Liddell v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis, 72-0100C(5).

686 F. Supp. 235

Craton LIDDELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., Defendants.

No. 72-0100C(5).

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, E.D.

May 10, 1988.

William P. Russell, Joseph McDuffie, St. Louis, Mo., for Liddell, et al.

Michael A. Middleton, Columbia, Mo., William Taylor, Washington D.C., Wayne C. Harvey, St. Louis, Mo., for Caldwell/NAACP.

Craig M. Crenshaw, Jr., Jeremiah Glassman, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Educational Opportunities Litigation Section, Washington D.C., for U.S.A., Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div.

James J. Wilson, City Counselor, St. Louis, Mo., for City of St. Louis, Mo.

Anthony J. Sestric, St. Louis, Mo., for Collector of Revenue for the City of St. Louis.

Charles Werner, St. Louis, Mo., for Nat. Educ. Ass'n.

Charles R. Oldham, St. Louis, Mo., for Teacher's Local Union 420.

Shulamith Simon, St. Louis, Mo., for amicus curiae—Court Appointed.

Kenneth C. Brostron, St. Louis, Mo., for Board of Educ. for the City of St. Louis (City Bd.).

Michael J. Fields, Asst. Missouri Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for State of Mo.

Andrew J. Minardi, Joseph D. Ferry, St. Louis, Mo., for St. Louis County.

Joseph Neimann, Eric Schmitz, Timothy R. Kellett, St. Louis, Mo., for Special School Dist.

Henry D. Menghini, Robert J. Krehbiel, St. Louis, Mo., for Affton and Lindbergh.

Darold E. Crotzer, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., for Bayless, Jennings, Normandy and Wellston.

Bertram W. Tremayne, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., for Brentwood and University City.

George J. Bude, St. Louis, Mo., for Clayton.

Frank Susman, St. Louis, Mo., for Ferguson-Florissant.

Robert P. Baine, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., for Hazelwood.

Robert G. McClintock, St. Louis, Mo., for Ladue.

Richard Ulrich, James Sanders, St. Louis, Mo., for Maplewood and Richmond Heights.

John Gianoulakis, Mark Bremer, St. Louis, Mo., for Mehlville, Pattonville and Ritenour.

Donald J. Stohr, James Erwin, R.J. Robertson, St. Louis, Mo., for Parkway.

Edward E. Murphy, Jr., Garry Seltzer, St. Louis, Mo., for Riverview Gardens.

Douglas A. Copeland, Robert W. Copeland, St. Louis, Mo., for Rockwood and Webster Groves.

Kenneth V. Byrne, St. Louis, Mo., for Valley Park.

MEMORANDUM

LIMBAUGH, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the State's motion for clarification of the extent of its responsibility for funding of interdistrict transfers, L(1715)87, and its supplemental memo in support, L(1776)88. Hazelwood School District, certain county school districts, Parkway School District, the City Board, the Caldwell-NAACP plaintiffs, Liddell plaintiffs, and the City of St. Louis have filed responses. L(1758)88, L(1760)88, L(1761)88, L(1762)88, L(1764)88, L(1769)88 and L(1774), respectively.

The State has adjusted the host district incentive payments to six county districts (Brentwood, Webster Groves, Ritenour, Ladue, Kirkwood and Hazelwood) because these districts are accepting transfers in excess of 25%. The State believes its fiscal responsibility extends only to an attainment of individual Plan Ratios and any school district taking in transfers past their Plan Ratio and especially more than necessary to reach the 25% Plan Goal does so at its own financial risk. In its supplemental memo, the State expands upon the issue of fiscal responsibility for city-to-county transfers by reiterating its position that there is no legal obligation upon any county district to reach the 25% Plan Goal, and furthermore Liddell VII set a limit of 15,000 transfers. The State argues that the 15,000 figure approximates the number of transfers if all participating county districts reach their Plan Ratios, because if all participating county districts were obligated to reach Plan Goals (of 25%), there would be in excess of 19,000 transfers.

The county districts' collective position is two-fold. Firstly, they believe they should not be penalized for over-estimating the number of transfers needed at the start of the school year because it is virtually impossible to forecast attendance in order to maintain an absolute 25% (the State is willing to give a ½% leeway). The county districts' estimates try to account for the natural growth of the resident student population, the overall student population, and anticipated "withdrawals." Furthermore, the Settlement Agreement provides for adjustment of host district fiscal incentive payments for actual enrollment of transfers. Section X.B.1 calls for adjustments in January and June of each school year to reflect actual number of transfers attending in each county district. Discrepancies in payments are corrected at that time. Secondly, they argue that Liddell VII did set a limit of 15,000 city-to-county transfers, however, the county districts are still obligated under the Settlement Agreement to reach and maintain the 25% Plan Goal. Thus, the county districts conclude that they are obligated to accept transfers towards reaching the Plan Goal until the 15,000 transfer limit is met.

The City Board, the Caldwell-NAACP plaintiffs, and the Liddell plaintiffs argue that there is no 15,000 limit on transfers and that the Settlement Agreement obligates the county districts to continue accepting transfers in order to reach and maintain the 25% Plan Goal even if their individual Plan Ratios are met. They argue that the 15,000 figure referenced in Liddell VII simply reiterates the Settlement Agreement's estimate of the number of transfers if all participating districts met their Plan Ratios. They further argue that the State's funding responsibility does not stem from the Settlement Agreement, but rather its liability as a constitutional violator. Thus, the State is fiscally responsible for interdistrict transfers even beyond the 25% Plan Goal. The City Board and both plaintiffs believe that the State's funding obligation only ends when the vestiges of segregation have been eliminated and a unitary system has been established.

The City of St. Louis believes that the Settlement Agreement obligates the county districts to accept transfers to reach and maintain the 25% Plan Goal, however, not more than 15,000 total transfer students. The City suggests that the State, City Board and the County Districts should work out an agreement regarding responsibility for cost of students in excess of 15,000.

In reaching its determinations, the Court has carefully reviewed the parties' arguments, Liddell VII and the Settlement Agreement. The issues raised by the State's motion place this Court in the difficult position of second-guessing the motives and reasoning behind the Liddell VII decision and the Settlement Agreement. This Court does not have the benefit of having been privy to the negotiations which resulted in the Settlement Agreement, nor does it possess the necessary skills to fathom the actual meaning of the language in Liddell VII. Thus, this Court will make its findings upon its interpretation of Liddell VII and the Settlement Agreement.

An examination of the plain language of the Settlement Agreement reveals several significant things. The Agreement in principle, which sets down the basis for the Settlement Agreement (Section I), clearly points out that the five basic elements of the Settlement Agreement are "at best statements of broad principles." One of these "broad principles" is the anticipated number of transfers by virtue of the Settlement Agreement. Section I.A.1.c. speaks of an estimate on the number of student transfers based upon 1980 Fall data reflecting declining enrollments. The 15,000 figure is specifically referred to as a "reasonable working figure". Nowhere in the Settlement Agreement is the 15,000 figure utilized as an absolute cap on the number of transfers. Instead, it is only an estimate of the number of transfers if all participating county districts were to reach their Plan Ratios. While it is true that Liddell VII makes reference to the 15,000 figure, there is nothing in Liddell VII to suggest that the Court of Appeals was setting a 15,000 ceiling on interdistrict transfers. It would appear from the total context of Liddell VII, that the Court of Appeals' statements were a reflection of its reading of the Settlement Agreement. The difference in interpretation of the Settlement Agreement by this Court to the Court of Appeals is debatable; however, it is not debatable that the appellate court affirmed the Settlement Agreement (with revisions not applicable here) as the guidelines by which the Interdistrict Plan operates. This Court finds that these guidelines do not set down a 15,000 limit on the number of transfers.

Another aspect of the Settlement Agreement pertains to Plan goals. This Court has already found that Section XII.D specifically requires each of the participating county districts, which has received final judgment for reaching its Plan Ratio to continue accepting transfer students in order to achieve and maintain the 25% Plan Goal. See, Order L(1631)87.

What remains in question is how long are the county districts obligated to accept transfers in striving for the Plan Goal, and the extent of the State's funding responsibility. The Settlement Agreement does not contain a termination date. What it does contain is a five-year stay of litigation. See Sections I.A.5 and XII. Section XII clearly establishes that the 5-year stay is a...