Link v. Mauz (In re Mauz)

532 B.R. 589

In re: Joseph P. Mauz, DebtorWilliam A. Link Kimberly A. Link, Plaintiffs

v.Joseph P. Mauz, Defendant

CASE NO. 1:12–bk–06672–RNO

ADVERSARY NO. 1:13–ap–00053–RNO

United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 30, 2015

Barry A. Solodky, Nikolaus & Hohenadel, LLP, Lancaster, PA, Frank Nardo, Jr., Lancaster, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Sara A. Austin, Austin Law Firm LLC, York, PA, for Defendant.

OPINION¹

Robert N. Opel, II, Bankruptcy Judge

Plaintiffs, William A. Link and Kimberly A. Link (collectively “Plaintiffs”), commenced the instant Adversary Proceeding against Joseph P. Mauz (“Debtor”). The Plaintiffs brought the present Adversary Proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt allegedly caused by the intentional infliction of emotional distress. After trial, I conclude that the debt owed to the Plaintiffs is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).²

I. Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(I).

II. Facts and Procedural History

A more complete procedural history and recitation of the facts may be obtained by reviewing two prior decisions in this Adversary Proceeding, In re Mauz, 496 B.R. 777 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2013) and In re Mauz, 513 B.R. 273 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2014). The procedural history from the prior Opinions is incorporated by reference.

For purposes of this Opinion, I offer the following procedural and factual background. A voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code was filed on November 19, 2012, by the Debtor. The Debtor filed his schedules of assets and liabilities. Schedules A through J and Summary of Schedules, December 17, 2012, ECF No. 27. The Chapter 7 Trustee filed a report of no distribution on October 27, 2014. Chapter 7 Trustee's Report of No Distribution, October 27, 2014, ECF No. 134.

The present Adversary Proceeding was commenced by a single count Complaint on March 7, 2013, based on a claim of willful and malicious injury. Subsequently, both the Debtor and Plaintiffs filed Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, May 21, 2013, ECF No. 12; Debtor's Motion for Summary Judgment, June 27, 2013, ECF No. 17. The parties briefed the Motions for Summary Judgment and I issued an Opinion denying the Debtor's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. In re Mauz, 496 B.R. at 784. I granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the alleged assault and battery claim and held that the damages for the assault and battery were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). Id. However, I denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the alleged claims for trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. Id.

On February 6, 2014, the Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Amend their Complaint, which included a proposed two count Amended Complaint. Amended Complaint with Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, February 6, 2014, ECF No. 39. The Debtor filed an Answer to the Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Answer to Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, February 19, 2014, ECF No. 44. I issued an Opinion, after briefing and hearings on the Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, granting the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their Complaint to the extent that it amended Count I, the nondischargeability portion, and denying the Motion to Amend the Complaint to the extent it sought to add an objection to discharge. In re Mauz, 513 B.R. at 282.

The Amended Complaint, thereafter, contained only Count I, a Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Amended Complaint, June 16, 2014, ECF No. 63. The Amended Complaint consists of twelve numbered paragraphs and four exhibits. Amended Complaint, June 16, 2014, ECF No. 63. Exhibit A is a copy of the twenty-two-page complaint from litigation between the parties in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania (“State Court Action”). Id. Exhibit B is a copy of the twenty-three-page non-jury trial verdict entered in the State Court Action. Id. Exhibit C is a two-page punitive damages order entered in the State Court Action. Id. Exhibit D is a three-page post-trial order entered in the State Court Action. Id. The Debtor filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. Answer to Amended Complaint, June 19, 2014, ECF No. 64.

The Amended Complaint alleges that, pursuant to § 523(a)(6), the state court judgment obtained against the Debtor is nondischargeable because of the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. After discovery and a pre-trial conference held on October 6, 2014, I issued a Pretrial Order approving the parties' stipulation as to what issues remained for trial. Pre–Trial Order, October 6, 2014, ECF No. 84.

The sole issue remaining for trial, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, was whether or not the Debtor undertook the actions complained of with the requisite intent to sustain a finding of nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(6). Id. The monetary amount of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Debtor was, therefore, not at issue in the trial of this Adversary Proceeding and the parties agreed that it was an all or nothing proposition. Id. The trial began on February 20, 2015, and was concluded on May 1, 2015. Thereafter, I took the matter under advisement.

The matter is now ripe for decision and my holding is limited to whether or not the Debtor undertook the actions complained of with the requisite intent to sustain a finding of nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

III. Discussion

A. General Elements to Prove a Nondischargeability Claim

In a nondischargeability proceeding, the bankruptcy court must address two separate questions. First, does the plaintiff/creditor hold an enforceable obligation under state law? Second, is the debt nondischargeable under a provision of the Bankruptcy Code? Black v. Gigliotti, 514 B.R. 439, 444 (E.D.Pa.2014) ; In re August, 448 B.R. 331, 346 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2011). A bankruptcy court looks to state law to determine whether or not there is an enforceable claim against the debtor. In re Hazelton, 304 B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2003).

As noted above, Exhibit A was filed with the Amended Complaint. Exhibit A is a complaint filed by the Plaintiffs in the State Court Action. Exhibit B was also filed with the Amended Complaint and is a non-jury trial verdict entered in the State Court Action. The state court found in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Debtor for, among others, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is the only count at issue in this Adversary Proceeding, based on the Amended Complaint.

A determination of whether the Plaintiffs have met their burden concerning an enforceable obligation will ultimately be based upon Pennsylvania law. However, it is important to remember that the Bankruptcy Code broadly defines the term “claim.” Section 101(5), in part, provides the term means: “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 105(5). The Supreme Court stated that the term “claim,” has the “broadest available definition....” F.C.C. v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302, 123 S.Ct. 832, 839, 154 L.Ed.2d 863 (2003) ; also see, In re Ruitenberg, 745 F.3d 647, 651–53 (3d Cir.2014) ; In re Grossman's Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir.2010).

In this case, the Plaintiffs' claim is based on a state court judgment finding, in part, that the Debtor was liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pennsylvania recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Corbett v. Morgenstern, 934 F.Supp. 680, 684 (E.D.Pa.1996). Under Pennsylvania state law, the gravamen of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is outrageous conduct by the tortfeasor. Corbett v. Morgenstern, 934 F.Supp. at 684 ; Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 150, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa.1998). A tortfeasor who by “extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another” is liable for such emotional distress. Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. at 150, 720 A.2d 745. Thus, a court must find egregious conduct before a tortfeasor is liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 151, 720 A.2d 745.

Here, the state court found that the Debtor engaged in a course of conduct which, as a whole, rose to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Amended Complaint, Exhibit B, June 16, 2014, ECF No. 63. That course of conduct included the Debtor filing ten complaints against the Plaintiffs in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 27, electronic page 127–28. The alleged complaints by the Debtor against the Plaintiffs were for: (1) harassment; (2) ejectment to locate a boundary line and a claim for damages; (3) harassment; (4) disorderly conduct; (5) damages from storm water runoff; (6) conversion of a pool cover; (7) conversion of a tow chain; (8) violation of a barking dog ordinance; (9) violation of a barking dog ordinance; and (10) harassment. Id. The Plaintiffs were found not guilty, the claims were dismissed, or the claims were withdrawn in nine of the ten complaints. Id. A default judgment was entered against the Plaintiffs in the boundary line dispute case. That judgment effectively determined the property line between the Debtor and Plaintiffs, who are adjoining property owners. Id. Additionally, the Debtor made over thirty complaints against the Plaintiffs to the Northern Regional Police Department (“Police”) and the Manchester Township municipal offices (“Township”). Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 30, electronic page 155. Most of the complaints, from the evidence introduced at the...