Linlor v. Holman

1

JAMES LINLOR, Plaintiff, v. JOHN HOLMAN, et al., Defendants.

No. 24-1001-DDC-GEB

United States District Court, D. Kansas

August 13, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DANIEL D. CRABTREE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

A land sale in western Kansas has gone awry, and legal chaos has ensued. Defendants John Holman and Marcella Warner Holman-who attempted to buy the land-filed a state court in rem lawsuit against the seller, plaintiff James Linlor's^[1] businesses. In something of a tit for tat plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the Holmans, their businesses, and their attorneys. He claims that defendants and their lawsuit have blocked the sale of his pasture. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a smorgasbord of claims. That smorgasbord is the subject of defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or to Dismiss (Doc. 36), which, as explained later, the court addresses as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.^[2] Plaintiff has responded to the motion.^[3] As explained below, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. This Memorandum and Order also denies plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 21), which the court construes as a sanctions request, and denies plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Quiet Title (Doc. 20).

I. Background

The following facts come from plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1). It isn't a model of narrative clarity. But given plaintiff's pro se status, the court does its best to apprehend the issues that gave rise to this litigation. The court accepts the facts pleaded there as true and views them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the party opposing the motion. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that on a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) the court “accept[s] the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff alleges defendants have blocked the sale of his pasture in Ford County. Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiff has tried to sell the land on multiple occasions: August 2022, March 2023, and August 2023. Id. at 3. Defendants obstructed the August 2022 and March 2023 sales. Id. And defendants interfered with the August 2023 sale, even though they weren't parties to that contract. Id. The court recounts each transaction in detail below.

In August 2022, defendant John Holman and Marcella Warner Holman^[4] bought the land at auction “as is” for $1.25 million. Id. at 4-5. The auction didn't allow contingent offers, but the Holmans made four contingent bids, and plaintiff accepted them. Id. Plaintiff warned the Holmans that he would refuse a fifth contingency bid, but defendants submitted one anyway. Id. Plaintiff, as promised, rejected the bid. Id. at 5. But the Holmans refused to release their sales offer, blocking the sale of the land to another buyer. Id. The Holmans also refused to close on a land sale where a 1031 tax exchange was pending against properties that plaintiff “had been identifying and ingratiating himself with the owners of those investment propert[ies.]” Id. Because of the Holmans, plaintiff can't purchase the new land. Id.

In March 2023, the Holmans again offered to purchase plaintiff's pasture. Id. at 5. The Holmans offered to purchase the property “as is” for $1.25 million. Id. But they refused to close, alleging plaintiff wasn't prepared to close. Id. Plaintiff told the title company he would do whatever was necessary to close the transaction. Id. The Holmans didn't show up at the title company at the agreed-upon date. Id. Plaintiff and the title company offered the Holmans an earnest money check, but they refused to deposit the check. Id. This held the transaction open, violated the sales contract, and blocked plaintiff from selling the land to anyone else. Id.

Critically, in neither the August 2022 nor March 2023 putative transactions did anyone mention an existing lease-use contract in the Seller's Attestation. Id. at 6-7. Defendants knew that no land lease existed because the August 2022 auction didn't list a land lease. Id.

In April 2023, John Holman, acting on behalf of himself and his Black Diamond Partnership, filed a document with the Farm Service Agency claiming to have a written pasture lease agreement with plaintiff's LLC. Id. at 7-8. When FSA asked for a copy of the lease, Mr. Holman returned to the FSA office and admitted that his document was false and withdrew his request. Id.

In August^[5] 2023, plaintiff again tried to sell his land. Id. at 8 (Compl. ¶ 5). None of the defendants were parties to this sale or its related transactions. Id. Nonetheless, defendants interfered with the sale. Id.

In December 2023, defendants Johnathan Holman and Marcella Warner Holman filed a separate lawsuit against plaintiff's limited liability companies. See Exhibits in Support of Notice of Removal, Holman v. Future Growth, LLC, No. 24-1012 (D. Kan. Jan. 17, 2024).^[6] This is an in rem lawsuit originally filed in state court, then removed to our court. Id. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Jonathan Holman and Marcella Warner Holman, in this Future Growth lawsuit, have falsely claimed that a verbal contract for a pasture lease exists. Doc. 1 at 6-7. Plaintiff further alleges that the Holmans sued in their personal names to shield their businesses from counterclaim liability. Id. And, plaintiff alleges, the Holmans have abused the civil litigation process wrongfully. Id.

With this background in mind, the court turns to defendants' motion, starting with the governing legal standard.

II. Legal Standard

Defendants' motion doesn't commit to a single rule of civil procedure. Instead, defendants move under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) “and/or” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Doc. 35 at 1. But defendants already have answered. Doc. 32. So, the court must construe defendants' motion as one under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (requiring a motion under the rule to “be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.” (emphasis added)).

A court evaluates a Rule 12(c) motion under the same standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Atl. Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1160. For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, but it is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Atl. Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1160 (explaining that on a Rule 12(c) motion, the court must “accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). And while this pleading standard doesn't require “‘detailed factual allegations,'” it demands more than a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'” which, as the Supreme Court explained, “‘will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff's Complaint brings a lot of claims.^[7] And, as mentioned above, plaintiff's Complaint isn't a model of clarity. He has divided his Complaint into 15 “Claims” with Claim 1 asserted against defendants Kite and Barngrover, Claims 2-9 asserted against all defendants, and Claims 10-15 asserted against defendants John Holman, Marcella Warner Holman, and their businesses. But not every “Claim” actually asserts a claim and some of the claims assert far more than one cause of action. So, the court pauses here to outline its understanding of the claims the Complaint actually asserts.

Construing plaintiff's Complaint broadly, the court concludes that “Claim 1” asserts nine distinct claims against defendants Kite and Barngrover. The court addresses these nine claims first. It then addresses the claims against the Holmans and their businesses together, construing plaintiff's Complaint to assert nine claims against them. After addressing all claims, the court considers plaintiff's request for sanctions against defendants-including plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 21)-which the court construes as a motion for sanctions. The court then addresses plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Quiet Title (Doc. 20) and closes with its conclusions. It begins with the claims against defendants Kite and Barngrover, below.

A. “Claim 1” against defendants Kite and Barngrover.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Kite is the Holmans' attorney. Doc. 1 at 9. And defendant Barngrover is Kite's assistant. Id. Plaintiff brings “Claim 1” against defendants Kite and Barngrover. Though labeled one claim, Claim 1 actually asserts nine claims: malicious prosecution, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, defamation, conspiracy for conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference, unfair competition, and fraud. Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings against all nine claims. The court considers each, in turn, below.

1. Malicious Prosecution

In “Claim 1,” plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution...