Lewis v. City of N.Y.

18 F.Supp.3d 229

William LEWIS, Plaintiff

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, The New York City Police Department, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, Lieutenant Luat Frank Sarayli, in his individual and official capacities, Deputy Inspector Daniel A. Carione, in his individual and official capacities, Chief Campisi, in his individual and official capacities, Captain Markov, in his individual and official capacities, Detective Victor Crespo, in his individual and official capacities, Lieutenant Shawn Carlson, in his individual and official capacities, and John Doe # 's 1–5, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

No. 11–CV–5044.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed May 7, 2014.

Jeffrey H. Lichtman, Law Offices of Jeffrey Lichtman, Mariel S. Lasasso, Lasasso Law Group PLLC, Philip A. Byler, Nesenoff & Miltenberg, LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Brian Paul Ceballo, New York City Law Department, Brooklyn, NY, Kimberly Conway, Okwede N. Okoh, Virginia Jackson Nimick, New York City Law Department, Vicki Becker Zgodny, NYC Law Department Corporation Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM, ORDER, & JUDGMENT

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge:

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction	233
II.	Facts	233

A.	Departmental Trial	233
B.	Federal Trial	234
C.	Dismissal	234

III. Law 234

A.	Summary Judgment Standard	234
B.	False Arrest Standard	235
C.	Malicious Prosecution Standard	235
D.	Monell Liability Standard	235
E.	Stigma–plus Standard	236

IV. Application of Law to Facts 236

A.	False Arrest	236
B.	Malicious Prosecution in Departmental Trial	237
C.	Malicious Prosecution in Federal Trial	237
D.	Monell Liability	237
E.	Stigma–plus	238

V. Conclusion 238

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, a former New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) detective, sues the City of New York, the NYPD, and various employees of the Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1) false arrest; (2) malicious prosecution in a departmental trial; (3) malicious prosecution in a federal trial; (4) municipal violations; and (5) defamation with stigma-plus.

He was fired after a quarter century of service, the immediate cause being his arrest by federal authorities for structuring monetary transactions—a charge on which he was acquitted in a jury trial. While seemingly harsh, the result comports with due process in the peculiar circumstances of the case. The complaint is dismissed.

II. Facts

A. Departmental Trial

From 2004 through 2010, plaintiff was investigated by the NYPD's Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) for violations of NYPD Rules and Regulations. Defendant Daniel Crespo and his supervisor, Daniel Carione, were among the group of IAB investigators. See Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 11, 14, ECF No. 1. After reviewing the results of this investigation, the Department Advocate's Office brought departmental charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. Id. at ¶ 50.

On March 30, 2009, Trial Commissioner Martin Karopkin announced the disposition of charges and recommended a penalty. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to: (1) failing to notify the NYPD of his change of address between 2004 and 2006; (2) engaging in off-duty employment without authorization; (3) owning real estate for rental purposes; and (4) employing individuals for business deals with establishments in his precinct. He was found guilty of: (1) failing to inform the NYPD that he had a relative employed in his precinct; and (2) employing individuals for business deals with establishments that participated in illegal gambling. Finally, he was found not guilty of: (1) divulging an undercover police operation; (2) attempting to collect debts in an intimidating manner; and (3) employing individuals for business deals with establishments in his precinct in conflict with his duties. See Nimick Decl. in Supp. of Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Tr. Comm'r's Decision, Ex. E, ECF No. 68.

Trial Commissioner Karopkin characterized the result as follows: “Some of the charges which this Respondent has been found guilty of do constitute serious misconduct but they do not rise to the level of corruption and misuse of authority claimed by the Department.” See Ex. E. at 199. He recommended that plaintiff be dismissed from the NYPD but that his dismissal be held in abeyance for one year. Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly approved the recommendation on October 16, 2009. See Ex. E. Plaintiff did not file an appeal pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. See Lewis Dep., Ex. T. at 255:1–17.

On October 22, 2009, plaintiff signed a probationary dismissal memorandum acknowledging that he could be terminated during the period of abeyance without further hearing by order of the police commissioner. See Memorandum, Ex. G.

B. Federal Trial

On July 23, 2009, plaintiff filed a report with the NYPD that approximately $90,000 had been stolen from a safe inside his home. See Report, Ex. H. This report was forwarded to the IAB because it involved a large sum of money missing from a member of the NYPD. At the IAB, Fuat Sarayli was assigned to investigate. He found that between February 13, 2009 and March 9, 2009, plaintiff made 25 withdrawals of cash. On multiple days, the withdrawals were slightly under $10,000. See Ex. J; Ex. K. Sarayli presented this information to Assistant United States Attorney Morris Fodeman and to Shawn Polonet and Christopher Costa at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) division of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). See Sarayli Dep., Ex. U at 64:12–66:3, 85:12–86:9, 181:2–11.

Agent Costa investigated the matter for DHS. He conducted his “own investigation separate and apart from Mr. Sarayli or anyone from the NYPD and determined that plaintiff had committed the crime of Structuring....” Costa Aff., Ex. R at ¶ 6. Costa then drafted an arrest warrant application, which included a chart showing that plaintiff made 25 withdrawals of at least $5000 during a period of 25 days. See Arrest Warrant, Ex. L. On ten of these days, plaintiff withdrew an amount under $10,000 but at or over $9000. See id.

On November 2, 2009, Magistrate Judge Andrew L. Carter issued an arrest warrant for plaintiff based on probable cause for structuring. See Arrest Warrant, Ex. L. The next day, plaintiff was arrested by Costa. Ex. R at ¶¶ 12–15. No member of the NYPD assisted in plaintiff's arrest. Ex. R at ¶ 14.

On December 1, 2009, a federal grand jury issued an indictment, charging plaintiff with structuring, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 et seq. See Indictment, Ex. N. Plaintiff was tried in the United States District Court in the Eastern District of New York. He was acquitted on March 18, 2010. See Acquittal, Ex. Q.

C. Dismissal

On February 16, 2010, NYPD Chief of Personnel Thomas Dale recommended that plaintiff be terminated from the NYPD. See Recommendation, Ex. O. In support of his recommendation, he noted that, while on dismissal probation, plaintiff had: (1) been named in a complaint filed by the U.S. Attorney's Office for structuring; and (2) engaged in off-duty employment without authorization. Id. Under the terms of the probationary dismissal letter, the police commissioner was entitled to dismiss plaintiff for these incidents. See Memorandum, Ex. G. The recommendation was endorsed by the First Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Chief, and the First Deputy Commission. Finally, on March 9, 2010, Police Commissioner Kelly approved the recommendation and dismissed plaintiff from the NYPD.

III. Law

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; see, e.g., Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist.,

190 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1999). Summary judgment is warranted when after construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–50, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The burden rests on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995). “Once a movant has demonstrated that no material facts are in dispute, the non-movant must set forth specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial exists in order to avoid the granting of summary judgment.” Cifarelli v. Vill. of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1996). This evidence may not consist of “mere conclusory allegations, speculation, or conjecture.” Id.

B. False Arrest Standard

A section 1983 claim for false arrest requires the same elements as a claim for false arrest under New York law. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996). “To state a claim for false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.’ ” See Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir.2003). Probable cause to arrest is a complete defense. See Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir.2007). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the authorities have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 75–76 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Malicious Prosecution Standard

To establish a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant lacked probable cause to believe the...