Lockridge v. Campbell

RAHIM OMARKHAN LOCKRIDGE, Petitioner, v. SHERMAN CAMPBELL, Respondent.

Case No. 1:16-cv-930

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

September 21, 2016

Honorable Robert Holmes Bell

OPINION

This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to "screen out" petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.

Factual Allegations

Petitioner Rahim Omarkhan Lockridge presently is incarcerated at the Carson City Correctional Facility. Petitioner's conviction arose from a domestic altercation involving a physical fight between Petitioner and his wife, during which Petitioner placed his wife in a choke hold, resulting in her death by strangulation. Following a jury trial in the Oakland County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.321. On May 31, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of eight to fifteen years.

Petitioner appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising two state-law claims, as follows:

I. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO BE RESENTENCED, WHERE THE REASONS GIVEN FOR DEPARTING FROM THE GUIDELINES WERE NEITHER SUBSTANTIAL NOR COMPELLING, AND WERE ADEQUATELY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE SCORING OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES. ADDITIONALLY, REASSIGNMENT IS WARRANTED UPON REMAND, WHERE THE SENTENCING JUDGE CANNOT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO SET ASIDE PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED VIEWS.

II. UNDER MICHIGAN LAW, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT SHOULD ACCURATELY REFLECT THE SENTENCING JUDGE'S DETERMINATIONS. THOUGH JUDGE GRANT AGREED TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES, THOSE CHANGES WERE NEVER MADE. THEREFORE, REMAND IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO [PETITIONER'S] REQUESTS TO CORRECT THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT.

(Pet'r's Br. on Appeal, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.22.) Petitioner subsequently filed a supplemental brief, raising a third issue: the sentence was based on improper judicial factfinding, in violation of the new rule established in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). In a published opinion issued on February 13, 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that thecourt was bound by a prior panel decision in People v. Herron, 845 N.W.2d 533 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013), which concluded that Alleyne was inapplicable to Michigan's indeterminate sentencing guidelines. See People v. Lockridge, 849 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). Two of the panel judges filed separate opinions, concurring in the result, but expressing their disagreement with the Herron decision. Id. at 391-408.

Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the following two issues:

I. WERE [PETITIONER'S] SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS VIOLATED BY JUDICIAL FACT FINDING, WHICH INCREASED THE FLOOR OF THE PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE, IN VIOLATION OF ALLEYNE V UNITED STATES?

II. IS [PETITIONER] ENTITLED TO BE RESENTENCED, WHERE THE REASONS GIVEN FOR DEPARTING FROM THE GUIDELINES WERE NEITHER SUBSTANTIAL NOR COMPELLING, AND WERE ADEQUATELY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE SCORING OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES. ADDITIONALLY IS REASSIGNMENT WARRANTED UPON REMAND, WHERE THE SENTENCING JUDGE CANNOT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO SET ASIDE PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED VIEWS?

(Pet'r's Appl. for Leave to Appeal, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.76.) The supreme court, in a lengthy published opinion issued on July 29, 2015, overruled Herron, 845 N.W.2d 533, and held that the mandatory Michigan sentencing guidelines violated the right to a trial by jury to the extent that they increased a minimum sentence based on judicial factfinding, in violation of Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151. People v. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d 502 (Mich. 2015). As a remedy for the constitutional problem, the Michigan Supreme Court severed the portion of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.34(2) that it made the guidelines mandatory, and severed the portion of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.34(3) that required substantial and compelling reasons for judicial departure from the guidelines. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d at 520-21. The court held, however, that, because the sentencing court had exercised its discretion to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines, the minimum sentence range was not actually constrained by the violation of the Sixth Amendment created by the mandatory guidelines. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d at 521-22.

In his habeas application, Petitioner raises the following three grounds for relief:

I. [PETITIONER'S] SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY JUDICIAL FACT FINDING, WHICH INCREASED THE FLOOR OF THE PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE, IN VIOLATION OF ALLEYNE V UNITED STATES.

II. [PETITIONER] CHALLENGES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE DEPARTURE OF HIS GUIDELINES, IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT[']S DECISION IN ALLEYNE V UNITED STATES - US -; 133 S. Ct. 2151; 186 L ED 2D 314 (2013)[.]

III. [PETITIONER] WAS ILLEGALLY SCORED 25 POINTS FOR PV 1, FOR GRAND LARCENY FROM A PERSON IN 1990. A CRIME IN WHICH THE JURY ON THIS CASE NEVER HEARD WHICH ELEVATED [PETITIONER'S] GUIDELINES BY 7 TO 14 MONTHS. HE WAS ALSO SENTENCED UNDER THE HYTA PROBATION STATUS.

(Pet., PageID.209, 211, 213.)

Discussion

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB. L. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). The AEDPA "prevents federal habeas 'retrials'" and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). The AEDPA has "drastically changed" the nature of habeas review. Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated onthe merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is "intentionally difficult to meet." Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the "clearly established" holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655. In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2014); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655. Moreover, "clearly established Federal law" does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44).

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). "To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to 'show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federalcourt was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Woods, 2015 WL 1400852, at *3 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). In other words, "[w]here the precise contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1705 (2014) (quotations marks omitted).

I. Grounds I & II: Violation of Alleyne v. United States

In Ground I of his habeas application, Petitioner contends that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by judicial factfinding that raised the floor of his minimum sentence, in violation of Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151. In Ground II of his application, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated Alleyne by departing upward from the guidelines in setting Petitioner's minimum sentence.

Petitioner argues the sentencing judge violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury by using, to enhance his sentence, facts that had not been admitted by Petitioner or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner bases his argument on the line of ...