Little v. Dean

BENJAMIN LITTLE, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT J. DEAN, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:13-cv-165-KOB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

August 29, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 17). Plaintiff Benjamin Little brings this § 1983 and state law suit against Defendants Robert J. Dean, Jr., Don A. Hoyt, Tana Bryant, Layton McGrady, and the City of Anniston, Alabama. The complaint arises out a encounter between Plaintiff Little and Defendants over Little's arrest for allegedly violating a city ordinance regarding the condition of residential properties on East 23rd Street in Anniston.

Count I of the complaint alleges "negligence by municipality in hiring and failing to adequately supervise police officers and employees" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988¹ and claims underlying constitutional violations of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and interference with civil rights. Count II of the complaint alleges "conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiff's constitutional rights" under § 1983 and § 1988² and claims the Defendants conspired to deprive the Plaintiff of his rights to free association, to be free from unreasonable arrest andseizure, to be free from wrongful conviction and imprisonment, to be free from malicious prosecution, assault, and battery, and to due process of law. Count III alleges false arrest under § 1983, Count IV alleges malicious prosecution under § 1983, and Count V alleges assault and battery under § 1983 and 29 U.S.C. § 2679(2)(a)³. Counts VI through IX allege Alabama state law claims for assault and battery, false imprisonment, negligence, and slander. (Doc. 1).

Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that no disputes of material fact exist and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the following reasons, the court will DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's state law claims against all Defendants in Counts VI through IX. The court will DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the assault and battery and interference with civil rights portions of Count I and Count V in their entirety against all Defendants and Count III as against Defendant Bryant.

The court finds that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to all claims against Defendant McGrady, as to the false arrest and false imprisonment portions of Count I against all Defendants, as to Count III as against all Defendants except Defendant Bryant, and as to Counts II and IV in their entirety against all Defendants. The court will ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants on these summary judgment claims only. No counts will remain pending.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is an integral part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment allows a trial court to decide cases when no genuine issues of material fact are presentand the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When a district court reviews a motion for summary judgment, it must determine two things: (1) whether any genuine issues of material fact exist; and if not, (2) whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). The moving party can meet this burden by offering evidence showing no dispute of material fact or by showing that the non-moving party's evidence fails to prove an essential element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Rule 56, however, does not require "that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id.

Once the moving party meets its burden of showing the district court that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party "to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Disagreement between the parties is not significant unless the disagreement presents a "genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its]own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis added); see also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("The very mission of summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial."). The moving party need not present evidence in a form admissible at trial; "however, he may not merely rest on [the] pleadings." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the evidence is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

In reviewing the evidence submitted, the court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," to determine whether the nonmoving party presented sufficient evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Cottle v. Storer Commc'n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir. 1988). The court must refrain from weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations, because these decisions fall to the province of the jury. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins. Co., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). "Even if a district court 'believes that the evidence presented by one side is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the basis of credibility choices.'" Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006)). The court should not disregard self-serving statements made in sworn testimony simply because they are self-serving at the summary judgment stage, and if the self-serving statementscreate a genuine issue of material fact, the court should deny summary judgment on that basis. Id. at 1253.

Furthermore, all evidence and inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282. The nonmoving party "need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference." Id. The evidence of the non-moving party "is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. After both parties have addressed the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant the motion if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

II. FACTUAL HISTORY

To the extent that either party included arguments in their fact section, the court will disregard those arguments. The parties had permission from the court to exclude their fact sections from the thirty-page limitation of their initial briefs (Order dated 2/25/2014), but the court did not intend that this exception be used to sneak in extra arguments. Furthermore, the court did not intend that this exception be used to bombard the court with extensive, unnecessary, immaterial facts. The following facts are those that the court finds undisputed, material and relevant to this case:

This case concerns at least three residential properties in the City of Anniston on East 23rd Street that have been blighted properties for many years. (Doc. 25, ¶ 1). Anniston's City Ordinance 11-O-22 adopted the International Property Maintenance Code of 2009 ("IPMC") into law. The City passed the IPMC Ordinance to protect the public health, safety and welfare of the City's citizens. (Doc. 18, Exhibit 11 &12; Doc. 27, Exhibit 2). Section 301.3 of the IPMCOrdinance states that "[a]ll vacant structures and premises thereof . . . shall be maintained in a clean, safe, secure and sanitary condition as provided herein so as not to cause a blighting problem or adversely affect the public health or safety." The official commentary explains that "this section establishes the code official's authority to order the cleanup of vacant lands and the securing of vacant structures that might present an attractive nuisance." (Doc. 18, ¶ 3; Doc. 25).

The IPMC Ordinance defines the "code official" as "[t]he official who is charged with the administration and enforcement of this code, or any duly authorized representative." Defendant Tana Bryant has served as the City's sole code official since 2007. Her job included making contact with the property owners about IPMC and nuisance violations, discussing plans for compliance, and coordinating enforcement through the City's IPMC and/or nuisance ordinance procedures. (Doc. 25, ¶ 4; Doc. 18, Exhibit 5).

Defendant Robert Dean, Director of the City's Department of Public Works ("DPW") supervised Ms. Bryant. Mr. Dean reported to Defendant Don Hoyt, who served as City Manager. (Doc. 25, ¶ 6). Mr. Hoyt testified that he had...