Lighter v. Carroll

231 N.E.3d 147

2023 IL 128468

Jamie LIGHTER, Appellee,

v.Kimberly Porter CARROLL, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Donald Christopher, Deceased, Appellant.

(Docket No. 128468)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed October 26, 2023.

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. John H. Ehrlich, Judge, presiding.

Ellen J. O’Rourke and Jean M. Bradley, of Yvonne M. Kaminski & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.

Yao O. Dinizulu, of Dinizulu Law Group, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.

Leslie J. Rosen, of Leslie J. Rosen Attorney at Law, P.C., and Richard F. Burke Jr., of Clifford Law Offices, P.C., both of Chicago, Rory Weiler and Charles J. Northrup, of Illinois State Bar Association, of Springfield, and John R. Wienold, of John R. Wienold and Associates, Ltd., of Aurora, for amici curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association et al.

OPINION

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 On January 19, 2018, the plaintiff, Jamie Lichter, filed a personal injury action in the circuit court of Cook County against Donald Christopher for injuries she suffered in a car accident on February 27, 2016. Unknown to the plaintiff at the time, Christopher had passed away on June 12, 2017. An estate was never opened for Christopher following his death.

¶ 2 On April 23, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to section 2-1008(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1008(b) (West 2018)) to appoint Kimberly Porter Carroll as the special representative of Christopher’s estate for the purpose of defending the lawsuit, which the circuit court granted. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, naming Porter Carroll as the special representative of Christopher’s estate and the defendant in the case. Eventually, counsel for Christopher’s insurer, State Farm, appeared on behalf of the defendant.

¶ 3 On March 3, 2020, the defendant, now represented by State Farm, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (West 2020)), arguing that the action was time barred. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff never moved to appoint a personal representative of Christopher’s estate prior to the statute of limitations expiring, as she was required to do pursuant to section 13-209(c) of the Code (735 ILCS 13-209(c) (West 2020)). The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.

¶ 4 The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s order. 2022 IL App (1st) 200828, 468 Ill. Dec. 346, 220 N.E.3d 1125. The appellate court held that, because an estate was never opened for Christopher and there was no personal representative to defend the lawsuit, the plaintiff acted properly in moving to appoint a special representative pursuant to section 13-209(b)(2) of the Code (735 ILCS 13-209(b)(2) (West 2018)). 2022 IL App (1st) 200828, ¶ 46, 468 Ill.Dec. 346, 220 N.E.3d 1125. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 5 BACKGROUND

¶ 6 On February 27, 2016, the plaintiff’s car was rear-ended by a car driven by Christopher. On January 19, 2018, the plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint against Christopher. Shortly after filing her complaint and after the two-year statute of limitations had expired, the plaintiff learned that Christopher had passed away on June 12, 2017. No letters of office were ever issued to open an estate on Christopher’s behalf, and thus, there was no personal representative to defend the lawsuit.

¶ 7 On April 23, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to appoint a special representative for Christopher’s estate pursuant to section 24008(b) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1008(b) (West 2018)). The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint naming Porter Carroll as the special representative and the defendant in the case. Subsequently, counsel for Christopher’s insurer, State Farm, filed an appearance on behalf of Porter Carroll.

¶ 8 On March 3, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 2-619(a) (West 2020)). The defendant’s motion argued that section 13-209(c) of the Code required the plaintiff to move to appoint a personal representative of Christopher’s estate, which she failed to do when she moved to appoint a special representative and thus her action was now untimely.

¶ 9 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint. In its written order, the trial court stated:

"The Code of Civil Procedure requires that a personal representative serve as the placeholder for a defendant who died without the plaintiff’s knowledge prior to filing suit. In this case, the plaintiff named instead a special representative,and the statute of limitations for naming a personal representative has expired. The plaintiff’s error compels this court to grant the defendant’s motion and dismiss the case with prejudice."

¶ 10 The trial court’s order noted that there are "dueling subparagraphs" in section 13-209, subsection (b) and subsection (c), which provide:

"(b) If a person against whom an action may be brought dies before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, and is not otherwise barred:

(1) an action may be commenced against his or her personal representative after the expiration of the time limited for the commencement of the action, and within 6 months after the person’s death;

(2) if no petition has been filed for letters of office for the deceased’s estate, the court, upon the motion of a person entitled to bring an action and after the notice to the party’s heirs or legatees as the court directs and without opening an estate, may appoint a special representative for the deceased party for the purposes of defending the action. If a party elects to have a special representative appointed under this paragraph (2), the recovery shall be limited to the proceeds of any liability insurance protecting the estate and shall not bar the estate from enforcing any claims that might have been available to it as counterclaims.

(c) If a party commences an action against a deceased person whose death is unknown to the party before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, and is not otherwise barred, the action may be commenced against the deceased person’s personal representative if all of the following terms and conditions are met:

(1) After learning of the death, the party proceeds with reasonable diligence to move the court for leave to file an amended complaint, substituting the personal representative as defendant.

(2) The party proceeds with reasonable diligence to serve process upon the personal representative.

(3) If process is served more than 6 months after the issuance of letters of office, liability of the estate is limited as to recovery to the extent the estate is protected by liability insurance.

(4) In no event can a party commence an action under this subsection (c) unless a personal representative is appointed and an amended complaint is filed within 2 years of the time limited for the commencement of the original action." 735 ILCS 5/13-209(b), (c) (West 2020).

¶ 11 Relying upon Relf v. Shatayeva, 2013 IL 114925, 375 Ill.Dec. 726, 998 N.E.2d 18, the trial court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that subsection (b)(2) applies to the facts of this case and instead found that subsection (c) is the relevant authority because the plaintiff did not learn of Christopher’s death until after the statute of limitations had expired. As such, the trial court found that the plaintiff was required to timely appoint a personal representative of Christopher’s estate to defend the lawsuit. The trial court explained:

"Subsection (c) applies in those instances in which a lawsuit is filed without the plaintiff knowing of the defendant’s death and learns of the death after the statute of limitations expired. *** Relf forecloses subsection (b)(2) to a plaintiff who does not know of a defendant’s death ***."

¶ 12 The trial court’s order stated that the plaintiff had the option to move to appoint a personal representative of Christopher’s estate but that she failed to do so within the statute of limitations period, which expired February 27, 2020, pursuant to section 13-209(c)(4) of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/13-209(c)(4) (West 2020) (an amended complaint must be filed against the personal representative within two years of the time limited for the commencement of the original action). Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice.

¶ 13 The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order. 2022 IL App (1st) 200828, ¶ 48, 468 Ill.Dec. 346, 220 N.E.3d 1125. In so ruling, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that subsection (c) affects subsection (b)(2), as subsection (b)(2) "stands separate and apart." Id. ¶ 28. The appellate court explained:

"If defendant is right, then Relf stands for the proposition that, if a plaintiff does not learn of a defendant’s death until after the limitations period has expired, that plaintiff must open an estate, get a personal representative appointed, and sue that personal representative. The new option of suing a special representative, created in 1997 for situations where no estate has been opened, would be strictly limited, in defendant’s mind, to situations where the plaintiff knows of the defendant’s death before the limitations period has expired. The trial court read Relf that way, too, though the trial court found that interpretation of subsection (b) ‘troubling.’

We do not read Relf as holding anything so extreme." Id. ¶¶ 37-38.

¶ 14 The appellate court concluded that Relf simply...