Lloyd ex rel. M.L. v. Ingenuity Prep Pub. Charter Sch.

BRIAN LLOYD, as Parent and Next Friend of M.L., Plaintiff, v. INGENUITY PREP PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL, Defendant.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00801 (TNM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

November 20, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Brian Lloyd sued Ingenuity Prep Public Charter School ("Ingenuity Prep" or "the School") on behalf of M.L., his minor daughter, who attends the School. He seeks to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred while litigating administrative claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") and defending against a counterclaim filed in this Court by Ingenuity Prep. After assessing the parties' arguments, Magistrate Judge Harvey recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Lloyd's Motion for Attorneys' Fees. Both parties objected to Magistrate Judge Harvey's Report and Recommendation ("Report"). Upon consideration of the Report, the parties' objections, the briefing before the Magistrate Judge, and the entire record, the Court will adopt in part the findings and conclusions of the Report. The Court will award Lloyd $40,867.36 in attorneys' fees and costs.

I.

The Report comprehensively recounts the relevant facts, see Report at 2-7, ECF No. 32,¹ and neither party objects to any factual findings, so only a review of the procedural history is necessary. In September 2017, Lloyd filed a complaint with the D.C. Office of the State Superintendent of Education, alleging that Ingenuity Prep had denied M.L. a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") as guaranteed by the IDEA. Compl. Ex. 1 at 2, ECF No. 1-1. Lloyd sought an order requiring the School to fund independent evaluations of his daughter, develop a new individualized education program ("IEP") tailored to her needs, and fund compensatory education that would allow her to advance two grade levels after she finished repeating the third grade. Id. at 2-3 & n.3. Negotiations failed to produce a settlement. See Def.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Attys' Fees ("Def.'s Second Opp'n") Ex. 1 at 35-130, ECF No. 30-1. The parties proceeded to an administrative adjudication, where a hearing officer found for Lloyd on some, but not all, of his claims against the School. Compl. Ex. 1 at 10-17. The hearing officer accordingly ordered Ingenuity Prep to provide M.L. with 100 hours of tutoring and certain evaluations but declined to award the full remedies Lloyd sought. Id. at 17-18.

In January 2018, the parties began negotiating over the costs and attorneys' fees that Lloyd incurred in pursuing the administrative action. Def.'s Second Opp'n Ex. 1 at 132-64. Lloyd sued after rejecting the School's final offer of $4,400. See id. at 156-57. Ingenuity Prep filed an answer and counterclaim seeking to appeal the findings and relief issued by the hearing officer. See Def.'s Answer and Countercl., ECF No. 3. Lloyd moved to dismiss the counterclaim as time-barred, see Pl.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, and after a round of briefingMagistrate Judge Harvey issued a report agreeing. See R. & R., ECF No. 9. This Court adopted the report in full, rejecting the School's objections and dismissing the counterclaim. See Lloyd v. Ingenuity Prep Pub. Charter Sch., 368 F. Supp. 3d 25 (D.D.C. 2019).

Lloyd moved for attorneys' fees and costs, and the parties completed a round of briefing before Magistrate Judge Harvey. See ECF Nos. 17, 18, 21. The D.C. Circuit then issued DL v. District of Columbia, clarifying the proper analysis of petitions for fees under the IDEA. 924 F.3d 585, 593-94 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Magistrate Judge Harvey requested another round of briefing so that the parties could consider DL. See ECF No. 25. Lloyd's briefs failed to request a specific amount in fees, but he submitted invoices totaling $76,954.20 in attorneys' fees, $4,987.50 in expert fees, and $1,244.50 in costs. See Report at 6-7 (citing ECF Nos. 27-10, 27-11, 27-12, 30-1 at 22). Ingenuity Prep opposed the request on multiple grounds, arguing for an award of $2,108.36 to Lloyd. See Def.'s Second Opp'n at 36.

Magistrate Judge Harvey ultimately recommended awarding $47,417.02 to Lloyd. Report at 32-33. At the outset, the Report noted that there was no dispute that Lloyd was the "prevailing party" in the administrative proceedings. Id. at 7-8; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (limiting awards in IDEA actions to "prevailing party"). The Report rejected Ingenuity Prep's contention that Lloyd had no right to compensation for fees incurred after the pre-hearing settlement negotiations, concluding that Lloyd was "substantially justified" in rejecting the settlement offers. Report at 9-14. The Report next determined that this case qualified as "complex federal litigation" and recommended awarding fees based on the full rates in the USAO Matrix, a variation of the Laffey Matrix.² Id. at 14-23. Although Magistrate JudgeHarvey rejected Ingenuity Prep's claims that the number of hours billed by Lloyd's attorneys was unreasonable, he recommended reducing the overall fee award by 40 percent because of Lloyd's limited success in the administrative proceedings. Id. at 23-30. Lastly, the Report recommended denying Lloyd's expert fees because he failed to show that they were reasonable and based on prevailing rates. Id. at 30-32.

Pending here are several objections by Ingenuity Prep to the Report, as well as one objection by Lloyd. See Def.'s Objs. to the Magistrate Judge's R. & R. ("Def.'s Objs."), ECF No. 34; Pl.'s Objs. to the Magistrate Judge's R. & R. ("Pl.'s Obj."), ECF No. 35. The objections are ripe, and the Court will address them below.

II.

Courts in this district may refer motions for attorneys' fees to a magistrate judge for assessment. LCvR 72.3(a)(7). After a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation, any party may file written objections within fourteen days. LCvR 72.3(b). The Court reviews de novo the parties' timely objections. LCvR 72.3(c); see also Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 857 F.3d 939, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("[W]e join a number of our sister circuits in requiring that motions for attorneys' fees be reviewed de novo if referred to a Magistrate Judge and properly objected to."). The Court need not review the unobjected-to portions of the Reportbefore adopting them. See Harris v. Friendship Pub. Charter Sch., 18-cv-396, 2019 WL 954814, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2019); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).

III.

The IDEA permits a court to award "reasonable attorneys' fees . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The party seeking fees bears the rebuttable burden of establishing entitlement to an award. Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To determine whether fees are reasonable, courts must consider "(1) the numbers of hours reasonably expended in litigation; and (2) the reasonable hourly rate for the services provided." Reed v. District of Columbia, 843 F.3d 517, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Even after establishing reasonable rates and hours, courts may reduce awards to account for limited success on the underlying administrative claims or where plaintiffs had rejected settlement offers that were not more favorable than the relief won in administrative proceedings. See Daniel v. District of Columbia, 174 F. Supp. 3d 532, 541, 550 (D.D.C. 2016).

The Court adopts in full the unobjected-to portions of the Report, such as Lloyd's status as the prevailing party in the administrative proceedings and the denial of expert fees. The Court will address the parties' specific objections in turn.³

A.

Ingenuity Prep's first objects to Magistrate Judge Harvey's determination that Lloyd was substantially justified in rejecting Ingenuity Prep's settlement offer of November 10, 2017.⁴ Def.'s Objs. at 3-10. The IDEA prohibits awarding attorneys' fees for "services performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent" if the offer is not timely accepted and "the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). But the statute carves out an exception. A court may award fees "to a parent who is the prevailing party and who was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer." Id. § 1415(i)(3)(E).

This exception requires a twofold inquiry. A court must first determine whether the relief awarded at the administrative proceedings was not more favorable to the plaintiff than the settlement offer; if so, then the plaintiff may receive an award for post-offer fees only if the rejection of the offer was "substantially justified." See Daniel, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 541.

Magistrate Judge Harvey determined that the November 10 offer was at least as favorable as the relief ultimately provided by the hearing officer. Report at 10. Neither party questions this conclusion in their objections. Nor does the Court—especially where the settlement offer included all the relief provided in the hearing officer's order. Compare Def.'s Second Opp'n Ex. 1 at 71-72, with Compl. Ex. 1 at 17-18. The Report, however, concluded that Lloyd was"substantially justified" in rejecting the settlement offer because the offer required as a condition of grade promotion that Lloyd's daughter achieve minimum test scores that were too high. Report at 12-14. Ingenuity Prep contends that Magistrate Judge Harvey erred in concluding that the rejection was "substantially justified." Def.'s Objs. at 3-10.

The Court starts with the standard at issue. The phrase "substantially justified" has eluded a precise definition, as the Report notes. Report at 10-11. Courts in this district have found "substantially justified" reasons for rejecting settlement offers where the offer failed to sufficiently cover the parents' attorneys' fees, see, e.g., Dicks v. District of Columbia, 109 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131-32 (D.D.C...