Lewis v. Celentino

Joseph Lewis, Plaintiff, v. Victor Celentino, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-1261

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

May 7, 2021

Hon Paul L. Maloney

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PHILLIP J. GREEN United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on Ingham County Defendants' motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 8), and the state Defendants motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 12). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that the Ingham County Defendants' motion (ECF No. 8) be granted in part and denied in part, and that the state Defendants' motion (ECF No. 12) be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff proceeding pro se, initiated this action on December 31 2020, against the following: Ingham County Sheriff's Deputies Brad Delaney and Scott Macomber; Ingham County District Court Judge Thomas Boyd; Ingham County Circuit Court Judge James Jamo; Ingham County Prosecuting Attorney Jennifer Lawton-Pace; Ingham County; fourteen individuals serving on the Ingham County Board of Commissioners; Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer; and the State of Michigan. In his complaint, Plaintiff makes the following allegations.

On the evening of May 10, 2019, Plaintiff and his young daughter were traveling in Plaintiff's truck on a public highway. Deputy Macomber, having allegedly observed Plaintiff texting while driving, initiated a traffic stop. Because Plaintiff “couldn't fathom any reason he would be pursued by a municipal employee, ” he failed to immediately stop, but instead “rushed to a nearby ‘rest stop' for their safety.”

Plaintiff disputed that he had been using his cell phone while driving and began to “contest the interruption of his travels.” Macomber requested assistance from additional law enforcement and continued questioning Plaintiff. Deputy Delaney arrived soon thereafter and “began supporting Macomber's claims.” Fearing for his life, Plaintiff stated that he would not cooperate further until his daughter “is brought to safety.” Plaintiff was permitted to telephone a friend who arrived shortly thereafter and took custody of Plaintiff's daughter.

Deputy Delaney later “attempted to grab [Plaintiff] by the wrist while threatening him with his taser-in-hand.” Plaintiff “pulled away” from Delaney, however, who then stated that Plaintiff was under arrest. Delaney and/or Macomber then “forcibly attacked” Plaintiff who immediately “submit[ted].” Despite Plaintiff stating “multiple times” that he did not “consent to any searches or seizures of his personal property, ” Delaney and Macomber searched Plaintiff's personal effects.

Plaintiff was transported to the Ingham County Jail and later charged with resisting arrest, careless driving, and refusal to provide a DNA sample. Plaintiff was arraigned the following morning, after which he was released on bond. On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff appeared before the Honorable Thomas Boyd. During this proceeding, prosecuting attorney Jennifer Lawton-Pace “attempted to act judicially as an expositor of the U.S. Const. and Statutes of Michigan's Compiled Legislation.” Plaintiff responded by arguing that his traffic stop and subsequent arrest violated his right to due process because he had committed no criminal offense. Judge Boyd disagreed and scheduled the matter for further proceedings.

On June 20, 2019, Plaintiff appeared before the Honorable James Jamo who, despite Plaintiff's attempts to “explain[] his comprehension of the Supremacy Clause, ” ordered “the preliminary exam to proceed.” Following the examination, Judge Jamo ruled that there existed probable cause to charge Plaintiff with resisting and obstructing and the matter proceeded forward.

Plaintiff asserts several causes of action: (1) his arrest and criminal prosecution violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the Michigan statute criminalizing resisting and obstructing a police officer is unconstitutional; (3) the Michigan statute criminalizing the refusal to provide a DNA sample is unconstitutional; and (4) his arrest and search of his personal possessions violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Plaintiff further alleges that the events in question have -3- negatively impacted his employment causing him to experience “losses of over $3, 000, 000, ” not to mention the loss of “private investments he sought to secure.”

Plaintiff seeks $5, 000, 000.00 in damages and the issuance of a “public memorandum” detailing the “errors found in the statutes, agencies, policies, procedures, etc.” Plaintiff further requests that the United States Department of Justice investigate the State of Michigan and Ingham County. Finally, Plaintiff “demands that if criminal conduct be found against Defendants, that charges be filed against them.” The Ingham County Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims on the ground that Plaintiff's allegations, even if true, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The Ingham County Defendants also assert various immunity defenses. The state Defendants assert sovereign immunity. Plaintiff has responded to the Ingham County Defendants' motion only. (ECF No. 11).

LEGAL STANDARD

A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). The Court need not accept as true, however, factual allegations which are “clearly irrational or wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).

As the Supreme Court has held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.' ” Id. As the Court further observed:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . .Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -but it has not “show[n]” - “that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).

The burden to obtain relief under Rule 12(b)(6) rests with the defendant. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” A motion to dismiss “should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” Ibid.

When resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider the complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the defendant's motion to dismiss provided such are referenced in the complaint and central to the claims therein. See Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008); see also, Continental Identification Products, Inc. v. EnterMarket, Corp., 2008 WL 51610 at *1, n.1 (W.D. Mich., Jan. 2, 2008) (“an exhibit to a pleading is considered part of the pleading” and “the Court may properly consider the exhibits . . . in determining whether the complaint fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted without converting the motion to a Rule 56 motion”); Stringfield v. Graham, 212 Fed.Appx. 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2007) (documents “attached to and cited by” the complaint are “considered parts thereof under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c)”).

ANALYSIS

I. Constitutionality of Michigan Statutes

Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of two Michigan statutes. First, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.81d(1), which makes it unlawful to assault, batter, wound, obstruct, oppose, or endanger “a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties.” Plaintiff also challenges the constitutionality of Michigan Compiled Laws § 28.173a, which makes it unlawful for “[a]n individual required by law to provide samples for DNA identification profiling who refuses to provide or resists providing those samples.” When challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, the proper defendant is the official whose enforcement of the statute is being challenged. See, e.g....