Let Them Choose v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist.

323 Cal.Rptr.3d 521

LET THEM CHOOSE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

S.V. et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.San Diego Unified School District, Defendant and Appellant.

D082478

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

Filed July 18, 2024

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Request for judicial notice granted. Reversed. (Super. Ct, No. 37-2021-00043172-CU-WM-CTL), (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-00049949-CU-WM-CTL)

Aannestad Andelin & Corn, Lee Michael Andelin and Arie L. Spangler, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Appellant Let Them Choose.

Precept Group, Chris Czaplak; Siri & Glimstad and Allison R. Lucas for Plaintiffs and Appellants, S.V., et al.

Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Mark Robert Bresee, Amy W. Estrada, and Alyssa Ruiz de Esparza, La Jolla, for Defendant and Respondent.

DATO, J.

A developed system of justice, with fair and impartial courts to decide disputes among citizens, is in many ways the hallmark of a civilized society. By providing an accessible forum for resolving both economic and philosophical disagreements, courts preserve order and a sense of community, preventing these differences from devolving into active conflict and even violence. Equally important, courts foster attitudes of tolerance for and respectful acceptance of different points of view, traits often sadly lacking in today’s polarized political landscape.

Designed to preserve and enhance access to the courts, the private attorney general theory for the award of attorney’s fees, codified in Code of Civil Procedure ¹ section 1021.5, can be viewed as a corollary principle. To be available to resolve important disputes, courts must be accessible; to be accessible, the cost of access must not overwhelm the economic benefit to be achieved. This cost-benefit calculus presents special challenges where the benefits of litigation to the individual litigant are largely noneconomic, and section 1021.5 seeks to address the problem by allowing for the award of attorney’s fees where the litigation enforces an important right affecting the public interest and confers a significant benefit—even a nonpecuniary benefit—on the general public or a large group of persons.

The underlying case arises out of the recent COVID-19 pandemic. In September 2021, at the height of the pandemic, the defendant San Diego Unified School District (District) proposed to implement a local "Vaccination Roadmap" (Roadmap) mandating that District students receive a COVID-19 vaccination in order to attend in-person classes and participate in extracurricular activities at the District’s schools. In Let Them Choose v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 693, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 667 (Let Them Choose I), this court affirmed the trial court’s order invalidating the Roadmap, holding that a local vaccination requirement as proposed by the District was preempted by state law. In doing so, we characterized the case as presenting "issues of broad public interest." (Id. at p. 700, fn. 1, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 667.)

Following our decision, the prevailing plaintiffs Let Them Choose (an organization) and S.V. (an individual parent) returned to the trial court and filed motions requesting an award of attorney’s fees under section 1021.5. The court (but a different judge than the one who invalidated the Roadmap) denied the motions, concluding that the litigation "did not enforce an important right affecting the public." The court also believed that an award of attorney’s fees against the District was not appropriate because, in adopting the vaccination requirement, it sought to protect students and "did nothing to adversely affect the public interest."

Although this case represents another chapter in the age-old debate about whether commendable ends justify questionable means, the trial court’s reasoning reflects an inappropriately narrow reading of both the concept of "public interest" in section 1021.5 and the beneficial effects of plaintiffs’ lawsuit. It may well be that requiring vaccinations for students was a good public health policy and a prudent precaution. But this case was never about the merits of the District’s underlying decision. Rather, it was always about process. The problem with the Roadmap was that the State had established procedures for adding new school attendance vaccination requirements, and the District failed to follow the law.

Nor is it correct to say that plaintiffs’ lawsuit did not enforce compliance with state law.² The District’s causation argument, accepted by the trial court, suggests that the lawsuit did not really stop the implementation of a vaccination requirement; rather, the District chose to abandon the Roadmap for unrelated reasons. But again, the District’s focus in defining the public interest is unduly narrow. In September 2021, the District announced its intention to unilaterally impose a vaccination requirement, and it never retreated from its assertion in the trial court or on appeal that it was entitled to implement the Roadmap. That it chose to delay and ultimately cancel its plans does not change the fact that the lawsuit enforced an important right affecting the public interest by making clear that both now and in the future, the District was required to follow the mandatory vaccination protocols established by state law.

The public interest that plaintiffs’ lawsuit sought to enforce was the District’s obligation to comply with established procedures, even as it sought to achieve laudable goals. The interest is an important one, but vindicating it generates no economic benefit for its champions. As a result, an award of attorney’s fees under section 1021.5 is peculiarly appropriate. Because plaintiffs’ lawsuit demonstrably promoted the strong public interest in following fair and uniform procedures, and because the District’s announced attempt to adopt the Roadmap was inconsistent with those procedures, we must reverse the trial court’s order and remand for a determination as to the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Chapter 1: Plaintiffs Successfully Challenge the Roadmap

The District, the second largest public school system in California, serves more than 100,000 students.³ As our opinion in Let Them Choose I explained, the foundational facts regarding the underlying lawsuit were "few and undisputed." (85 Cal. App.5th at p. 699, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 667.) On September 28, 2021, the District’s board adopted a plan, referred to as the Roadmap, that would generally require proof of a COVID-19 vaccination for students to attend in-person classes and participate in extracurricular activities beginning with the spring semester in January 2022. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed this law-suit challenging the District’s authority to unilaterally impose a local vaccination requirement. They contended that any decision to condition public school attendance on vaccination status had to be made at the state level. In an order issued on December 20, 2021, the trial court (Judge Meyer) agreed with plaintiffs. Although noting that the Roadmap "appears to be necessary and rational, and the district’s desire to protect its students from COVID-19 is commendable," the court concluded that "the field of school vaccine mandates has been fully occupied by the State, and the Roadmap directly conflicts with state law."

Judgment was entered on January 6, 2022 granting plaintiffs’ petitions for writ of mandate. On the same day, the court declined to stay the effect of the judgment pending appeal, although it acknowledged the District’s right to seek relief in this court. The District filed a notice of appeal on January 10, and 11 days later sought a writ of supersedeas in this court. On February 1, we granted the District’s request to stay the trial court’s order and judgment pending resolution of the appeal.⁴

In November 2022, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on plaintiffs’ petitions for writ of mandate.⁵ We held that the Roadmap was preempted because (1) it conflicted with specific state standards, and (2) the Legislature had impliedly "occupie[d] the field" with regard to school vaccination requirements by providing comprehensive state procedures that the District made no attempt to comply with. (Let Them Choose I, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 702, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 667.) In February 2023, the Supreme Court denied a request to depublish the opinion and declined to review the matter on its own motion.

Chapter 2: Plaintiffs Request Attorney’s Fees

Following issuance of the remittitur, each plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (See Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 925, 154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200 (Woodland Hills); see generally Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (Serrano).) Both argued they were successful parties in a lawsuit that "resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest" within the meaning of the statute. In particular, they asserted that (1) they had conferred a "significant benefit .. on the general public or a large class of persons," (2) the necessity and "financial burden of private enforcement [made] the award appropriate," and (3) there was no pecuniary recovery out of which the fees could be paid. (§ 1021.5.)

In response, the District opposed the motions based primarily on two factual premises. First, it contended that plaintiffs’ lawsuit did not advance, but rather interfered with, the public interest. In this regard, it referred to Judge Meyer’s comments in granting the petitions for writ of mandate that the Roadmap appeared to be "necessary and rational," and he viewed the District’s desire to protect its students as "commendable." On this basis it...