Lloyd v. Leeper

451 F.Supp.3d 1314

Orvel Winston LLOYD, Plaintiff,

v.Bill LEEPER, Sheriff, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:16-cv-906-J-34PDB

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, JACKSONVILLE DIVISION.

Signed March 31, 2020

Orvel Winston Lloyd, Hilliard, FL, pro se.

Matthew Joseph Carson, Michael P. Spellman, Sniffen & Spellman, PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants Sheriff Bill Leeper, Deputy C.D. Arline.

Michael P. Spellman, Sniffen & Spellman, PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant Joshua Moyers.

William H. Stafford, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant Judge Robert Foster.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge.

I. Status

Plaintiff Orvel Lloyd, a former inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on October 7, 2016, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint; Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Lloyd asserts that Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Lloyd alleges that Defendant Joshua Moyers illegally stopped his vehicle, illegally searched and arrested him, seized property without probable cause, and made false statements in a traffic report. According to Lloyd, Defendant C.D. Arline made false statements in his affidavit in support of a search warrant, illegally searched his home, and arrested him without probable cause. Lloyd maintains that Defendant Bill Leeper knew of Moyers and Arline's corrupt behavior, supported it, and failed to train his deputies to not be corrupt and to comply with the Fourth Amendment and falsely imprisoned Lloyd based upon the bogus search warrant. Lloyd requests declaratory and injunctive relief and an award of compensatory and punitive damages. Of the initial Defendants listed in the Complaint, only Defendants Leeper, Moyers, and Arline remain in this suit. See Docs. 44; 65.

Before the Court is Leeper, Moyers, and Arline's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion; Doc. 79). Defendants submitted the following exhibits (Defs. Exs.): (A) Moyers's affidavit; (B) Lloyd's deposition; (C) the Information in state criminal case 2016-CF-340; (D) the arrest and booking report for Maranda Sterling; (E) the arrest and booking report for Sky King; (F) the arrest and booking report for Alan Verde; (G) Arline's affidavit; (H) the Information in state criminal case 2016-CF-345; (I) composite exhibit of court documents from cases 2016-CF-340 and 2016-CF-345; (J) a copy of the motion to suppress filed in state criminal case 2016-CF-342; (K) a copy of the order denying the motion to suppress in case 2016-CF-342; (L) a copy of no contest plea agreement in case 2016-CF-340; (M) a copy of the no contest plea agreement in case 2016-CF-345; and (N) a printout of Lloyd's prisoner profile on the Florida Department of Corrections website. Lloyd filed a response to the Motion, with a memorandum of law in support. See Motion to Response to Defendant Motion for Summary [sic] (Response; Doc. 89). Lloyd submitted the following exhibits along with his Response (Pls. Exs): (1) Lloyd's affidavit; (2) a picture of a Toyota Tacoma; (3) Marty Johnson's affidavit; (4) an affidavit for search warrant; and (5) a copy of a Nassau County Sheriff's Office's call for service detail report.¹

II. Lloyd's Allegations

In his Complaint, Lloyd alleges that on April 22, 2016, Moyers illegally stopped Lloyd's pick-up truck, in which Lloyd, another male and two female passengers were riding. Complaint at 2, 5-6. According to Lloyd, Moyers made false statements in his report that Lloyd was not wearing a seatbelt, that the truck's windows were illegally tinted, and that Lloyd's vehicle matched a victim's description of a truck that individuals who had passed counterfeit bills had used to leave the scene. Id. at 3, 5. Lloyd asserts that Moyers never issued him a traffic citation, which demonstrates the illegality of the stop. Id. at 2. Once stopped, Lloyd alleges that Moyers made him wait outside his vehicle for an hour until the canine unit arrived. Id. at 2, 5-6. Upon arrival, the canine unit and other deputies searched the exterior of Lloyd's truck without finding any contraband. Id. Deputies then searched inside the bed of the truck, including property belonging to the two female passengers in the bed of the truck, and found pills and counterfeit bills, which Lloyd alleges belonged to the male passenger, Al Commings, who was never charged. Id. Prior to obtaining a search warrant and without conducting a pat down, Lloyd contends that Moyers took Lloyd's wallet from his pocket and placed it on the hood of his car. Id. Lloyd maintains that Moyers and other deputies had earlier obtained counterfeit bills from a business and Moyers planted those counterfeit bills in Lloyd's wallet. Id. at 5.

Regarding Arline, Lloyd contends that on the same date, Arline submitted a false affidavit in support of a search warrant. Id. at 3-4, 6-7. According to Lloyd, Arline falsely wrote in the affidavit that Lloyd had a prison sentence from a previous conviction for counterfeiting money, was actively producing counterfeit bills, and was the subject of an on-going investigation. Id. Arline also allegedly fabricated evidence and witness statements to obtain the warrant because Arline used "stale" hearsay statements from the two female passengers. Id. Lloyd maintains that the affidavit also did not describe with any specificity the property to be seized. Id. Additionally, Lloyd avers that Arline failed to investigate who was living at the house searched and failed to investigate the criminal activity occurring at the house. Id. Based on these allegations concerning the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant, Lloyd asserts that there was no probable cause to search his house or arrest him. Id.

As to Leeper, Lloyd alleges that Leeper knew about Moyers and Arline's corrupt behavior generally but failed to terminate their employment and, in fact, insisted that his deputies act corruptly. Id. at 4-5, 7. Lloyd also asserts that Leeper violated clearly established policy and procedures when he kept Lloyd in jail despite the lack of probable cause. Id. Last, Lloyd contends that Leeper failed to train his deputies not to be corrupt and to comply with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. Id.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 instructs that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Rule 56(c)(1)(A).² An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993) ). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the moving party need not ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim,’ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), in order to discharge this initial responsibility." Gonzalez v. Lee Cty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). Instead, the moving party simply may demonstrate "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id.

"When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court "must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int'l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994) ).

Of course, "pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, "a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment." Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Although courts show leniency to pro se litigants, courts "will not serve as de facto counsel or ‘rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’ " Nalls v. Coleman Low Fed. Inst., 307 Fed. Appx. 296, 298 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir....