Logan v. State

312 Ga. 379

863 S.E.2d 31

LOGAN

v.The STATE.

S21A0811

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: September 8, 2021

Robert James Beckwith, The Beckwith Law Firm, 363 Lawrence Street, Marietta, Georgia 30060, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Parisia Faith Sarfarazi, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Joshua Bradley Smith, A.D.A., Jared Tolton Williams, District Attorney, Augusta Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, 735 James Brown Blvd., Suite 2400, Augusta, Georgia 30901, for Appellee.

Boggs, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Carl Garland Logan challenges his 2017 convictions for malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime in connection with the stabbing and beating death of Anthony Glenn Olivet. Appellant's sole enumeration of error is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers by preventing him from playing for the jury certain audio-recorded statements that a prosecution witness made to law enforcement officers to impeach the witness on cross-examination. However, the record does not support this claim. Accordingly, we affirm.¹

1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following. Appellant is from Danville, Virginia. On February 26, 2012, he went to a house in Danville to exchange drugs for sex. When the woman he started to have sex with said that she could not continue, he got angry, retrieved a knife from the kitchen, and stabbed her in the back. He also threatened to kill the woman, and she fled. Appellant then attacked the woman's roommate with a steak knife, stabbing her twice in the abdomen before plunging the knife so hard into her temple that the handle broke off and the blade had to be surgically removed from her face.

Two weeks later, Appellant's brother told him that Appellant's name had come up in connection with the stabbings, and Appellant decided to flee to Augusta, Georgia, where his older cousin Alvin Coleman lived. Soon after Appellant arrived in Augusta, he went to a convenience store with Coleman and met Coleman's friend Olivet, who was panhandling outside. Olivet was known in the community as a peaceful and likeable person who was beset by both physical and mental disabilities. A local pastor and school superintendent, Joseph Boulineau, had previously helped Olivet get an apartment, and Appellant began staying there with Olivet.

On Sunday evening, March 18, Coleman took Olivet to get something to eat, and Olivet said that he was not getting along with Appellant, because Appellant was "trying to take over his household" and overcharging him for cocaine. Appellant was still at Olivet's apartment when Coleman took Olivet home. Coleman was disturbed by his conversation with Olivet and discussed it with his wife, and later that same night, Coleman drove back to Olivet's apartment. On the way to Olivet's apartment, Coleman saw Appellant walking down the road in the opposite direction.

At Olivet's apartment, Coleman knocked on the door and the window, but there was no response. Coleman drove back the way he came, picked up Appellant, and asked him what had happened with Olivet. Appellant said that nothing had happened with Olivet but that he had decided to leave Augusta. Coleman thought that was a good idea and drove Appellant to the bus station downtown, where Appellant bought a ticket back to Danville using a fake name.

On Monday, March 19, Boulineau went to Olivet's apartment in the late morning to check on him and found Olivet lying dead on the floor underneath a quilt with an 11-inch kitchen knife sticking out of his throat. Boulineau immediately left the apartment, called 911, and waited for the authorities. In addition to the knife sticking out of Olivet's throat, responding officers recovered a bloody wooden two-by-four lying on the floor near Olivet's body. Coleman drove up as officers were processing the scene. After interviewing Coleman and confirming aspects of his account, law enforcement officers identified Appellant as a possible suspect but were unable to locate him.

The medical examiner found multiple stab wounds to Olivet's neck and chest, as well as several injuries to the back of Olivet's head and neck that were consistent with his having been repeatedly bludgeoned with a two-by-four. A fingerprint in the blood on the two-by-four was later matched to Appellant.

When Appellant left Augusta, he made his way to Texas, where he was arrested within weeks on unrelated charges and imprisoned. Following Appellant's indictment in October 2013, a warrant was issued for Appellant's arrest, and Georgia initiated the process of extradition. In October 2015, Appellant sent a letter to the District Attorney's office stating that he "stab[bed] a man to death in Augusta."

In February 2016, Appellant sent another letter to the District Attorney's office, this time writing, "I am let[t]ing you know I ... stab[b]ed to death Anthony Glenn Olivet."

2. Appellant's sole enumeration of error is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers by preventing him from impeaching Coleman on cross-examination with certain statements from Coleman's audio-recorded interviews with law enforcement officers that Appellant asserts were inconsistent with Coleman's trial testimony. Specifically, Appellant contends that the court prevented him from playing for the jury the following two statements that Coleman made, referring to Appellant: (1) "That's my cousin.... His dad's name is Carl Logan, from Virginia"; and (2) "He went in [a convenience store] and got something. He don't drink, he don't smoke or nothing, so he went in there and got him[self] something to eat."

On the first day of trial, Appellant informed the court that he wanted to represent himself instead of having his appointed counsel, Kelly Williamson, represent him. The court warned Appellant of the dangers of self-representation, including that if Appellant represented himself, he would be "expected to follow all the rules of law, all the rules of criminal procedure, rules of evidence, [and] rules related to the presentation of evidence," even if Appellant did not know those rules. See Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ("The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law."). At the end of an extensive colloquy, the court found that Appellant had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel and had instead chosen to represent himself at trial. The court then appointed Williamson to serve as standby counsel for Appellant, to which Appellant said that he had no objection. See id. ("Of course, a State may – even over objection by the accused – appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary.").

During Appellant's cross-examination of Coleman, the following exchange occurred:

Q. So when you was investigated by the investigator, you don't remember saying to the investigator that, "Carl Logan don't smoke or drink or do drugs?"

A. No, sir, I don't quite remember. I don't remember saying that.

Q. That's what you said. I'm just asking you do you remember.

A. I said I don't remember.

The lead prosecutor interjected, "Your Honor, if he's going to impeach the witness, he needs to show some proof of it." The court told Appellant:

If you want to present him with a copy of that statement that you're referencing, you can. But right now, I think this question has been asked and answered unless you want to go there and show him a copy of what he said, whatever you allege he said; okay?

Appellant replied, "It's on ... the CD that the investigator had." The court asked if it was an "audio-recorded statement," and when Appellant said that it was, the court excused the jury.

The court asked Appellant if he was alleging that a recording existed of a statement that Coleman made to law enforcement officers, and Appellant said, "Yeah." The court then asked Appellant if he was alleging that in that statement, Coleman said "that he had never seen you [i.e., Appellant] drink or smoke or use drugs; something like that?" Appellant replied, "Yes. He [i.e., Coleman] said he knows I didn't smoke or drink. He says that he knows I was his cousin. He says a lot of different things he's not saying now ...."

The court asked Williamson if she had a copy of the statements that Appellant was talking about. Williamson said that there were two disks of interviews of Coleman, which she handed up to the court at the court's request. The court asked Appellant which of the CDs contained the statements that he wanted to play for the jury or whether he wanted to play statements from both disks, and Appellant answered, "I don't know." The court asked Appellant if he knew which officer was conducting the interview or interviews in which Coleman made the statements, and Appellant replied, "No, I don't know which one it was." The court tried unsuccessfully to get assistance from the lead prosecutor, but he was not aware of the statements that Appellant referenced, although he could not say that the statements did not exist. The court confirmed with Appellant that he recalled hearing the statements on the CDs. The court then said that it did not mind asking Williamson "as stand-by counsel and basically as an officer of the court" to make copies of the specific statements that Appellant wanted to play for the jury, but that the court did not know "where to start looking."

At that point, the discussion veered off onto other topics until the court brought it back to...