Liebenguth v. Quiros

1

DAVID G. LIEBENGUTH Petitioner, v. ANGEL QUIROS ET AL. Respondents.

No. 22-CV-00285

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

May 10, 2023

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On February 21, 2022, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 2254 and 2241,^[1] in which he asserts that his 2016 conviction and sentence for breach of peace violated his First Amendment right to free speech. As he must, Petitioner claims that the Connecticut Supreme Court's determination to the contrary violated clearly controlling United States Supreme Court precedent. The State of Connecticut opposes the Petition. For the following reasons, the Petition is DENIED.

Procedural History

On May 16, 2016, following a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of tampering with a witness in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-151 and one count of breach of peace in the second degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat § 53-181. On August 9, 2016, the court sentenced Petitioner to four years of incarceration and four years of probation on the tampering conviction, which was to run consecutively to his sentence of six months of incarceration and two years of probation on the breach of peace conviction. On April 17, 2018, however, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed Petitioner's breach of peace conviction. See State v. Liebenguth, 181 Conn.App 37 (2018). The state sought review of the Appellate Court's decision in the Connecticut Supreme Court, and on August 27, 2020, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's decision, affirming the Petitioner's breach of peace conviction. Petitioner subsequently sought review from the Supreme Court of the United States, but his petition for writ of certiorari was denied on February 22, 2021. See Liebenguth v. Connecticut, 141 S.Ct. 1394 (Mem) (2021). This Court received the current Petition on February 21, 2022.^[2]

Facts^[3]

The Appellate Court set forth the facts the jury could have reasonably found as follows. On August 28, 2014, Michael McCargo (“McCargo”), a parking enforcement officer in New Canaan, Connecticut, ticketed Petitioner's car for being parked in a metered space without payment. Before McCargo left the area, Petitioner came back to his car and engaged in conversation with McCargo about the ticket. Petitioner said that the parking authority was “unfucking believable” and accused McCargo of issuing a parking ticket “because my car is white...[N]o, [you gave] me a ticket because I'm white.”^[4] Petitioner flared his hands and added emphasis to the profanity. As Petitioner walked toward his vehicle, he said to McCargo, “remember Ferguson.”^[5] At trial, McCargo testified that once both men were back in their vehicles, he heard Petitioner say, “fucking n*ggers.” McCargo believed that this statement, paired with the statement about Ferguson, implied that what had happened recently in Ferguson, Missouri “was going to happen to him.” Mallory Frangione, a young woman who witnessed the incident in the parking lot, also testified at trial. She observed that Petitioner moved his hands and body in an aggressive, irate way; that he raised his voice; and that he took steps toward McCargo during their interaction. She also described that Petitioner, once back in his car, circled the parking lot twice before pulling up next to McCargo. Frangione further confirmed that she heard Petitioner mention Ferguson and use profanity.

As McCargo drove off to continue his patrol, Petitioner drove by his car, turned to him with an angry expression, and repeated, louder this time, “fucking n*ggers.” McCargo reported this incident to the New Canaan police, and Petitioner was later arrested in connection with the incident. At trial, after the state rested, Petitioner moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. Ruling from the bench, the trial court found, in relevant part:

“[Considering.. .the content of the defendant's speech taken in context and in light of his belligerent tone, his aggressive stance, the fact that he was walking towards Mr. McCargo and moving his hands in an aggressive manner, there's no other interpretation other than these are fighting words. And he uttered the phrase not once but twice.so for those reasons, the court rejects the defendant's claim that either or both of these statements were protected first amendment speech.”

State v. Liebenguth, 181 Conn.App. at 44-45.

Standard of Review

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, the petitioner must properly exhaust his state court remedies. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The petitioner must present the essential factual and legal bases for the federal claims to each appropriate state court, including the highest state court capable of reviewing it, to afford the state courts a full and fair “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And the presentment to the state courts must be sufficient to alert the state court that the petitioner is asserting a federal claim. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). “The exhaustion requirement is designed to avoid the ‘unseemly' result of a federal court ‘upset[ting] a state court conviction without ‘first according the state courts an ‘opportunity to ... correct a constitutional violation.'” Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 527 (2017) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)).^[6]

Further, the federal court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a state court conviction only if the petitioner claims that his custody violates the Constitution or federal laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The federal court cannot grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody with regard to any claim that was rejected on the merits by the state court unless the adjudication of the claim in state court either:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

(2) or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The federal law defined by the Supreme Court “may be either a generalized standard enunciated in the Court's case law or a bright-line rule designed to effectuate such a standard in a particular context.” Kennaugh v. Miller, 289 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 909 (2002). Clearly established federal law is found in holdings, not dicta, at the time of the state court decision. See White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). Second Circuit law which does not have a counterpart in Supreme Court jurisprudence cannot provide a basis for federal habeas relief. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778 (2010) (holding that court of appeals erred in relying on its own decision in federal habeas action); see also Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005) (finding that absent a Supreme Court case establishing a particular right, federal court inference of such a right is not a basis upon which to grant federal habeas relief).

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law where the state court applies a rule different from that set forth by the Supreme Court or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on essentially the same facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court law when the court has correctly identified the governing law but unreasonably applies that law to the facts of the case. The state court decision must be more than incorrect; it must be “‘so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.' ” Virginia v. LeBlanc, 582 U.S. 91, 94 (2017) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)); see also Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (federal habeas relief warranted only where the state criminal justice system has experienced an “extreme malfunction”); andSchriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (objective unreasonableness is “a substantially higher threshold” than incorrectness). Even clear error will not establish an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. See LeBlanc, 582 U.S. at 94 (quoting Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (per curiam)).

When reviewing a habeas petition, the federal court presumes that the factual determinations of the state court are correct. Here, Petitioner does not challenge the factual determinations of the state court. Finally, the federal court's review under Section 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011).

Discussion

Petitioner identifies a single ground for relief-that his conviction violates the First Amendment and the Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling to the contrary is incompatible with federal law. This Court disagrees, and for the reasons that follow, concludes that the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of any established First Amendment jurisprudence.^[7]

In reviewing the Appellate Court's decision to reverse Petitioner's breach of peace conviction, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the following question: “[Did] the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the defendant's conviction...