Lofgren v. Polaris Indus. Inc.

509 F.Supp.3d 1009

Christopher Lars LOFGREN, Plaintiff,

v.POLARIS INDUSTRIES INC., Defendant.

NO. 3:16-cv-02811

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Filed December 23, 2020

B. Keith Williams, James R. Stocks, Lannom & Williams, Lebanon, TN, Daniel O. Rose, Kreindler & Kreindler, Evan Katin-Borland, Kreindler & Kreindler, New York, NY, Michael D. Allweiss, Michael D. Allweiss, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL, for Plaintiff.

Charles Frederick Spainhour, Lela M. Hollabaugh, R. Brandon Bundren, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Nashville, TN, David Albert Rammelt, Dawn M. Beery, Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP, Chicago, IL, Michael John Montgomery, Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELI RICHARDSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Doc. No. 165, "Motion"). Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. No. 174, "Response"), and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. No. 177).¹ For the reasons discussed, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

On June 30, 2015, Plaintiff, a West Point cadet in training with the United States Army at Fort Campbell in Tennessee, was involved in an accident while operating a MRZR-4 Lightweight Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle ("MRZR"). (Doc. No. 180 ¶ 1).³ On the day of the accident, Plaintiff began vehicle "familiarization" on the sniper range following basic driver training. (Id. at ¶ 56). The sniper range was used for training because the trails normally used were temporarily closed. (Id. at ¶ 57). The sniper range is over 1,000 feet long and contains large dirt berms at 100-meter intervals. (Id. at ¶ 3). The tops of the berms are roughly level, but the ground slopes downwards, causing variance in the heights of the berms. (Id. at ¶ 4).

During the familiarization process, Chief Warrant Officer Fuchs drove a lap around the sniper range with Plaintiff and Cadet Truax as passengers, heading north along a gravel path to the top of the range, before turning south and carefully navigating the berms. (Id. at ¶ 58). During this drive, Fuchs never caused the MRZR's wheels to leave the ground, and he did not travel over the speed of around 25 to 30 miles per hour. (Id. at ¶ 59; Doc. No. 186 ¶ 129). Fuchs then exited the MRZR, allowed Plaintiff to take over as the driver, and told Plaintiff to "take it easy." (Doc. No. 180 at ¶ 60). Cadet Truax moved to occupy the front-passenger seat. (Id. at ¶ 61).

After taking over the driver's role, Plaintiff drove north, made a U-turn beyond the 200-meter berm, and then came to a stop. (Id. at ¶ 63). Plaintiff accelerated, the MRZR lost contact with the ground, and when it landed both seat bases had broken in a similar location.⁴ (Id. at ¶¶ 64, 65). As a result of the accident, Plaintiff suffered a spinal injury and is a paraplegic. (Doc. No. 1 at 1). Cadet Truax, who was in the MRZR with Plaintiff, was uninjured. (Doc. No. 180 at ¶ 8).

CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

Plaintiff's Complaint pleads counts of 1) negligence, 2) strict liability, 3) breach of warranty, and 4) a constitutional challenge to Tennessee laws limiting punitive damages. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff requests relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 26).

In its brief in support of its Motion, Defendant claims that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the political question doctrine based on two defenses it plans to assert: 1) the United States Special Operations Command ("USSOCOM")⁵ improperly trained and supervised Plaintiff on the day of the incident, and 2) MRZR's design, including the decision to include the tactical seats, was done at the request and under the specific direction of USSOCOM. (Doc. No. 170 at 16). According to Defendant, the nature of these defenses is such that they necessarily trigger the political question doctrine

In order to properly assess its first defense, Defendant asserts, the Court and jury will have to review various military decisions, including the decisions to: "(1) let Plaintiff operate the MRZR before completing the Army's MRZR training program; (2) permit Chief Fuchs to supervise Plaintiff despite having no MRZR training or experience; (3) allow vehicle-familiarization training to proceed when the dedicated training course was closed; (4) allow untrained and unsupervised personnel to drive the MRZR on a sniper range that had never before been used for MRZR training and that featured a series of 12-foot jumps; (5) allow Plaintiff to operate the vehicle in violation of the Army's express speed restrictions; and (6) let Plaintiff operate the MRZR without in-vehicle supervision." (Doc. No. 177 at 2, 4-5).

In making the second determination, Defendant claims, the jury will have to review military decisions regarding the design of the MRZR. (Doc. No. 170 at 2-4). Defendant asserts that: the military was involved in the design process of the MRZR; the military specifically exerted design control over the seat; USSOCOM tested the MRZR and issued a document imposing safe operation limits; USSOCOM specifically addressed speed limits and did not conduct any jump testing; and USSOCOM additionally adopted Defendant's owner's manual. (Id. at 2-7).

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) "provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Cartwright v. Garner , 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). "Subject matter jurisdiction is always a threshold determination." Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon , 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007).

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: facial and factual attacks. Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. , 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). A facial attack questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading. When reviewing a facial attack, a district court takes the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. If those allegations establish federally-cognizable claims, jurisdiction exists. Id. A factual attack instead raises a factual controversy concerning whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Id.

Where there is a factual attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), no presumptive truthfulness applies to the complaint's allegations; instead, the court must weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter jurisdiction does or does not exist. Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc. , 491 F.3d at 330. "[T]he district court has considerable discretion in devising procedures for resolving questions going to subject matter jurisdiction[.]" Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States , 922 F.2d 320, 327 (6th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit has noted that:

The factual attack, however, differs greatly for here the trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction—its very power to hear the case—there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.

RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 549 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1977) ).

In making its decision, the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve jurisdictional facts.⁶

Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc. , 491 F.3d at 330 ; see also Nichols v. Muskingum Coll. , 318 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 2003) ("In reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes concerning jurisdiction, and both parties are free to supplement the record by affidavits."); Cunningham v. Rapid Response Monitoring Servs., Inc. , 251 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1192 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (discussing Gentek ). As always, the party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to prove that jurisdiction. Global Technology, Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power Steering Sys. Co. , 807 F.3d 806, 810 (6th Cir. 2015) ; Golden v. Gorno Bros. , 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005).

Defendant here lodges a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. This is a factual attack because its success or failure hinges on the factual validity of the Complaint's allegations. Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion to resolve the Motion by reference to the record outside of Plaintiff's Complaint.

DISCUSSION⁷

The political question doctrine entails that the presence of a "political question" will deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 137, 170, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) ("Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."). "The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch. The Judiciary is particularly ill suited to make such decisions, as ‘courts are fundamentally underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in nature.’ "

Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc. , 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (citation omitted).

In Baker v. Carr , the Supreme Court laid out "six independent tests" to determine whether a political question is present:⁸

[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and

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