Libby v. City Of Gridley

MICHAEL A. LIBBY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GRIDLEY, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-00017-JAM-AC

United States District Court, E.D. California

November 16, 2021

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

JOHN A. MENDEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Michael A. Libby ("Plaintiff") brings this Section 1983 action against the City of Gridley, the Gridley Police Department, Gridley Police Chief Rodney W. Harr, Gridley Police Sergeant Farr, and Gridley Police Officer Pasley ("Defendants"). First Amended Complaint ("FAC") at 2, ECF No. 21. Pending before the Court are two motions: Defendants' motion to dismiss Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 32, and Plaintiff's motion to strike, PL's Mot., ECF No. 35.^[1] Plaintiff opposed Defendants' Motion. PL's Opp'n, ECF No. 40. Defendants replied. Defs.' Reply, ECF No. 42. Defendants also opposed Plaintiff's Motion. Defs.' Opp'n ECF No. 39. Plaintiff replied. PL's Reply, ECF No. 41. After consideration of the parties' briefing and relevant legal authority, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss and denies Plaintiff's motion to strike.

I . BACKGROUND

The parties are intimately familiar with the factual background of this case as previously set forth in the operative complaint, the parties' briefings, and the Court's prior order. See Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss ("Prior Order") at 1-3, ECF No. 20. These material facts are not restated here.

On May 17, 2021, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. See generally Prior Order. On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding Sergeant Farr as a named Defendant. See FAC. Defendants again move to dismiss. See Defs.' Mot. On June 30, 2021, Defendants filed an answer. See Answ., ECF No. 31. Plaintiffs move to strike affirmative defenses asserted by Defendants in their answer. See PI.'s Mot.

II. OPINION

A. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike

A Rule 12(f) motion asks the court to strike any "insufficient defense" from an answer. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). An affirmative defense may be insufficient as a matter of law or as a matter of pleading. Butcher v. City of Marysville, No. 2:18-cv-02765-JAM-CKD, 398 F.Supp.3d 715, 728 (E.D. Cal. 2019)(internal citations omitted). Motions to strike affirmative defenses are "regarded with disfavor because of the limited importance . . . and because they are often used as a delaying tactic." Brooks v. Vitamin World USA Corp., No. 20-cv-01485-MCE-KJN, 2021 WL 4777014, at *l (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2021) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, "courts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving party before granting the requested relief." Id. "Where no such prejudice is demonstrated, motions to strike may therefore be denied even though the offending matter was literally within one or more of the categories set forth in Rule 12(f)." Id.

Here, Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant's affirmative defenses. See generally PI.'s Mot. Plaintiff first argues affirmative defenses are subject to the plausibility pleading standard. Id. at 2-3. This argument, however, has been squarely rejected by this Court, see Xiong v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00508-JAM-EFB, 2019 WL 3817645, at *l (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019) ("Consistent with its prior decisions, this Court declines to apply the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) pleading standards to affirmative defenses."), and by other Eastern District courts, see e.g. Vitamin World USA Corp., 2021 WL 4777014, at *2 ("District courts in this circuit were previously split on whether the heightened pleading standard announced [in Twombly and Iqbal] applied to affirmative defenses . . . the Ninth Circuit, however, has resolved the spilt in the district courts . . . accordingly, this Court applies the `fair notice' standard, and not the heightened pleading standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal when evaluating motions to strike affirmative defenses."). Plaintiff's first argument thus fails.

Plaintiff next argues that he is not required to show prejudice. PI.'s Mot. at 8. This argument, too, has been rejected by this Court, see Brooks v. Boiling Crab Franchise Co. LLC, No. 2:20-cv-01390-JAM-CKD, ECFNo. 12 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2020) (denying plaintiff's motion to strike "because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any cognizable prejudice"), by other Eastern District Courts, see e.g. Vitamin World USA Corp., 2021 WL 4777014, at *l (explaining "courts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving party before granting the requested relief"), and by other district courts within the Ninth Circuit, see e.g. N.Y.C. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 667 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("Where the moving party cannot adequately demonstrate . . . prejudice, courts frequently deny motions to strike `even though the offending matter was literally within one or more of the categories set forth in Rule 12(f).'"). Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's contention, a showing of prejudice is required. Plaintiff has not demonstrated prejudice. See PI.'s Mot.; see also PI.'s Reply. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to strike is denied.

B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the complaint as not alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b) (6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While "detailed factual allegations" are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more than `` [ t ]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the complaint, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory `factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

Here, Defendants move to dismiss the claims against the City of Gridley and the Gridley Police Department, see Defs.' Mot. at 3-5, as well as the claims against Chief Harr and Sergeant Farr, see id. at 6-15.

1. Claims Against the City and Police Department

Specifically, Defendants City of Gridley and Gridley Police Department seek to dismiss the fourth claim for violation of the Rehabilitation Act ("Rehab Act") and the fifth claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Defs.' Mot. at 3-6; Defs.' Reply at 2-3. The Court previously dismissed these two claims for failure to allege disability with the requisite factual specificity. Prior Order at 5. Defendants argue that the FAC still does not contain sufficient facts to maintain these claims. Defs.' Mot. at 1, 3-6.

As explained in the Court's prior order, courts analyze ADA and Rehab Act claims together because they provide identical remedies, procedures, and rights. Prior Order at 4 (citing to Tennyson v. Cty. of Sacramento, No. 2:19-cv-00429-KJM, 2020 WL 4059568, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2020)). To state a claim under Section 504 of the Rehab Act, a plaintiff must allege: `` (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) he was denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the program receives federal financial assistance." Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that: `` (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability." Id.

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff's allegations as to the elements of disability and reasonable accommodation are sufficient. Defs.' Mot. at 5 ("In sum Plaintiff's FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate he was disabled, that Defendants were aware of his disability, and that they failed to accommodate him."); PI.'s Opp'n at 1-3. As to disability, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that he has added sufficient facts to survive the motion to dismiss. PI.'s Opp'n at 1-2. Plaintiff added the following allegations to the FAC: "Since 1995, [Plaintiff] has struggled with a persistent and ongoing injury to his left arm and shoulder, originating with a torn rotator cuff he experienced when he was involved in a rollover vehicle accident. In 2006, [Plaintiff] underwent a `clean up' surgery on his injured arm, in order to remove scar tissue around the site of the injury. In 2015, [Plaintiff] received a `total shoulder replacement' surgery at the Cleveland Shoulder Institute. In July 2020, [Plaintiff's] employer placed him on `non-industrial disability' for six-months, due to his arm injury. [Plaintiff's] injured arm is a source of consistent soreness and nerve pain which substantially limits his ability to perform manual tasks, including lifting or putting pressure on the injured arm. [Plaintiff's] injured arm continuously causes him pain and imposes...