LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL D. v. PULASKI COUNTY SCH. D. 1

769 F. Supp. 1491

LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff, v. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, et al., Defendants Mrs. Lorene Joshua, et al., Katherine W. Knight, et al., Intervenors.

No. LR-C-82-866.

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, W.D.

July 15, 1991.

Christopher Heller, Little Rock, Ark., for LRSD.

Samuel M. Jones, III, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, Ark., for PCSSD.

Stephen W. Jones, Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., Little Rock, Ark., for NLRSD.

John W. Walker, John Walker, P.A., Little Rock, Ark., for Joshua intervenors.

Richard Roachell, Mitchell & Roachell, P.A., Little Rock, Ark., for Knight intervenors.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SUSAN WEBBER WRIGHT, District Judge.

The three districts and Joshua intervenors¹ ask the Court to reconsider its order of June 21, 1991, 769 F.Supp. 1483, in which the Court declined to accept a multitude of proposed changes to the settlement plans approved by the Eighth Circuit in Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir.1990). With one exception, the Court will let the order stand.

Contrary to the bleak picture painted by the parties' counsel, the Court did not consider and reject on the merits each and every proposed revision in the May 1, 1991 submissions hereinafter May submissions. Rather, the Court found that the revisions as a whole exceeded the bounds of permissible modifications outlined by the court of appeals. In order to focus the parties' efforts on bringing the settlement plans "up to date" after the lengthy hiatus during appeal, the Court withheld its approval of any revisions pending a resubmission of proposed changes pursuant to the terms of the June 21 order. See Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 769 F.Supp. 1483, 1489-1490, (E.D.Ark.1991). Those terms specified that any suggested alterations at this stage should be transitional: the parties may incorporate useful features of the Tri-District Plan or may make necessary adjustments to produce an appropriate fit between the future application of the plans and existing circumstances.

I.

The parties object to the June 21 order because they "do not read the Court of Appeals' decision to limit substantive changes to either matters embraced by the Tri-District Plan or as necessary only to facilitate transition." Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider at 2 hereinafter Brief. Indeed, the parties contend that the authority bestowed on them by the Eighth Circuit to alter the settlement plans "is unqualified except for the agreement of the parties, and, of course, the dictates of the Constitution." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the parties may change the plans whenever and however they wish as long as they agree; the Court may not interfere unless the modifications are unconstitutional.

Close scrutiny of the court of appeals' opinion fails to divulge any endowment of such far-reaching proportion. In only two instances did the Eighth Circuit mention future modifications to the settlement plans. The court recognized that "the parties may conclude that the Tri-District Plan contains useful ideas. They are free, by agreement, to modify the settlement plans by incorporating in them one or more provisions of the Tri-District Plan, subject, of course, to the approval of the District Court." Id. at 1393 n. 15 (emphasis added). The court also said the parties could make necessary transitional adjustments in certain details of the settlement plans.

The parties have been proceeding during this school year under the terms of our interim order filed on July 2, 1990. It may be necessary, in order to make a smooth transition, for the details of the settlement plans to be adjusted to produce an appropriate fit between their future application and existing circumstances. The parties should be able to agree as to whether any such adjustments are necessary, and, if so, what they should be. Absent such agreement, the District Court is authorized to take such actions as may be just.

Id. at 1394 (emphasis added). Incredibly, the parties suggest that it is this "transitional authority" which is "unqualified." Brief at 3. How the parties can construe language limiting changes to "adjustments" that are necessary, transitional, and fitting as an unfettered grant of authority is beyond comprehension. The court of appeals wisely provided a passage from one plan to another; it did not create an interminable tunnel.

Moreover, the language of the Eighth Circuit opinion anticipates only the possibility, not the surety, of changes in the settlement plans: "it may be necessary ... for the details of the settlement plans to be adjusted.... The parties should be able to agree as to whether any such adjustments are necessary, and if so, what they should be." Id. (emphasis added). It is obvious that these words cannot fairly be read as authorizing extensive deletions or revisions in the plans.

The parties' insistence that their authority to change the plans is "unqualified" also conflicts with another Eighth Circuit decision, Liddell v. Board of Educ. of the City of St. Louis, 867 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.1989). In Liddell a suburban school district reached an agreement with the other parties in the St. Louis school desegregation case that allowed it an additional three years to achieve its targeted percentage increase in black student enrollment under the court-approved settlement agreement. The district court determined that two rather than three years was sufficient time for the school district to attain the ratio required by the settlement agreement. The school district argued on appeal that court approval of the extension agreement was not required and, even if it was, the district court lacked authority to reduce the length of the extension agreed to by the parties. In rejecting the school district's contentions, the court of appeals concluded that

as a part of its broad equitable powers in a court-supervised school desegregation case, the district court has authority to review, approve, and modify extensions of the Settlement Agreement previously entered into by the parties. In this instance, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in modifying the ... extension agreement.

867 F.2d at 1155.

As the Seventh Circuit observed in Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1980), the overriding public interest in favor of settlement must be balanced against "strong countervailing public policies which counsel against automatic judicial acceptance of such agreements." The court must be concerned about safeguarding the rights of class members who are not involved in the settlement negotiations nor present to voice their views in court. Additionally, in civil rights cases such as this, the effects of a settlement extend far beyond individual class members. The interest of the public as a whole must be considered, since "the substantive issues involved in many class actions reflect a broad public interest in the rights to be vindicated or the social or economic policies established." Id. at 313. This is why approval of a settlement agreement should be given only where the court finds the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate. Id. (citing Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864, 96 S.Ct. 124, 46 L.Ed.2d 93 (1975)). Likewise, the Eighth Circuit said in its December 12, 1990 opinion that

this does not mean that a court must automatically approve anything the parties set before it. In the present case, for example, any remedy will necessarily require some judicial supervision—monitoring, at least—for a long time. A court has a strong interest in not involving itself, along with the prestige of the law, in an ongoing equitable decree which is either manifestly unworkable or plainly unconstitutional on its face. In addition, this is a class action, and courts are not obliged (indeed, they are not permitted) to approve settlements that are unfair to class members, or negotiated by inadequate class representatives.

921 F.2d at 1383. No less a standard should apply to a court's review of proposed modifications of such agreements.

In the alternative, the parties suggest that they have simply availed themselves of the court-approved amendment process set forth in the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) plan. While they dispute the Court's understanding of the process, see infra, they now submit (after the fact) that "any changes they have proposed that are not embraced by either the Tri-District Plan or the transitional authority are products of this amendment process." Brief at 5. As discussed in its June 21, 1991 order, the Court views this amendment process as a vital means of ensuring sufficient flexibility in the plans for responding to changing conditions and unforeseen developments. However, the process can be abused, especially if it is invoked to justify creating a set of plans materially different from those approved by the Eighth Circuit. The parties admit the importance of preserving the language of the original settlement plans: "These steps in organizing the NLRSD plan into a single document were taken to minimize the amount of editorial change and to retain as much of the original language as possible since that is the language approved by this Court and the Court of Appeals" (NLRSD May submission, p. 905). But their actions speak louder than their words—the proposed revisions include literally hundreds of alterations to the court-approved plans.

The controversy at hand underscores the different perspectives held by the Court and the parties as to the settlement plans. The Court sees the Eighth Circuit's approval of the plans as akin to establishing a benchmark; we now have distinct reference point, a sure guide for ending this dispute and getting the parties out of court. Some...