Lintzeris v. City of Chi.

2023 IL 127547

216 N.E.3d 151

465 Ill.Dec. 900

Rita LINTZERIS et al., Appellants,

v.The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee.

Docket No. 127547

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed January 20, 2023

Charles F. Morrissey, René A. Torrado Jr., and Kaitlyn M. Frey, of Morrissey & Donahue, LLC, of Chicago, for appellants.

Celia Meza, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Suzanne M. Loose, and Stephen G. Collins, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.

Brian M. Funk, of OKGC Law, LLC, of Northbrook, for amicus curiae Illinois Counties Risk Management Trust.

CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs Rita Lintzeris, William Moraitis, Zaron Jossel, and Clarence Daniels brought an action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against the City of Chicago (City). Plaintiffs challenged the City's authority to enact an ordinance imposing administrative penalties on the owners of impounded vehicles (Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132 (amended Nov. 16, 2016)). Plaintiffs contended that the ordinance is an invalid exercise of the City's home rule authority because it is preempted by section 11-208.7 of the Illinois Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7 (West 2016) ). The Cook County circuit court dismissed the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016) ), and the appellate court affirmed. 2021 IL App (1st) 192423-U, 2021 WL 2952783. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The Impoundment Ordinance

¶ 4 In 1998, the City enacted an ordinance setting forth the applicable procedures, penalties, and fees that apply to vehicle owners when their vehicle has been impounded because of its use in certain enumerated municipal code offenses. See Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132 (added Apr. 29, 1998). Under the ordinance, as generally relevant here, within 15 days of the impoundment, an owner may request a preliminary hearing, at which an administrative law officer determines within 48 hours whether there is probable cause to believe the owner's vehicle was used in one of the enumerated offenses. Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132(a)(1) (amended Nov. 16, 2016). If the administrative law officer finds probable cause, the vehicle owner may regain possession of the vehicle by paying the administrative penalty applicable to the municipal code offense, plus towing and storage fees, as well as any outstanding debt arising from other vehicle offenses. Id. § 2-14-132(a)(1)-(2). If probable cause is lacking, the vehicle is returned to the owner, and no penalty or fees are owed. Id. § 2-14-132(a)(3).

¶ 5 Additionally, the owner of the vehicle has a right to request a hearing to challenge the impoundment. If the administrative law officer finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle was used in the offense, the owner is liable for the administrative penalty applicable to that offense, plus towing and storage fees. Id. § 2-14-132(b)(3)(A). If the administrative law officer does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner's vehicle was involved, the vehicle is returned, and the owner receives a refund of any penalty and fees paid. Id. § 2-14-132(b)(3)(B). If the owner does not request a hearing or fails to appear at the hearing, the administrative law officer enters a default order imposing the applicable administrative penalty, plus towing and storage fees. Id. § 2-14-132(b)(4). An administrative penalty constitutes a debt due to the City and may be enforced as a judgment in accordance with applicable law. Id. § 2-14-132(c).

¶ 6 The Vehicle Code

¶ 7 The Vehicle Code covers vehicle regulation in the state, including traffic regulation in chapter 11, titled "Rules of the Road." 625 ILCS 5/ch. 11 (West 2016). Article II of chapter 11 concerns obedience to and the effect of traffic laws. Id. ch. 11, art. II. Section 11-207 provides that the provisions in chapter 11 are to be uniform throughout the State; while local authorities can adopt additional traffic regulations, "no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter unless expressly authorized herein." Id. § 11-207. The Vehicle Code further provides within chapter 11 that home rule units, such as the City, cannot adopt inconsistent local police regulations, subject to exceptions not at issue in this case. Id. § 11-208.2.

¶ 8 In 2012, the General Assembly amended the Vehicle Code to add a provision to chapter 11, article II, governing administrative fees and procedures for the release of impounded vehicles. See Pub. Act 97-109, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012) (adding 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7 ). That section authorizes counties and municipalities to "provide by ordinance procedures for the release of properly impounded vehicles" and to impose "a reasonable administrative fee related to [a county's or municipality's] administrative and processing costs associated with the investigation, arrest, and detention of an offender, or the removal, impoundment, storage, and release of the vehicle." 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(a) (West 2016).

¶ 9 Procedural History

¶ 10 In 2017, plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of themselves and a purported class of vehicle owners who either paid administrative penalties or had default judgments entered against them for such penalties under the impoundment ordinance from 2012 to the time of the complaint. Plaintiff Lintzeris alleged that her son borrowed her vehicle and was arrested for driving while intoxicated and possessing unlawful drugs. Her vehicle was impounded, and she paid an administrative penalty, as well as fees for towing and storage. Plaintiff Moraitis alleged that his son was arrested for driving with a suspended license. After a full hearing, an administrative law officer upheld the impoundment of his vehicle and ordered that he pay an administrative penalty, storage costs, and a towing fee. Moraitis did not allege that he paid the penalty or fees. Plaintiff Jossel alleged that his vehicle was impounded after he was arrested for possessing a controlled substance. He paid an administrative penalty, as well as towing and storage fees. Plaintiff Daniels alleged that his vehicle was impounded after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. He alleged that he was assessed an administrative penalty and fees, which he did not pay.

¶ 11 Plaintiffs challenged the impoundment ordinance, alleging that the Vehicle Code prohibits the City from imposing the administrative penalties in connection with a vehicle's impoundment. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that section 11-208.2 expressly limits the City's authority to adopt local police regulations that are inconsistent with chapter 11 and that section 11-208.7 allows for only towing, storage, and other reasonable administrative costs. Therefore, plaintiffs alleged that the impoundment ordinance's imposition of administrative penalties is inconsistent with section 11-208.7 and thereby unenforceable.

¶ 12 In count I of the complaint, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the City is not authorized to impose the penalties. In count II, plaintiffs sought an injunction barring the City from imposing any further administrative penalties. In counts III and IV, plaintiffs asserted claims for unjust enrichment and conversion and sought a refund of administrative penalties collected since 2012, as well as proceeds from the sale of impounded vehicles.

¶ 13 The City then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016). The City argued that plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of law because the ordinance is not inconsistent with section 11-208.7 and because section 11-208.7 does not apply to home rule units. After briefing and a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that prior to the enactment of section 11-208.7 the City had home rule authority to impose the penalties and that adding section 11-208.7 did not preempt the City's home rule authority to impose the penalties because the statute's authorization to impose fees did not include a prohibition of penalties. As an alternative basis, the court determined that section 11-208.7 did not apply to home rule units.

¶ 14 The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 2021 IL App (1st) 192423-U, 2021 WL 2952783. The court found that "nowhere in [section 11-208.7] is there an explicit limitation on the power of a home rule unit to charge an administrative penalty or fine for the underlying violation that led to the impoundment of the vehicle." Id. ¶ 49. Accordingly, the court held that "[t]he impoundment ordinance is not inconsistent with the Vehicle Code and operates concurrently with the Vehicle Code." Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 15 We subsequently allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We also allowed the Illinois Counties Risk Management Trust to file an amicus curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 The central issue in this appeal is whether the City's ordinance, imposing administrative penalties on owners of vehicles impounded for certain municipal violations, is a valid exercise of the City's home rule power. Plaintiffs contend that the statutory provisions of the Vehicle Code and the limitations on home rule authority in the Vehicle Code foreclose the City's imposition of administrative penalties, thus rendering the ordinance unenforceable.

¶ 18 The appeal comes to this court from the circuit court's dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016). A motion to dismiss under that section tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint based on defects apparent on its face. O'Connell v. County of Cook , 2022 IL 127527, ¶ 18, 463 Ill.Dec. 720...