Loizon v. Evans

PHILIPPE Y. LOIZON, Plaintiff, v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. EVANS,CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,individually, and THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OFTHE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Defendants.

18 C 2759

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

September 3, 2020

Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Philippe Y. Loizon ("Loizon") has brought numerous claims against Timothy C. Evans, the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois ("Chief Judge Evans"), as well as the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois ("OCJ") (collectively "Defendants"), arising out of his termination from the Cook County Adult Probation Department ("APD"), an agency managed and supervised by the OCJ. Defendants have moved to dismiss most of Loizon's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to strike some allegations in Loizon's complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), and to dismiss Chief Judge Evans in his individual capacity. For the reasons below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, their motion to strike is denied, and their motion to dismiss Chief Judge Evans in his individual capacity is denied.

I. Background

A. Factual Background¹

Loizon started working for the APD in 1988, beginning what would prove to be a long career as a probation officer ("PO"). Am. Compl. ¶ 8. Roughly a decade later, Chief Judge Evans was elected to his present post, the duties of which include responsibility for the management and operation of the APD and the OCJ. Id. ¶ 6.

During Loizon's nearly thirty years of service as a PO, he received uniformly positive performance evaluations. See id. ¶¶ 21, 22, 34, 37, 41, 44, 60, 141. He was promoted to Supervisor in 1996, id. ¶ 16, and to Deputy Chief PO in 2003. Id. ¶ 23. At one point, Loizon supervised almost three times more employees than any other Deputy Chief in the APD, covering roughly 125 POs and about 7,000 probationers. Id. ¶¶ 31-32.

Despite his strong employment record, Loizon's tenure at the APD was tumultuous. He repeatedly corresponded with Chief Judge Evans and Acting APD Chief Jesus Reyes ("Reyes") regarding the APD's "need for additional manpower, the need for new policies and procedures and clarification of existing policies and procedures, [and] the need for holding officers accountable." Id. ¶ 39. Not only were these communications allegedly ignored, but Reyes purportedly ordered Loizon tocease writing regarding his "concerns about deficiencies in the APD's management and operation." Id. ¶ 40.

Some time later, in 2013, Loizon presented a new caseload management strategy for POs at an APD executive staff meeting. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. For reasons unknown, Reyes put a stop to Loizon's presentation and ordered Loizon to destroy the materials related to it. Id. ¶ 68. Several months later, Loizon complained to the OCJ's Human Resources department that Reyes had subjected him to "discriminatory and harassing conduct." Id. ¶ 72. Loizon never received a response to his complaint. Id. ¶ 73.

But the real trouble for Loizon began in May 2014, when the Chicago Tribune (the "Tribune") published an article containing many troubling allegations against him. For example, the article claimed that Loizon had built inappropriate "alliances with the police and FBI" during his work as a PO, that POs serving under him were inadequately trained, that he conducted illegal raids, and that he had an "improper personal relationship with [some] probationers." Id. ¶ 83. Loizon maintains that all of the allegations against him in this article were false. Id. ¶ 84.

In response to the piece, Chief Judge Evans publicly announced that Loizon had been placed on "desk duty" pending an investigation into his behavior. Id. ¶ 117. While on desk duty, Loizon was prohibited from going into the field as part of his normal responsibilities. Id. ¶ 119.

Chief Judge Evans received the results of the investigation in August 2014, but has never disclosed any details to the public or to Loizon. Id. ¶ 121. Loizonhimself was never "afforded any opportunity to respond" to the Tribune's allegations, id. ¶ 118, and his request to Chief Judge Evans that he be provided counsel to assist him in refuting the allegations was denied. Id. ¶ 125.

Almost two years later, in March 2016, the Tribune published an article critical of Chief Judge Evans' silence regarding the investigation into Loizon. Id. ¶ 142. Two days after this article was published, the Chief PO ordered Loizon to appear at a meeting to discuss the allegations against him. Id. ¶ 146. At this meeting, Loizon was asked a number of questions, but, according to him, no facts were cited or evidence presented in support of any of the allegations. Id. ¶ 148. For his part, Loizon provided the meeting's attendees with the names of a number of witnesses he believed would clear his name, but none of these witnesses were ever interviewed by the OCJ or APD. Id. ¶¶ 153-54.

About a year later, in March 2017, the Tribune published a third article; this one reported the approximately thousands of hours of compensatory time Loizon had accrued with the APD. "The article was critical of the high number of Loizon's accrued comp hours . . . and referred to Loizon as 'a controversial figure in the [APD].'" Id. ¶¶ 157-58. About two weeks after this piece was published, Chief Judge Evans directed that Loizon be terminated. Id. ¶ 160. This litigation followed.

B. Procedural Background and Summary of Counts

Loizon initially filed a five-count complaint against the OCJ and Chief Judge Evans in his official capacity, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.§ 201 et seq., and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act ("IWPCA"), 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115 et seq. See 2/12/19 Order at 1, ECF No. 55. The Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Loizon's claims against Chief Judge Evans in his official capacity as duplicative of his claims against the OCJ, but denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Loizon's claim under the IWPCA. Id. As to that claim, the Court determined Loizon had alleged that, "contrary to the applicable OCJ policies," he had not received payment for the compensatory time he had accrued with the APD and therefore, had adequately pleaded he "was owed compensatory time under an agreement." Id. at 4.

Loizon amended his complaint to add six more counts against the OCJ and Chief Judge Evans, this time in his individual capacity. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Dismiss and/or Strike ("Pl.'s Resp.") at 1, ECF No. 150. Defendants have now moved to strike Loizon's references to his accrued compensatory time in Count III, to dismiss Counts IV through XI for failure to state a claim, and to dismiss as a defendant Chief Judge Evans in his individual capacity. Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem.") at 1, ECF No. 146.

At this junction, a brief summary of Loizon's claims relevant to the motion to dismiss would be helpful. In Count III,² Loizon claims that the OCJ violated the FLSA by failing to pay him for the "at least 2,877 . . . compensatory hours" he accruedwith the APD. Am. Compl. at 60, ¶ 238.³ The OCJ's alleged failure to cash out Loizon's comp hours also largely forms the basis for Counts IV and V, respectively asserting claims under the IWPCA and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1 et seq.

Count VI claims a violation of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. Loizon alleges that the OCJ failed to notify him of his right to continued insurance coverage under COBRA at the time of his termination. Am. Compl. at 63, ¶ 219. As a result, Loizon's insurance coverage lapsed, and he was forced to procure alternative insurance "nearly three times more costly" than his plan with the APD. Id. at 64, ¶ 223.

In Count VII, brought against both the OCJ and Chief Judge Evans in his individual capacity, Loizon alleges that the treatment he experienced at the APD, as well as his termination, constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") under Illinois law. Id. at 64-66, ¶¶ 217-27.

Count VIII, against the OCJ only, is based on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The FMLA entitles "eligible employees" to take a twelve-week leave if they suffer from a "serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Loizon claims that the OCJ retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the FMLA because "he was on approved medical leave" at the time he was terminated. Am. Compl. at 68, ¶ 222.

Counts IX and X, against the OCJ and Chief Judge Evans in his individual capacity, allege that Loizon was deprived of a property interest in his continued employment (Count IX) and a liberty interest in the pursuit of his chosen occupation (Count X) without due process of law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Am. Counts IX and X to Am. Compl. ("Am. Counts"), ECF No. 141.⁴

Finally, Count XI, which also names the OCJ and Chief Judge Evans in his individual capacity, alleges that Defendants violated Loizon's First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for speaking out regarding his concerns about APD operations. Am. Compl. at 75, ¶¶ 217-21.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

That said, when considering motions to dismiss, the Court accepts "all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."...