Lofton v. Franklin Cnty. Miss.

1

ETHAN LOFTON by and through VEDA LEARY as GUARDIAN OF ETHAN LOFTON PLAINTIFF v. FRANKLIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; AMITE COUNTY MISSISSIPPI; JOHN DOES 1-10 DEFENDANTS

No. 5:22-cv-00052-DCB-RHWR

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Western Division

February 14, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID BRAMLETTE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 9] under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which was filed by Franklin County, Mississippi (“Franklin County”) and joined by Amite County, Mississippi (“Amite County”; Franklin County and Amite County are referred to collectively as, “Defendants”). See Joinder, [ECF No. 14]. In his Complaint [ECF No 1], Ethan Lofton, by and through Veda Leary as Guardian of Ethan Lofton (“Plaintiff”), alleges that Defendants, jointly and severally: (i) violated 42 U.S.C § 1983^[1]by depriving him of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under unnamed provisions of the Mississippi State Constitution (Count I); (ii) conspired to interfere with his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count II); (iii) intentionally inflicted emotional distress in violation of Mississippi state law (Count III) and (iv) negligently inflicted emotional distress in violation of state law (Count IV). Having reviewed the issues, the parties' submissions, and applicable law, the Court finds as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, officers of the Franklin County, Mississippi Sheriff's Department awakened Plaintiff at a residence within Franklin County on November 8, 2021, and arrested him for the possession of Schedule II narcotics. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 8.1. Plaintiff was booked and charged in Franklin County. Id. ¶ 8.2. After Plaintiff made an initial appearance before the Franklin County Justice Court, the Franklin County Sheriff's Office delivered him into the custody of the Amite County Sheriff's Office, where he was held at the Amite County jail. Id. ¶ 8.3-.4.

The Court will therefore disregard arguments in Plaintiff's briefing that attempt to do so.

While in the jail, Plaintiff alleges that he was severely beaten by four inmates. Id. ¶ 8.4. Plaintiff's friend, Jamie Sue Newell, received a phone call from an inmate inside the Amite County Jail, who advised her that Plaintiff had been beaten and injured. Id. Ms. Newell called her mother, Amanda Cupit Mabry, and Ms. Mabry alerted the jail staff. Id. The Complaint alleges that the jail staff was not cooperative and that the staff told Ms. Mabry that Plaintiff simply fell from a bunk bed. Id. The Complaint further alleges that the staff did nothing to “assist [Plaintiff] in a timely manner thereafter.” Id. Ms. Mabry called Lincoln County 911 from her Lincoln County residence and requested that an ambulance be sent to the Amite County Jail. Id. An ambulance and Plaintiff's brother, who had driven to the Amite County Jail from his residence in Lincoln County, arrived at the jail at the same time. Id. Plaintiff was transported to Southwest Regional Medical Center in McComb, Mississippi. Id.

Because Plaintiff had suffered traumatic brain injuries, he was airlifted from Southwest Regional Medical Center to Forrest General Hospital in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, for more specialized care. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff underwent surgery to correct his brain bleeds, and he remained in intensive care for three weeks. Id. He still was seeking care at Forest General Hospital when his guardian filed the Complaint. Id.

Regarding his injuries, Plaintiff alleges that: portions of his skull were removed and cannot be replaced; he suffered multiple brain bleeds; he requires extensive speech and physical rehabilitation; he requires the oversight of other persons in order to walk; he cannot speak and communicates in writings on a chalkboard; and he needs constant nursing care and hospital supplies. Id. The Lincoln County Chancery Court decree that approved Plaintiff's guardianship states: “[T]he medical professionals of the Ward have found that he is not able to manage his own affairs.” [ECF No. 1-1] ¶ II. Plaintiff seeks actual or compensatory damages, punitive^[2]or exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and requests that Plaintiff be declared a ward of Franklin and Amite Counties, with the counties being jointly and severally responsible for his future medical care and other damages. Id. ¶ 25.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. E.g., Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020); Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004); McCoy v. Defs., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-207-DCB-LRA, 2017 WL 6329600, at *2 (S.D.Miss. Dec. 11, 2017); Franklin v. N. Cent. Narcotics Task Force, No. 5:15-cv-120-DCB-MTP, 2016 WL 7378215, at *2 (S.D.Miss. Dec. 20, 2016). However, the Court is not required to credit “mere conclusory statements” or “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The factual allegations in a complaint must be enough to raise the right to relief above the speculative level. E.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; In re Great Lakes Dredge & Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010).

III.

ANALYSIS

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Count I.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants, jointly and severally, deprived him of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under unnamed “corresponding sections of the Constitution and Code of the State of Mississippi ". [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 12-17; 25. In his Complaint and briefing in response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff suggests that Defendants committed a wide variety of constitutional violations including failures to: hire, train, and supervise staff; provide peer review of staff; repair jails; and provide a reasonably safe environment. [ECF No. 1]; [ECF No. 17]. Plaintiff further suggests that Defendants delayed in providing needed medical care to him. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 8.4; [ECF No. 17] ¶ 3. Defendants counter generally that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1983 because the Complaint pleads no viable constitutional claims against them and no official policy that caused Plaintiff's injuries. [ECF No. 10] at 3-4; Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 527 (5th Cir. 2016) (“liability for constitutional torts arises when the execution of an official policy causes the plaintiff's injury”).

As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff's reliance on the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is misplaced. [ECF No. 10] at 5. Pre-trial detainees, like Plaintiff, have no protections under the Eighth Amendment. Such detainees are protected, rather, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979) (“The Court of Appeals properly relied on the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment in considering the claims of pretrial detainees.”).^[3]The Court will dismiss with prejudice any claims that Plaintiff seeks to assert under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Second, to the extent that Plaintiff intends to assert a Section 1983 claim based on violations of unidentified provisions of the Mississippi State Constitution or unspecified Mississippi Code sections, the Court will disregard all such references. Plaintiff's intent in his Complaint with respect to potential Mississippi law violations related to his Section 1983 claim is unclear to the Court. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 17, 25. In any event, violations of non-federal laws cannot form a basis for liability under Section 1983. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119 (1992) (finding that § 1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law); Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 579 (5th Cir. 2009).

The Court turns to Plaintiff's Section 1983^[4]claim that is based on alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. The United States Supreme Court set forth the cornerstone of a Section 1983 analysis in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978):

... a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The Fifth Circuit has instructed district courts that, when ruling on a motion to dismiss a Monell claim such as this one:

. a plaintiff must show that an official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009). And to get past the pleading stage, a complaint's “description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation cannot be conclusory; it must contain

...