Lewis v. Stango

1

RODERICK LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES STANGO, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-1248 (OAW)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

July 21, 2023

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

OMAR A. WILLIAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Roderick Lewis, an inmate^[1] in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”), has filed an amended complaint asserting civil rights claims (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986), constitutional claims (under the First, Fourth, Fifth^[2], Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments), conspiracy, and state law claims against the State of Connecticut, the Commissioner of Correction (whom Plaintiff identifies as a John Doe), and eight individuals: Connecticut State's Attorneys Charles Stango, Cornelius Kelly, and Margaret Kelley; Connecticut Judges of the (State) Superior Court Iannotti and Brown Attorney John Walkley (State Public Defender); Connecticut Attorney General William Tong; and Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont. Am. Compl., ECF No. 12. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. For the following reasons, the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.

I. Factual Allegations^[3]

On December 18, 2013, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with Home Invasion. Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 at ¶ 13. He asserts that Attorneys Stango and Kelly fraudulently concealed the jurisdiction process throughout the two years prior to his trial. Id. He alleges that they knowingly and intentionally proceeded without jurisdiction and withheld valuable information that they had a duty to disclose. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff further alleges that Judge Iannotti sentenced him to fourteen years' incarceration and six years' special parole knowing that the court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 15.

On December 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil suit against police officers of the West Haven Police Department (“WHPD”).^[4] Id. at ¶ 16. He alleges that this suit was settled and that the officers “admitted guilt.” Id. at ¶ 17.

On April 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a “motion to vacate” in state superior court in Milford, Connecticut, asserting that the federal court had ruled that his arrest had been made in retaliation. Id. at ¶ 18. Nine months later, a hearing was scheduled for Plaintiff's motion to vacate. Id. at ¶ 19. At the motion hearing, Attorney Kelley served as the prosecutor. Id. Judge Brown denied the motion. Id. Plaintiff asserts that both Judge Brown and Attorney Kelley knew that there was a lack of jurisdiction. Id.

On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence that challenged the superior court's jurisdiction to obtain Plaintiff's conviction. Id. at ¶ 20.

On March 17, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a request for response or opposition from the Milford State's Attorney but received no reply. Id. at ¶ 21.

From April through June 2022, Plaintiff and his family were in constant contact with the Milford Superior Court Clerk's Office. Id. at ¶ 22. During this time, the court clerks and Defendants denied having received Plaintiff's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id. at ¶ 23. After Plaintiff clarified that the motion was sent by United States certified mail, the motion appeared. Id.

In June 2022, Plaintiff was informed by a clerk that he would have a guaranteed hearing date in the second week of July 2022. Id. at ¶ 24. During the second week of July, he was told that no hearings would be scheduled until the month of September. Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff explained that his motion was one that normally took forty-five days to be heard but was taking several months to be scheduled. Id. at ¶ 26.

The following week, Plaintiff received a letter through DOC interdepartmental mail from Attorney Walkley, who indicated that he was reaching out to Plaintiff upon the presiding judge's request to provide Plaintiff with assistance and “to put [his] motions in order so the Judge can properly consider them.” Id. at ¶¶ 27-28; see also Ex. C, ECF No. 12-1 at 13.

Plaintiff later reached out to Attorney General Tong by certified mail to explain that the superior court was not scheduling a hearing for his motion that had been pending five months. ECF No. 12 at ¶ 29; see also Ex. E, ECF No. 12-1 at 18. Plaintiff never received a response. ECF No. 12 at ¶ 30.

Plaintiff maintains that Defendants conspired with the West Haven police officers as retaliation for Plaintiff's lawsuit against the WHPD. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. He claims that the West Haven officers acted on behalf of Defendants in their retaliation against Plaintiff. Id. In addition, he claims that Defendants sought to retaliate against Plaintiff for pursuing a writ of habeas corpus to expose violations of the law. Id. at ¶ 31.

On November 30, 2022, Plaintiff submitted written argument in support of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id. at ¶ 33. In December 2022, Plaintiff appeared before Judge Brown at a hearing with Attorney Kelley. Id. at ¶ 34. In a written order, Judge Brown dismissed the motion to correct an illegal sentence, citing a lack of jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 35; see also Ex. F, ECF No. 12-1 at 20. Plaintiff received this ruling so late that he missed the deadline to appeal. ECF No. 12 at ¶ 36.

Plaintiff then submitted a motion to dismiss and a motion for articulation, each of which was denied. Id. at ¶ 37-38.

Plaintiff alleges that Governor Lamont has put unofficial policies in place to permit state prosecutors and state judges to impose illegal sentences by using fraudulent means to obtain convictions. ECF No. 12 at ¶ 47.

Plaintiff seeks damages, and asks the court to order the authorities to provide a hearing for Defendants to prove on the record that Plaintiff consented to jurisdiction in his criminal case.^[5]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), district courts must review prisoners' civil complaints against governmental actors and sua sponte “dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that, under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, sua sponte dismissal of frivolous prisoner complaints is mandatory); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Section 1915A requires that a district court screen a civil complaint brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint sua sponte if, inter alia, the complaint is ‘frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.'” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A)).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff plead only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), to provide the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (alteration in original).

A plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. A claim is facially plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require “detailed factual allegations,” a complaint must offer more than “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claim] is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, however, “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 100-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the “special solicitude” courts afford pro se litigants).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 in connection with his arrest, state prosecution, conviction, and sentence. His Amended Complaint asserts the following eight counts: false imprisonment (Count One); retaliation (Count Two); procedural due process violation (Count Three); lack of jurisdiction (Count Four); conspiracy (Count Five); fraud (Count Six); malicious prosecution (Count Seven); and deprivation of rights (Count Eight). Plaintiff seeks damages and asks the court to order the authorities to provide a hearing for Defendants to prove on the record that he consented to jurisdiction in his state criminal case.

A. Claims Against the State of Connecticut

Plaintiff cannot bring a Section 1983 claim against the State of Connecticut because the state is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (“[A] State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”). Accordingly, any claims against the State of Connecticut are not plausible and must be dismissed....