Lewis v. Dist. of Columbia

KAYLA DIONNE LEWIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-352 (RBW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kayla Dionne Lewis and Felton Hill, the named plaintiffs in this case, bring this putative class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) against the defendant, the District of Columbia (the "District"). See Third Amended Complaint [a]nd Jury Demand ("Third Amended Complaint" or "3d Am. Compl.") ¶ 1. Currently pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification ("Pls.' Mot."). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,¹ the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must deny the plaintiffs' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court discussed the factual background of this case in its Memorandum Opinion issued on June 27, 2016, see Lewis v. District of Columbia ("Lewis I"), 195 F. Supp. 3d 53, 56-57 (D.D.C. 2016) (Walton, J.), and it will not reiterate those facts again here. The Court will,however, discuss the procedural posture of this case, which is relevant to the resolution of the pending motion.

The current operative complaint in this case—the Third Amended Complaint, which was filed on March 12, 2018, see 3d Am. Compl. at 1—asserts three claims that challenge the District's policies regarding probable cause determinations and detainee strip searches. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the District (1) "violated their Fourth Amendment rights . . . under Gerstein v. Pugh[, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),] by holding them after presentment after the administrative steps incident to their arrests had been completed without an affirmative finding of probable cause" ("Count One"), 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 103; (2) "violated the Fourth Amendment rights . . . of Lewis . . . [under County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991)] by holding [her for] more than [forty-eight] hours after [her] arrest without a finding of probable cause by a judicial officer" ("Count Two"), id. ¶ 107; and (3) "violated the Fourth [and Fifth] Amendment rights of the [plaintiffs] . . . by subjecting them to blanket strip[ ]searches at the [District of Columbia] Jail after presentment (after the administrative steps incident to their arrests had been completed) without an affirmative finding of probable cause" ("Count Three"), id. ¶ 112.

Lewis v. District of Columbia ("Lewis II"), 417 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79 (D.D.C. 2019) (alterations in original).

On October 8, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part the District's motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. See Order at 1 (Oct. 8, 2019), ECF No. 91; see also Lewis II, 417 F. Supp. 3d at 78. Specifically, the Court dismissed Count One as to "Hill's claim challenging the length of his detention[,]" id. at 83, dismissed Count Two as duplicative of Count One, see id. at 85, and dismissed Count Three "to the extent that the plaintiffs rely on the Fifth Amendment to maintain their strip search claim[,]" id. at 86.

On January 31, 2020, the plaintiffs' filed their motion for class certification, see generally Pls.' Mot., which is the subject of this Memorandum Opinion.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, "'[a] class action may be maintained' if two conditions are met: [t]he suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity,commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it also must fit into one of the three categories described in subdivision (b)." Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)) (first alteration in original). A class may be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)

if[] [ ] prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). To certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class for injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). For a putative class to be certified as a Rule 23(b)(3) class, the Court must find that (1) "the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members[,]" and (2) "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Coleman through Bunn v. Dist. of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68, 84-85 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).

The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). Accordingly, "a class plaintiff has the burden of showing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and that the class is maintainable pursuant to one of Rule 23(b)'s subdivisions." Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

To satisfy this burden, "a party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his [or her] compliance with [ ] Rule [23]—that is, he [or she] must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) ("Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard."). And, "[i]n deciding whether class certification is appropriate, a district court must [ ] undertake a 'rigorous analysis' to see that the requirements of the Rule have been satisfied." R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 179 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of SW v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).

III. ANALYSIS

Here, the plaintiffs seek to certify the following classes pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3):

[Individuals] who (1) in the period beginning three years before the date of filing of the original complaint in this case and going forward until the case is terminated; (2) [were] arrested in a warrantless arrest; (3) and at the initial appearance [in a case prosecuted by the Attorney General for the District] in [the] Superior Court [were] ordered held [in the District's custody]; (4) for a Gerstein perfection hold [for more than forty-eight hours from the time of arrest,]

(the "Illegal Hold Class"), 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 116; Pls.' Mot. at 4; Pls.' Reply at 3,² and

[Individuals] who: (1) in the period beginning three years before the date of filing of the original complaint in this case and going forward until the case is terminated; (2) [were] arrested in a warrantless arrest; (3) and at the initial appearance in [the] Superior Court [were] ordered held; (4) for a Gersteinperfection hold; and (5) [were] then admitted to the [District of Columbia] Jail [or Correctional Treatment Facility] and subjected to a strip[ ]search[,]

(the "Illegal Strip Search Class"), 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 118; Pls.' Mot. at 4.³ The Court will address in turn whether the plaintiffs have met the requirements for certifying each class.

A. The Illegal Hold Class

In order to satisfy the numerosity requirement, the proposed class must be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Although "[t]here is no specific threshold that must be surpassed in order to satisfy the numerosity requirement[,] . . . courts in this jurisdiction have observed that a class of at least forty members is sufficiently large to meet this requirement." Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 241 F.R.D. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2007). On the other hand,"a class that encompasses fewer than [twenty] members will likely not be certified absent other indications of impracticability of joinder," Coleman through Bunn, 306 F.R.D. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Newberg on Class Actions § 3:11 (5th ed. 2014)), including "(1) judicial economy arising from avoidance of a multiplicity of actions; (2) geographic dispersion of class members; (3) size of individual claims; (4) financial resources of class members; and (5) the ability of claimants to institute individual suits," id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12).

Here, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing that the proposed Illegal Hold Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The plaintiffs claim that the proposed Illegal Hold Class is sufficiently numerous because "there are at least [twelve] Illegal Hold Class members, and likely there are at least [twenty]." Pls.' Mem. at 20-21.⁴ However, as the District correctly notes, even if the Court were to accept the plaintiffs' estimate, "[twelve] to [twenty] class members is too low to satisfy the numerosity requirement." Def.'s Opp'n at 9. And, although the plaintiffs assert that "this number is likely higher because the data [that] the District relies on for the release time is the Superior Court CourtView docketing data[, which] probably is based on the time the person appeared in Court for the Gerstein perfection hold or the time the Clerk made the docket entry rather than the actual time...