Lockhart v. NAI Elite, LLC

209 Conn.App. 308

267 A.3d 359

John LOCKHART

v.NAI ELITE, LLC, et al.

AC 44273

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 20, 2021

Officially released December 14, 2021

David L. Gussak, Farmington, for the appellants (defendants).

Andrew L. Houlding, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Suarez, Clark and Pellegrino, Js.

PELLEGRINO, J.

This appeal arises from an action instituted by the plaintiff, John Lockhart, against the defendants, NAI Elite, LLC (NAI Elite), and Carl Berman.¹ In that action, the plaintiff asserted claims for the collection of unpaid commissions under General Statutes § 31-72, and hourly minimum and overtime wages under General Statutes § 31-68, and sought double damages, attorney's fees, and damages for duress. The defendants raised three special defenses² and filed a counterclaim asserting claims of breach of contract, tortious interference, conversion, and violation of General Statutes § 52-564, and seeking, pursuant to Practice Book § 17-54, an order of the court declaring, inter alia, the rights and liabilities of the parties and that the plaintiff is not entitled to a commission on the relevant transactions. A bench trial was held on the plaintiff's complaint and the defendants’ special defenses and counterclaim. After the conclusion of the trial, and while awaiting posttrial briefs, the trial judge, Dubay, J. , unexpectedly died. Pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183f, the matter was assigned to a successor judge, M . Taylor, J. , for adjudication on the record. After reviewing the record, transcripts, exhibits, and briefs, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff on his claim for unpaid commissions under § 31-72 and for attorney's fees, but determined that he was not entitled to unpaid minimum and overtime wages under § 31-68 and could not prevail on his claims for duress or double damages. The court rejected the defendants’ special defenses. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his claims for unpaid commissions and attorney's fees, and with respect to all counts of the defendants’ counterclaim.

The plaintiff subsequently filed an application for an award of attorney's fees, claiming that he had incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $68,831.24. The court granted the plaintiff's application for an award of attorney's fees, concluding that "the plaintiff should be made whole by requiring the defendant[s] to pay for his attorney's fees, which the court finds reasonable, but not punitive." The defendants then brought the present appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the award of attorney's fees. On appeal, the defendants originally claimed that the court erred by (1) finding that the plaintiff was entitled to pursue an action under § 31-72, (2) concluding that the defendants produced insufficient evidence to offset the amount of the plaintiff's commission, (3) concluding that the plaintiff met the burden of "the so-called ‘ABC Test,’ " and (4) awarding excessive and unreasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff. At oral argument before this court, the defendants withdrew all of their claims except for their claim of excessive attorney's fees. We conclude that the amount of attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff did not constitute an abuse of discretion and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

"We set forth the standard of review and applicable legal principles. We review the reasonableness of the court's award of attorney's fees under the abuse of discretion standard. ... Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. ... [Thus, our] review of [the amount of attorney's fees awarded] is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion it did. ...

"The factors a court normally applies in determining a reasonable attorney's fee include (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. ... That list of factors is not, however, exclusive. The court may assess the reasonableness of...