. Plaintiff's application was granted, and plaintiff's final deadline for filing an amended complaint was set for December 30, 2011.

Plaintiff's amended complaint, signed and dated December 27, 2011, was filed with the Court on January 4, 2012, and names the following defendants: Commissioner of Long BeachP.D., Thomas R. Sofield, Sr. ("Sofield"); Det. John Sharpe ("Sharpe"); Sgt. Howard Domitz ("Domitz"); Det. C. Walsh ("Walsh"); Det. Jose Miguez ("Miguez"); Sgt. Hayes ("Hayes"); Nassau County District Attorney Kathleen M. Rice ("D.A. Rice"); Assistant District Attorney Brian J. Haran ("A.D.A. Haran"); Mitchell Barnett ("Barnett"); Det. Walter Monsterman ("Monsterman"); "Nassau County Sheriff's Dept. Correction Center Medical/NUMC Main Core/Satelite [sic]" ("Nassau County Sheriff's Department"); Det. G. Picucci ("Picucci"); P.O. P. Brathwaite ("Brathwaite"); New York State Division of Parole, Chief Alan Preston ("Preston"); P.O. Karen Jones-Morgan ("Jones-Morgan"); New York State Department of Correctional Services, Commissioner Brian Fischer ("Fischer"); Winthrop University Hospital ("Winthrop"); S.P.O. G. Leifer ("Leifer"); Judge John L. Kase ("Judge Kase"); and Chief Judge William C. Donnino ("Chief Judge Donnino").

II. The Amended Complaint

Plaintiff's handwritten amended complaint, submitted on the Court's Section 1983 complaint form, includes a twenty-eight (28) page attachment asserting a myriad of claims arising from his June 30, 2010 arrest and appears to challenge the validity of plaintiff's arrest for an unspecified "incident" that occurred in Long Beach, New York on June 26, 2010, as well as his subsequent guilty plea and sentence.¹ See Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") [DocketEntry No. 24] at 4.

According to the amended complaint, plaintiff was arrested at his girlfriend's apartment. Parole officers Preston and Jones-Morgan entered the apartment along with Long Beach Police Detective Sharpe, two other unidentified Long Beach police officers, and unidentified detectives from the New York City Police Department's 101st Precinct. Plaintiff claims he was arrested without a warrant and the officers entered his girlfriend's apartment without her consent or a search warrant. Id, at 3-4. Plaintiff further claims that "the N.Y.S. division of parole technically lacked jurisdiction over [him] as [he] should of [sic] not being [sic] on parole anymore." Id. at 3.

Plaintiff states that he was subsequently transported to the Long Beach Police Department, where he was handcuffed to a desk, then questioned by Sharpe and another unidentified detective. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was then asked a series of questions, including whether he "hit Phil with the bat" and whether he had possessed a firearm. See id. at 5. According to plaintiff, he denied any involvement in the incident about which he was being questioned. Id, Plaintiff claims Sharpe then questioned him about a prior drug conviction and asked whether plaintiff was still selling drugs. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Sharpe continued to question him about various issues, including his family members, his religious beliefs, the fact that plaintiff had been limping. Id. at 5-6. According to plaintiff, he told Sharpe that he has diabetes and a "DVT blood clot" in his right lower leg. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that as soon as the questioning concluded, he was taken to the Long Beach Medical Center emergency room for treatment of his diabetes and the blood clot in his right leg. Id.

According to plaintiff, he told the treating physician he was taking eighteen (18) milligrams of the blood thinner Coumadin. Id. at 6. After receiving the results of plaintiff's blood test, the treating physician allegedly indicated that plaintiff was not fit for confinement. Id at 7. Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to the Long Beach Police Station, where he was questioned further. Id at 7-9.

The next morning he was taken "upstairs to court" where he was assigned a lawyer, defendant Barnett, who represented him at arraignment before Judge Tepper. Id. at 9. Plaintiff claims that Judge Tepper declined to set bail because plaintiff had a prior felony conviction, and that Barnett failed to inform the judge of plaintiff's medical condition. Id. at 9. Plaintiff was sent to the Nassau County Correctional Center. Id.

The amended complaint alleges that plaintiff was "railroaded" during his criminal proceeding and that plaintiff was "forced" to enter a guilty plea. Id. at 10-17. Plaintiff claims that his "D.N,A, has been tampered with ... and they have [him] locked up under [his cousin's] D.N.A....." Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff also complains generally about the medical care he received at the Nassau University Medical Center, including "countless injections" he claims were not needed. Plaintiff alleges that his kidneys have been damaged from the excessive dosage of medications he was given. Id. at 17.

Plaintiff seeks to recover an unspecified sum as compensation for "medical expenses and to compensate [him] for all the pain they caused to [him] and [his] body and for the hurt they put on [his] family." Id at 32. Furthermore, plaintiff claims to have suffered "mental stress ... for [being] falsely convict[ed] of a crime that [he] did not do." Id.

III. Discussion

A. In Forma Pauperis Application

Upon review of plaintiff s declaration in support of his application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that plaintiff's financial status qualifies him to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

B. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915, requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) & (b); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and the Court is required to read the plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally, Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed.2d 251 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius. 618 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2010), and to construe them '"to raise the strongest arguments'" suggested. Chavis.618 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris v. City of N.Y., 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010)); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937,...