Little v. City of Chattanooga

REBECCA M. LITTLE v. THE CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE

No. E2018-00870-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

February 20, 2019 Session

March 21, 2019

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County

No. 18-0003

Pamela A. Fleenor, Chancellor

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint, which ostensibly alleged declaratory judgment, inverse condemnation, and due process violations. We vacate the dismissal of Plaintiff's procedural due process claim because that claim was not actually addressed in the trial court's order of dismissal. The trial court's judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part; Vacated in Part and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which, CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Rebecca Little, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Pro se.

Melinda Jane Foster and Misty Lavender Foy, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, City of Chattanooga.

OPINION

Background¹

On November 8, 2016, Defendant/Appellee the City of Chattanooga ("the City") adopted Resolution No. 28838, updating its right-of-way abandonment policy.² The resolution stated that its purpose was to "give guidance to citizens, staff, and elected officials regarding the closure and abandonment of rights-of-way. It is intended to form a basis of rationale and process for decisions on right-of-way closure and abandonment requests." The resolution further provided that the City's policy was to only "recommend the permanent closure and abandonment of rights-of-way when it is demonstrated that the public has no further need or interest to retain the right-of-way and that its abandonment is necessary to achieve a significant private or public interest."

Resolution No. 28838 thereafter provided specific guidance for how abandonment issues would be addressed through a tiered classification system. Under Tier 1, for example, rights-of-way that are dedicated for public use and maintained by the City cannot be closed or abandoned "unless a suitable replacement is provided."³ Applications seeking to abandon a Tier 1 right-of-way "will be reviewed using the review factors and according to the tenets of this policy." In contrast, Tier 2 rights-of-way are dedicated for public use, not maintained by the City, and only partially opened or unopened. These rights-of-way may be closed following a review of the factors pursuant to the tenets of the policy. Finally, Tier 3 rights-of-way are not physically opened. These rights-of-way are reviewed in the same manner as rights-of-way under Tier 2.

Resolution No. 28838 then detailed specific factors to guide review of closure applications:

1. Width of right-of-way.

2. Presence of or potential for the location of utilities.

3. Currently open to vehicular, bicycle, or pedestrian traffic.

4. Potential for future use or which provides future connections to the existing street pattern or could provide needed services, and which are integral to the community's future development (i.e, access to abutting property, bypass for other streets, parking, pedestrian connectivity, etc.).

5. Type/conditions of surface.

6. Does the topography/grade impede the potential use of a right-of-way for vehicles, bicycles, or pedestrians?

7. Will the closure and abandonment landlock any property. If so, has a subdivision plat been submitted which eliminates this situation?

8. Identification of a suitable replacement.

Finally, the resolution provided a specific process for abandonment requests:

Application. The Regional Planning Agency (RPA) will accept petitions for closure and abandonment of any right-of-way created by plat, deed or by drawing, by ordinance/resolution and which are of public record according to the tenets of this policy.

Review. Rights-of-way will be reviewed by various public agencies, City departments, utility companies, and the Chattanooga Department of Transportation (CDOT) according to the tenets of this policy to determine its current use and its potential for future development.

Planning Commission. The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Regional Planning Commission will review and make a recommendation to the Chattanooga City Council according to the tenets of this policy and the recommendations of the reviewers.

City Council. Based on the recommendation of the planning commission and CDOT, City Council will take final action to approve or deny a right-of-way closure and abandonment.

In August 2016, City resident Taylor Vickers petitioned the Chattanooga Regional Planning Commission ("Planning Commission") for abandonment of the alley behind her property at 249 Jarnigan Avenue.⁴ The stated purpose of the abandonment application was for abutting property owners to add onto their property. In September 2016, property owners affected by the application received a letter notifying them that Ms. Vickers had filed an application for the abandonment of the alley. The notice indicated that property owners could attend a public hearing of the Planning Commission on October 10, 2016 to either "support or oppose the proposed change."

One of these property owners was Plaintiff/Appellant Rebecca Little ("Plaintiff"), who owns the property located at 412 Thompson Street. Plaintiff's primary concern was that the alley provided the best access to her property "for parking and future development." According to Plaintiff, although her property is also fronted by a street, the topography of her property prevents off-street parking in the front of her home due to a fifteen foot retaining wall that covers the frontage of her property. It does not appear that Plaintiff's home has any off-street parking currently or at the time that she purchased the property in 2016. Plaintiff contends however, that she purchased the property because the alley made it feasible to create off-street parking in the back of her home in the future.

The meeting occurred as scheduled on October 10, 2016. Plaintiff and another neighbor spoke in opposition to the abandonment. On the same day, the PlanningCommission voted to recommend denying the application for abandonment. Pursuant to the process outlined in Resolution No. 28838, the issue then came before the Chattanooga City Council ("City Council") on November 15, 2016; the issue was deferred so that a council member could meet with the neighborhood. During this time, Plaintiff was in communication with council members concerning her opposition to the abandonment.⁵ At the December 13, 2016 City Council meeting, the ordinance abandoning the subject alley was passed on the first reading. On December 20, 2016, the ordinance to abandon the alley was approved upon second reading and thereafter signed by the mayor. The ordinance specifically provided that it would "take effect two (2) weeks from and after its passage." According to Plaintiff, although she was present for these meetings, at neither the December 13 nor December 20 City Council meeting were residents who opposed the abandonment allowed to speak.

On January 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint for inverse condemnation and declaratory judgment against the City of Chattanooga ("the City" or "Appellee") in the Hamilton County Chancery Court ("trial court").⁶ Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint on January 12, 2018. The amended complaint primarily sought to invalidate the ordinance, but also requested damages resulting from the interference with her property. Plaintiff requested this relief on the basis of inverse condemnation, the City's failure to comply with Resolution No. 28838 in granting the abandonment application, failure to show a rational basis for the abandonment ordinance, a violation of the Open Meetings Act, and violations of both substantive and procedural due process rights under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions.

The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadings, in which it alleged that Plaintiff's claims for inverse condemnation and declaratory judgment were improper and time-barred. Specifically, the City argued that Plaintiff was seeking to challenge a factual determination made in accordance with an existing law, rather than seeking to invalidate an ordinance itself. As such, the City alleged that filing a common law writ of certiorari was the proper procedure rather than a declaratory judgment action, and further alleged that the sixty-day statute of limitation for filing a writ of certiorari was lapsed. With regard to the Plaintiff's substantive and procedural due process claims, the City argued that the passing of the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power and that Plaintiff had not suffered an injury to any vested right. Moreover, the City reiterated that even if Plaintiff had a valid due process claim, the proper remedy would be a writ of certiorari, for which the time to file had passed. In addressing Plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim, as well as her claim related to the Tennessee Open Meetings Act, the City again argued that the claims were time-barred.Ultimately, the City asserted that the gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint was that the ordinance passed in December of 2016 was invalid and as such, any claims related to the ordinance should have been brought via a writ of certiorari. Accordingly, the City asserted that the time to file the writ would have been by February 20, 2017, sixty days after the passing of the ordinance.

The trial court entered an order denying the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings but granting the motion to dismiss on April 16, 2018, largely adopting the City's arguments as to Plaintiff's claims. Specifically, the trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment because Plaintiff failed to join all of the necessary parties, namely, other property owners affected by the ordinance. The trial court went on to find that the passage of...