Litten v. GM Components Holdings, LLC

LYNETTE LITTEN, Plaintiff, v. GM COMPONENTS HOLDINGS, LLC, Defendant.

No. 19-CV-926S

United States District Court, W.D. New York

March 9, 2022

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff Lynette Litten seeks damages from her employer, GM Components Holdings, LLC, (“GM”) for violating her rights under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act when co-workers harassed her and when she was subjected to a disciplinary suspension for harassing a co-worker. Before this Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 34), which this Court will grant, for the following reasons.

II. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. This Court takes the facts in the light most favorable to Litten, the non-moving party. See Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2016) (at summary judgment, a court “views the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to ... the non-moving party”).

Litten, a member of the Mohawk Nation, is over 66 years old. (Docket No. 40-3 at pp. 2-4; Docket No. 34-3 at p. 40.) She began working at Delphi Corporation in Lockport, New York, around 2000, and continued to work at the same facility when GM acquired it.

(Docket No. 34-2, ¶¶ 5-6.)

Cathy Palmer was a fellow employee of Litten's at GM. Palmer is a 58-year-old African-American woman. (Id., ¶¶ 13, 58.) Sometime in 2016, Palmer called Litten a “dirty Indian.” (Id., ¶¶ 16.) In September 2017, Litten was involved in an argument with Palmer over seating in the breakroom. (Id., ¶ 11.) Around that time, Palmer “threw parts” at Litten while they were working on the same machine. (Id., ¶ 14.) The parts did not hit Litten. (Id., ¶ 15.) At some point in 2017, Palmer called Litten an “old, stupid thief.” (Id., ¶ 17). In October 2017, Litten complained to GM that Palmer was spraying cleaner on things that Litten touched, arguing about the smell of the break room, and accusing Litten of stealing silverware from the break room. (Id., 24.) Around the same time, Litten also experienced interpersonal issues with Bonnie Lajoie, a Caucasian co-worker, and Joella Smidl, an African-American co-worker. (Id., ¶ 21.)

Litten met with GM's human resources manager Dennis Gilbert about her problems with Palmer, Lajoie, and Smidl. (Id., ¶ 24-25.) When asked at her deposition, “did you find that Gilbert was courteous in his dealings with you?” Litten answered, “he was ok.” (Docket No. 34-3 at p. 35.)^[1]

On October 26, 2017, GM interviewed Litten, Palmer, Smidl, and Lajoie regarding Litten's complaint. (Id., ¶¶ 30-31.) On November 7, 2017, Gilbert held a meeting discussing the interpersonal issues between the employees and reiterating GM's anti-harassment policy. (Id., ¶ 32.) Gilbert, Palmer, Lajoie, and Smidl all attended this meeting.

(Id., ¶ 33.) Litten received no discipline following her October complaint. (Id., ¶ 34.) Palmer, Lajoie, and Smidl all received one-day disciplinary layoffs in connection with GM's investigation of Litten's October complaint. (Id., ¶¶ 35-37.)

On January 25, 2018, Litten's co-worker Meril (or Marie) Irby submitted a complaint about Litten to GM. (Id., ¶ 38). Irby is a 60-year-old African-American woman. (Docket No. 34-2, ¶¶ 44, 59.) In a “Statement of Harassment, ” Irby complained that Litten had been harassing her for the past two years by laughing hysterically whenever Irby walked by. (Docket No. 34-9 at p. 2.) Litten denied harassing Irby and had considered Irby to be a friend prior to Irby's complaint. (Docket No. 40-1, ¶¶ 41, 43.) On or around February 9, 2018, GM determined that Litten was guilty of violating its rule against threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with employees and issued Litten a five-day disciplinary layoff without pay. (Id., ¶¶ 45, 47.) Litten filed two grievances regarding this discipline and continued to assert that she never harassed Irby. (Id., ¶¶ 50, 54.) Both grievances were denied. (Id., ¶¶ 53-54.)

III. DISCUSSION

Litten claims that GM violated her rights under Title VII and the ADEA to be free from race-based discrimination and retaliation and from age-based discrimination. She seeks lost wages and compensatory and punitive damages from GM.

GM moves for summary judgment on Litten's claim.

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Addickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct.1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). Indeed, “[i]f, as to the issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party, summary judgment is improper.” Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

But a “mere scintilla of evidence” in favor of the nonmoving party will not defeat summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. A nonmoving party must do more than cast a “metaphysical doubt” as to the material facts; it must “offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (“When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documents or other evidentiary materials, the party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading....”); D'Amico v. City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, there must be evidence from which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

In the end, the function of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment.” Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996).

Summary judgment is appropriate even in discrimination cases, for, as this Court noted, “the salutary purposes of summary judgment-avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials-apply no less to discrimination cases than to ... other areas of litigation.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985)).

B. Litten's Race Discrimination claim under Title VII 1. Title VII Claims

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92-93, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 2150, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). This provision prohibits intentional discrimination (disparate treatment), severe and pervasive discrimination that permeates the workplace (hostile work environment), and retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices (retaliation). See Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F.Supp.3d 481, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

When, such as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances of that adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003); Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42.

If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the defendant succeeds in making this showing, “the presumption of discrimination arising with the establishment of the prima facie case drops from the picture.” Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)).

If the defendant makes this showing at the second stage, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's explanation is pretext for unlawful discrimination. Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The plaintiff must produce “evidence that the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for actual discrimination.” Weinstock, ...