Lewis v. United States

1

KIESHA D. LEWIS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 22-2566

United States District Court, D. Maryland

May 8, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case brought by Plaintiff Kiesha Lewis for the “intentional infliction of emotional distress” are the motion to dismiss by Defendant United States, (ECF No. 18), the motion to sever and remand by Plaintiff Kiesha Lewis, (ECF No. 20), the motion for judgment on the pleadings by Defendant Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (“TMCC”), (ECF No. 26) and the motion to strike by Plaintiff, (ECF No. 27). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons the United States' motion to dismiss will be granted Plaintiff's motion to sever and remand will be denied, TMCC's motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted, and Plaintiff's motion to strike will be denied.

I. Background

Plaintiff Kiesha Lewis filed this suit in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County, Maryland. (ECF No. 2). All allegations in her complaint are contained in one paragraph:

This is an “[i]ntentional infliction of emotional distress” claim. In tax year 2016, both Toyota Motor Credit [Corporation] (TMCC) and I filed a 1099-C form, Cancellation of Debt, for a 2010 Toyota Sienna van. On June 16, 2022, I received documentation from the IRS proposing to alter my 2020 tax returns to claim this debt again. Based on the documentation I received, it appears that both TMCC and IRS are intentional[ly] inflicting emotional distress on me; TMCC by submitting a second 1099-C form, the IRS by proposing to alter my tax return to claim this debt again despite the fact that their records show that this debt was already claimed in a previous tax year.

(ECF No. 2). The complaint names as defendants the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (“TMCC”).^[1] It also claims $5000 in money damages and requests “[c]orrection of [Plaintiff's] records at all organizations.” (ECF No. 2). TMCC filed a notice of intention to defend in state court. (ECF No. 1-3).

Acting on behalf of the IRS Commissioner, the United States removed the case to this court and explained that it should be substituted as a defendant for the IRS commissioner because “the relief sought [by Plaintiff] would expend itself on the public treasury and restrain the federal government from action.” (ECF No. 1, at 2). When docketing this case, the court substituted the United States as a defendant for the IRS commissioner. (ECF No. 18-1, at 2).

In this court, the United States moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), (ECF No. 18), Plaintiff responded, (ECF No. 21), and the United States replied, (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff moved to sever the claim against TMCC and remand it to state court, (ECF No. 20), and both Defendants filed responses, (ECF Nos. 23, 25). TMCC moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), (ECF No. 26), to which Plaintiff responded, (ECF No. 29). Finally, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), (ECF No. 27), to which no party responded.

II. Standards of Review

A court will grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4^th Cir. 1991). In deciding a 12(b)(1) motion, courts “may consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4^th Cir. 1999).

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true a complaint's well-pleaded allegations, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4^th Cir. 1999). A court need not, however, accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4^th Cir. 2009).

Under Rule 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Rule 12(c) motions are analyzed under the same standard as those under Rule 12(b)(6), except that courts may consider the answer as well as the complaint. See Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. V. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4^th Cir. 2002). Thus, the court assumes all facts alleged in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Burbach Broad Co. of Del., 278 F.3d at 406.

III. Analysis

A. The United States' Motion to Dismiss

The United States argues that the claim against it should be dismissed because it is barred by sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 18-1, at 4). Under the sovereign immunity doctrine, the United States generally “may not be sued without its consent.” Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4^th 311, 363 (4^th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). Congress may, however, enact statutes that waive the government's sovereign immunity for certain causes of action. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court have described the waiver of sovereign immunity as “a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Robinson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 917 F.3d 799, 801 (4^th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 212). Thus, when a plaintiff sues the federal government and the government moves to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds, the plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that the government has waived sovereign immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.” Id. at 802.^[2]

Plaintiff's complaint does not identify any basis for a waiver or abrogation of sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 2). In her response to the United States' motion to dismiss, she appears to argue that the government's sovereign immunity has been “nullified” by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. (ECF No. 21, at 3). The FTCA “was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort.” Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 506 (2013) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962)). To that end, the statute permits a plaintiff to bring a tort claim for “money damages” against the United States “in accordance with the law of the place where the [alleged tortious] act . . . occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

The FTCA does not, however, waive sovereign immunity for every tort claim for money damages brought against the government. Levin, 568 U.S. at 507. Rather, the statute provides a list of claims to which the immunity waiver does not apply. 28 U.S.C. § 2680. For these excepted claims, the government's immunity is “preserve[d].” Levin, 568 U.S. at 507. Among those exceptions is Section 2680(c), which preserves the government's immunity from “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax.” The Fourth Circuit has held that this exception applies to any suit involving “activities that are even remotely related to the assessment or collection” of “a specific tax debt.” Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910, 915 (4^th Cir. 1995).

The tax exception applies in this case. Plaintiff's sole allegation against the United States is that the IRS improperly seeks to tax her twice for a single debt cancellation. (ECF No. 2). An alleged incorrect assessment of taxes surely “aris[es] in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 71 F.3d 475, 477-78 (2^d Cir. 1995) (holding that the FTCA tax exception applied where the IRS withheld a portion of a tax refund to which the plaintiff claimed it was entitled); Am. Assoc. of Commodity Traders v. Dep't of Treasury, 598 F.2d 1233, 1235 (1^st Cir. 1979) (holding that the FTCA tax exception applied where it was alleged that the IRS “maliciously” over-taxed the plaintiff). Because the tax exception applies to Plaintiff's claim, the United States retains sovereign immunity against that claim.

Plaintiff's only response is that sovereign immunity does not apply here because she filed federal paperwork notifying the IRS of her claim before she sued. (ECF No. 21, at 3). That argument misunderstands the FTCA. To be sure, a plaintiff cannot sue under the FTCA before she “present[s] the claim to the appropriate Federal agency” and the agency denies it in writing. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Meeting that prerequisite, however, merely allows a plaintiff to bring a suit that the FTCA otherwise permits. It does not remove the government's sovereign immunity for claims to which the FTCA's immunity waiver does not apply in the first place. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Because sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs' tax claim altogether, her compliance with the FTCA's notice requirement does not make the United States any less immune.^[3]

B. Plaintiff's Motion to Sever and Remand

Plaintiff moves to sever and remand her claim against TMCC. (ECF No. 20). TMCC opposes the motion, in part because “[s]evering the co-defendants at this stage of the litigation would . . . be a waste of judicial resources.” (ECF No. 23-1, at 2). The United States takes no position on severance and remand of the claim against TMCC. (ECF No. 25, at 1). None of the parties brief the legal standards that govern this motion.

The United States removed this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which states that a federal d...