Liender v. L3Harris Techs.

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JOEY LIENDER, Plaintiff, v. L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., CHARLES DENERIS, and BRIAN SPENCER, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-00081-CMR

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division

March 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' [45] & [51] MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Cecilia M. Romero, Magistrate Judge

All parties in this case have consented to the undersigned conducting all proceedings, including entry of final judgment (ECF 10). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. Before the court are two Motions Defendant L3Harris Technologies' (L3Harris) Motion to Dismiss (L3Harris' Motion) (ECF 45) and Defendants Charles Deneris and Brian Spencer's Motion to Dismiss (Individual Defendants' Motion) (ECF 51). The court also considers each of the Motions' respective Oppositions (ECF 52; ECF 57) and Reply Memoranda (ECF 55; ECF 58). Having carefully considered the relevant filings, the court finds that oral argument is not necessary and decides this matter on the written memoranda. See DUCivR 7-1(g). For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS the Motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's action arises from his time working, and later his firing, as a program manager for L3Harris (ECF 41 at ¶¶ 22, 272). This spanned roughly from 2010 to 2021 (id.). According to Plaintiff, L3Harris was his employer and is a “corporation” and “a Prime Contractor and a Subcontractor to the U.S. Department of Defense” (id. at ¶¶ 7, 29). And both the Individual Defendants were at some point Plaintiff's supervisors (id. at ¶¶ 50, 72). Relevant to the Motions, Plaintiff alleges to be part of a protected class as he is a person of Persian descent born outside of the United States (id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff also alleges L3Harris “is a Public Entity” and “its employees public entity employees” under the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act (UPPEA), or Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-1 (id. at ¶ 30).

Plaintiff alleges that on or about 2011 to 2012, after receiving positive yearly reviews, he engaged in protected activity by raising good faith questions to his management regarding off the clock work, and this protected activity led to later racial discrimination and retaliation by Defendants (ECF 41 at ¶¶ 32, 325-28). This concern originally regarded L3Harris' Communication Systems West (CSW); a program used to account for time spent working on projects for L3Harris (id. at ¶ 32). According to Plaintiff, CSW was not accurately reflecting employee work performed outside of regular business hours, helping L3Harris gain an economic advantage against its competitors, and forcing employees to forgo pay (id. at 53-56). Plaintiff further alleges unlawful conduct from Defendants including to but not limited to discrimination and retaliation via negative performance reviews, accusations of false timecard violations, spreading false rumors, and inaction on sexual assault (id. at ¶¶ 236, 243, 153).

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is the operative complaint and asserts sixteen causes of action against L3Harris and the Individual Defendants (collectively, Defendants) (id. at 47 - 84).^[1]L3Harris' Motion asks the court to “dismiss all but Plaintiff's Title VII and ADA claims” (Causes of action 1 and 4) with prejudice (ECF 45 at 1). L3Harris argues that all of Plaintiff's state law claims (Causes of action 2, 3, 9-16) are preempted by the Utah Antidiscrimination Act (UADA) and should be dismissed because they amount to nothing more than discrimination or retaliation claims (id. at 4). L3Harris further argues that the part of Plaintiff's first cause of action under the UADA (the other part is under Title VII) is subject to dismissal because any subsequent state law claims under the UADA are now barred (id.). L3Harris then argues that Plaintiff's causes of action alleging constitutional right violations under the UPPEA, or any invoking Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Bivens) (Causes of action 5, 6, 7, and 8) should be dismissed as L3Harris' status as a private actor precludes these claims (id. at 4-5). L3Harris also argues any remaining causes of action should be dismissed as they are barred given Plaintiff's at-will employment at the time of the suffered discrimination (id. at 5). Finally, as to Plaintiff's fraud and misrepresentation claims, L3Harris argues these fail for failure to state a plausible claim (id.).

The Individual Defendants' Motion joins L3Harris' Motion in making the same arguments for dismissing all but the Title VII and ADA claims against them (all but Causes of action 1 and 4) (ECF 51 at 4). Alternatively, as to the non-Title VII and ADA claims, the Individual Defendants argue they should be dismissed because they are not public employers, they were not Plaintiff's employers, and because Plaintiff has failed to state plausible claims (Causes of action 2, 3, and 516) (id. at 6-13). Lastly, the Individual Defendants argue Plaintiff's first and fourth causes of action should be dismissed against them because neither Title VII nor the ADA allow for individual liability (id. at 5).

Having considered the filings submitted by the parties, the court turns to the arguments.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570) (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In this review, a “court accepts as true well-pleaded factual allegations and views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hendershot v. Gurstel L. Firm, P.C., No. 2:20-cv-00118-DBB-DAO, 2020 WL 8083573, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 17, 2020) (citing Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 76163 (D. Utah Jan. 8, 2021).

Additionally, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and further provides that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). “Rule 8 serves the important purpose of requiring plaintiffs to state their claims intelligibly so as to inform the defendants of the legal claims being asserted.” Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In undertaking this analysis, the court is mindful that Plaintiff is acting pro se and that his filings are liberally construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Still, a pro se plaintiff must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994)). The court “will [also] not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997)).

III. ANALYSIS

Although not fully fleshed out in either of the Motions, L3Harris' Motion (ECF 45 at 5 n.3) and the Individual Defendants' Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss (ECF 58 at 8), raise Rule 8 concerns. The court agrees. First, several of Plaintiff's causes of action repeatedly allege multiple, combined, or independent theories for the causes of action, muddling the claims and the factual support for those claims. For example, Plaintiff's second cause of action for common law wrongful termination raises bald references to antitrust violations (ECF 41 at ¶ 343), racial discrimination (id. at ¶¶ 345, 353, 357), sexual harassment (id. at ¶ 346), an ADA violation (id. at ¶ 347), and even a deprivation of a property interest without due process of law (id. at ¶ 355). Similarly, Plaintiff's sixth cause of action is purportedly brought under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but also again repeats a myriad of factually unsupported statutory violations (id. at ¶ 409), alleges another deprivation of a property interest without due process of law (id.), and racial discrimination (id. at ¶ 414). Plaintiff's excessive repetition of allegations and causes of action makes his Second Amended Complaint difficult to understand.

Additionally and somewhat related to the concern above, there are several instances in which Plaintiff seems to allege a type of violation but fails to substantiate any legal grounds for relief under the relevant cause of action or allege specific facts against each Defendant. For example, Plaintiff's twelfth cause of action cites to the False Claims Act twice (ECF 41 at ¶¶ 496, 500), but the twelfth cause of action is supposedly a claim for negligent infliction of emotion distress. Likewise, the thirteenth cause of action is allegedly brought against all Defendants (ECF 41 at 75), but it first focuses on statements allegedly made by Defendant Brian Spencer, and then switches to discuss L3Harris' code of conduct and how the statements in it are fraudulent as to some unidentified defendant (ECF 41 at...