Little v. City of Saginaw

674 F.Supp.3d 376

David William LITTLE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SAGINAW, Steven Lautner, and Jordan LaDouce, Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-11104

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division

Signed May 19, 2023

Ayanna D. Hatchett, Johnson Law PLC, Detroit, MI, Madeline M. Sinkovich, Mike Morse Law Firm, Southfield, MI, Thomas W. Waun, Grand Blanc, MI, for Plaintiff.

Anthony K. Chubb, Geoffrey S. Wagner, John C. Clark, Giarmarco, Mullins & Horton, P.C., Troy, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DECLARING THAT DEFENDANTS VIOLATED PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S FOUR REMAINING CLAIMS, AND ADJOURNING SCHEDULING ORDER

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, United States District Judge

This case concerns an alleged Fourth Amendment violation by two Saginaw City police officers who entered a man's apartment without a warrant and arrested him after tracking footprints in the snow at night allegedly leading to his doorstep.

In January 2020, one person called the Saginaw County 911 dispatch and reported a black man wearing a tan coat breaking a window at a law firm and walking toward a medical building. A second caller reported a broken window at the medical building. From there, the officers followed footprints in the dark until they arrived at the front door of David Little—a white man with a gray coat—entered his apartment, and then arrested him for malicious destruction of property. Little spent five days in jail. The charges were dismissed 15 months later. In May 2021, Little sued the two officers and the City of Saginaw for Fourth Amendment violations, malicious prosecution, and three state-law claims. Defendants assert the entry and arrest were lawful based on Little's consent and "eyeballing" his shoes.

As explained hereafter, the officers' warrantless entry was unlawful, they lacked probable cause to arrest Little, and the City of Saginaw is responsible for the Chief of Police's policy for establishing probable cause or an exception to the warrant requirement and for failing to train the officers on determining probable cause or an exception to the warrant requirement.

I.

On January 5, 2020, Defendants Steven Lautner and Jordan LaDouce, both City of Saginaw police officers, were dispatched to investigate two complaints of malicious destruction of property: a "black male in a tan coat" breaking a window at Central Michigan University and then fleeing toward a law firm where another window was reported broken. See ECF Nos. 26 at PageID.100; 26-4 at PageID.203-04, 208.

As noted above, Defendants say they followed "four blocks" of footprints in the snow at night from the medical building to Plaintiff David Little's apartment. See ECF Nos. 26-4 at PageID.211, 232-34; 29-5 at PageID.408. Defendants assert Plaintiff allowed them into his apartment, after which they matched his shoes to the footprints that began at the law firm, creating probable cause to arrest him for malicious destruction of property. ECF No. 26 at PageID.100.

By contrast, Plaintiff claims that he was sleeping when Defendants knocked on his door and entered without a warrant, arrested him without probable cause, and unlawfully seized his shoes. ECF No. 29 at PageID.297-99. As Plaintiff put it, they only relied on "eyeballing" the footprints and did not have any other evidence linking him to the crime. Id. at PageID.296. Plaintiff was in jail for five days before he was released on bond. ECF No. 29-6 at PageID.443-47.

The officers' body cameras reflect all the relevant activity from the knocking at Plaintiff's door to the cuffing of his wrists. See generally Pl.'s Resp. Ex. 11, ECF No. 29 [hereinafter "Lautner Cam"]; Pl.'s Resp. Ex. 12, ECF No. 29 [hereinafter "LaDouce Cam"].

Plaintiff brought the following eight claims in May 2021:

(1) Count I: Unlawful Entry under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(2) Count I: Unlawful Seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(3) Count II: Unlawful Arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(4) Count II: Malicious Prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(5) Count III: Unlawful Imprisonment under Michigan law;

(6) Count III: Assault and Battery under Michigan law;

(7) Count III: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress under Michigan law; and (8) Count IV: Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against City of Saginaw.

ECF No. 1 at PageID.5-9.

Defendants seek summary judgment on the claims for Unlawful Entry, Unlawful Arrest, and Municipal Liability.¹ ECF No. 26. The Parties agree that Defendants followed four blocks of footprints in the snow and dark, stopped at and entered Plaintiff's apartment, and arrested him for destruction of property. However, they disagree on the existence of probable cause and the unlawfulness of the entry. Defendants argue Plaintiff permitted their entry, while Plaintiff contends they entered without his consent, wrongfully seized his shoes, and arrested him without seeking a warrant based on a hunch that did not amount to probable cause.

II.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The movant has the initial burden of "identifying those portions of [the record] it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must set out specific facts showing "a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citation omitted). A genuine issue of fact requires more than "a mere scintilla of evidence," id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, more than "some metaphysical doubt," Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant to determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see Lossia v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 895 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Matthew N. Preston II, The Tweet Test: Attributing Presidential Intent to Agency Action, 10 BELMONT L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2022) (explaining that courts should only draw "reasonable" inferences).

Summary judgment will be granted if the nonmovant fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. But summary judgment will be denied if the challenged elements have "genuine factual issues that . . . may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). "The standard is the same [if] 'the parties present cross-motions.' " MRP Props. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 3d 981, 990 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (quoting Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991)).

III.

First, Defendants contest Unlawful Entry. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures by requiring a warrant supported by probable cause. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1229, 1248 (1983) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend IV). Yet the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches with valid consent. United States v. Hinojosa, 606 F.3d 875, 881 (6th Cir. 2010). "To be valid, the consent must be 'voluntary, unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by duress or coercion.' " United States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 346 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Alexander, 954 F.3d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 2020)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 717, 211 L.Ed.2d 404 (2021). The validity of consent is based on "the totality of all the circumstances," Harris v. Klare, 902 F.3d 630, 639 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)), which the government must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence, through clear and positive testimony," United States v. Blomquist, 976 F.3d 755, 758 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Alexander, 954 F.3d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 2020)).

Defendants have not carried their burden. There is no dispute that they did not elect to seek a warrant to enter Plaintiff's apartment, and they do not explain why. Indeed, Defendants only argue that Plaintiff consented to the search based on his later deposition testimony that he "let them in." ECF No. 26 at PageID.105 (quoting ECF No. 26-2 at PageID.138). But that unclear testimony arguably suggests Plaintiff chose not to ask the officers to leave after they entered his apartment—and who would? Such "witness credibility is quintessentially a question of fact for the jury." United States v. Jackson, 918 F.3d 467, 479 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). But not here.

Valid consent is determined by reviewing the totality of the circumstances "[a]t that time"—not by considering post hoc statements. United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1999); e.g., United States v. Cousin, No. 1:09-CR-00089, 2010 WL 338087, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 19, 2010) (holding that suspect's after-the-fact statement about giving consent was not relevant to whether consent was valid when allegedly given), aff'd, 448 F. App'x 593 (6th Cir. 2012); accord Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221, 93 S.Ct. 2041; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the "objective legal reasonableness of the action" must be "assessed . . . at the time it was taken" (citations omitted)). Plus, Plaintiff has since consistently maintained that he did not give Defendants any consent. Compl., ECF No. 1 at PageID.4-6 ("Officer Lautner explicitly lied in his report when he wrote that Mr....