Lewandowski v. Jelenski

401 Ill.App.3d 893

929 N.E.2d 114

340 Ill.Dec. 810

Urszula LEWANDOWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Beata K. JELENSKI, Defendant-Appellant (Joanna Jelenski and Michael Noonan, Defendants).

No. 1-09-0612.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Sixth Division.

May 14, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Leon Zelechowski, Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Robert R. Dlugajczyk, Chicago, IL, for Appellee.

Justice ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Beata K. Jelenski appeals from a judgment order, entered after a bench trial, finding that she was unjustly enriched by her receipt of $83,000 from plaintiff Urszula Lewandowski, plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $21,883.52, and granting plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to state a cause of action for unjust enrichment to conform the pleadings to the proofs pursuant to section 2-616(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-616(c) (West 2006) (“A pleading may be amended at any time, before or after judgment, to conform the pleadings to the proofs, upon terms as to costs and continuance that may be just”)). Plaintiff was granted leave to amend her complaint to allege unjust enrichment in the same order entering judgment in favor of plaintiff based on that unjust enrichment count. On appeal, Jelenski argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting plaintiff leave to amend her complaint because plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment was time-barred as it was filed after the applicable statute of limitations expired, and the cause of action did not relate back to the previous timely filed complaints. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings of the trial, a bystander's report, or an agreed statement of facts in accordance with paragraphs (a), (c), and (d) of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323 (210 Ill.2d Rs. 323(a), (c), (d)). As a result, our recitation of the facts is derived from the common law record before us, including the trial court's judgment order. See City of Highland Park v. Didenko, 274 Ill.App.3d 24, 210 Ill.Dec. 916, 653 N.E.2d 1378 (1995). We proceed to consider this appeal because the record before us is sufficient to address some of the issues raised. Luss v. Village of Forest Park, 377 Ill.App.3d 318, 331, 316 Ill.Dec. 169, 878 N.E.2d 1193 (2007) (appellate review is not precluded when the record actually contains that which is necessary for a disposition of the issues in the case).

Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint (original complaint) against Jelenski on April 28, 2004. According to the allegations of the original complaint, plaintiff and Jelenski formed a joint venture in May 2002 to develop certain real property located at 6400 South Green Street in Chicago (Property). In furtherance of the joint venture, plaintiff alleged that she provided Jelenski a total of $76,000, in increments of $1,000 to $15,000, the final of which occurred on August 19, 2002. According to the original complaint, plaintiff's monies were never used for the acquisition or development of the Property, and Jelenski never returned plaintiff's monies to her in breach of Jelenski's fiduciary duty to plaintiff. As such, plaintiff's original complaint set forth claims against Jelenski for an accounting, a constructive trust, and breach of fiduciary duty, in counts I, II, and III, respectively.

On September 12, 2005, plaintiff filed an amended complaint (first amended complaint) adding Michael Noonan as a defendant.¹ The amended complaint included nearly identical allegations to the original complaint; however, it alleged that Noonan had specific knowledge of Jelenski's alleged wrongful conduct and obtained financial gain as a result of Jelenski's breach of her fiduciary duty to plaintiff. The first amended complaint did not specify how Noonan financially gained by Jelenski's breach of her fiduciary duty to plaintiff. Like the original complaint, the first amended complaint set forth three counts. Counts I and II, naming both Jelenski and Noonan, sought an accounting and the imposition of a constructive trust. Count III directed solely against Jelenski, alleged Jelenski's breach of her fiduciary duty to plaintiff.

On December 12, 2005, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint adding a fourth count against both Jelenski and Noonan, alleging that Jelenski and Noonan participated in a civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff. The second amended complaint was substantially identical to the first amended complaint in all other respects.

On April 3, 2007, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint adding Jelenski's daughter, Joanna Jelenski, as a defendant The third amended complaint alleged that Jelenski deposited the plaintiff's monies into a bank account held jointly by her and her daughter Joanna, and that both she and her daughter used plaintiff's monies for personal expenses. Plaintiff's third amended complaint was pled in 11 counts. Count I alleged that Jelenski fraudulently induced plaintiff into giving her $76,000 for the joint venture by fraudulently representing that she had “expertise and financial success” in real estate development when indeed she did not. Count II alleged that Jelenski breached her fiduciary duty to plaintiff by failing to return plaintiff's monies after the Property was never purchased, or by using plaintiff's monies for the personal expenses of herself or her daughter. Count III of the third amended complaint was directed at Jelenski for conversion. Count IV alleged that Noonan aided and abetted Jelenski's fraudulent inducement of plaintiff. Count V alleged that Joanna Jelenski aided and abetted her mother's fraudulent inducement of plaintiff. Count VI of the third amended complaint alleged that Joanna aided and abetted Jelenski's conversion of plaintiff's monies. Count VII alleged that Joanna breached a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff. Count VIII, naming Jelenski, sought an accounting. Count IX, against Jelenski, sought the imposition of a constructive trust. Count X against Joanna sought the imposition of a constructive trust. Finally, count XI alleged that Jelenski, her daughter Joanna Jelenski, and Noonan participated in a civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff.

The trial court's February 3, 2009, judgment order confirms that a bench trial occurred in the instant case. See City of Highland Park v. Didenko, 274 Ill.App.3d 24, 210 Ill.Dec. 916, 653 N.E.2d 1378 (1995) (in the absence of a report of proceedings of the trial, a bystander's report, or an agreed statement of facts, a reviewing court can assume that a trial court's order accurately reflects the trial court proceedings).

In its February 3, 2009, judgment order, the trial court found that “the evidence admitted at trial established that [Jelenski] ha[d] been unjustly enriched by virtue of her receipt of $83,000 from [plaintiff], of which $80,500 remain[ed] due and owing.” ³ Over objection, the trial court granted plaintiff leave to amend count VIII of plaintiff's third amended complaint to “state a cause of action for unjust enrichment and thereby conform the pleading to the proofs,” pursuant to section 2-616(c) of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-616(c) (West 2006)). The amendment to count VIII of plaintiff's third amended complaint deleted plaintiff's allegations that Jelenski owed her a fiduciary duty. The trial court then entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Jelenski on count VIII of the third amended complaint, as amended, in the amount of $80,500, and awarded plaintiff $21,883.52 in prejudgment interest pursuant to section 2 of the Illinois Interest Act ( 815 ILCS 205/2 (West 2006)). The trial court proceeded to find against plaintiff and in favor of all defendants on all other counts of plaintiff's third amended complaint.

As noted, Jelenski appeals arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by granting plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to set forth a cause of action for unjust enrichment because plaintiff's claim was time-barred as it was filed after the applicable statute of limitations expired, and the cause of action did not relate back to the previous timely filed complaints.

ANALYSIS

Whether to allow an amendment to pleadings is within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Compton v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 382 Ill.App.3d 323, 331, 320 Ill.Dec. 734, 887 N.E.2d 878 (2008), citing Village of Wadsworth v. Kerton, 311 Ill.App.3d 829, 842, 244 Ill.Dec. 560, 726 N.E.2d 156 (2000). A trial court abuses its discretion if “ ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” DeLapaz v. SelectBuild Construction, Inc., 394 Ill.App.3d 969, 972, 334 Ill.Dec. 496, 917 N.E.2d 93 (2009), quoting In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill.App.3d 640, 651, 324 Ill.Dec. 310, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (2008).

Section 2-616(c) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-616(c) (West 2006)) provides: “A pleading may be amended at any time, before or after judgment, to conform the pleadings to the proofs, upon terms as to costs and continuance that may be just.”

The parties here agree that count VIII of plaintiff's third amended complaint, as amended, is barred by the five-year statute of limitations of section 13-205 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2006)), unless the claim “relates back” to the date of filing of any of the timely filed previous complaints. Frederickson v. Blumenthal, 271 Ill.App.3d 738, 742, 208 Ill.Dec. 138, 648 N.E.2d 1060 (1995) (cause of action for unjust enrichment is subject to the five-year statute of limitations as set forth by section 13-205 (735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2006))).

As noted, plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 28, 2004, alleging that she and Jelenski formed a joint venture in May 2002 to develop certain real property, and that she provided Jelenski with a total of $76,000, in furtherance of the joint venture...