Lonergan v. Johnston

Peter Gerard Lonergan, Appellant, v. Nancy Johnston, et al., Respondents.

No. A21-0816

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

April 11, 2022

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-20-1097

Peter Gerard Lonergan, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Drew Bredeson, Brandon Boese Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Connolly Judge; and Cleary, Judge.

CLEARY, JUDGE ^[*]

Appellant, Peter Gerard Lonergan, challenges the district court's dismissal of his suit against respondents, multiple Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) officials, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellant argues the district court erred by dismissing his complaint because (a) it failed to liberally construe his pleadings; (b) it erred by determining Minn. Stat. § 144.651 (2020), the Patient Bill of Rights (PBR) does not create a private cause of action; and (c) appellant has the right to pursue recovery through a personal-injury tort claim. Appellant also argues the district court erred in denying his temporary restraining order (TRO) and makes a series of arguments in his reply brief. Because PBR does not create a private cause of action and appellant's complaint asserted no other legitimate cause of action, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant is a civilly committed sex offender residing in an MSOP facility. MSOP has used a series of vendors, but now contracts with T.W. Vending to provide canteen items within the facility and Thrifty White Pharmacy to supply over the counter medications and other medical supplies. MSOP has policies that limit the approved vendors MSOP patients can purchase items from and contends these policies are meant "to maintain the therapeutic environment and ensure the safety and security of clients, staff, and the public."

Appellant started this case in February 2020, by filing a complaint in Ramsey County District Court against MSOP's executive director and other staff, and immediately seeking a TRO because MSOP staff confiscated as contraband two mugs appellant bought from a non-approved vendor.

Appellant's complaint stated PBR gives him "the right to contract with any commercial or private vendor of his choosing" and each named respondent restricted this right. See Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subd. 24. Appellant argued this violation of PBR caused a violation of a series of constitutional rights. In relevant part, appellant sought (1) for MSOP's unlawful conduct to be declared "illegal and in violation of Minnesota Statutory Law, the Minnesota Constitution, United States Constitution and common law basic human rights claims"; (2) for respondents to be "enjoined from engaging in the same or similar practices"; (3) for the repeal of policies restricting appellant's rights and privileges to select a vendor of his choice; and (4) an order requiring MSOP to permit appellant to purchase "necessary hygiene, over-the-counter medications, snack items, and other allowable property items through any reputable commercial company of his choice."^[1] Simultaneously with filing the complaint, appellant petitioned for a TRO to enjoin enforcement of the vendor selection policy.

The district court denied appellant's TRO petition after applying the requisite five-factor test. See Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (Minn. 1965) (providing the five-factor test). The district court determined "the application of the Dahlberg factors do not favor granting a [TRO]" and that "the most significant factor by far is the likelihood of success on the merits-which [appellant] has failed to demonstrate at this early stage."

After the district court denied the TRO, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint because Favors v. Kneisel, 902 N.W.2d 92 (Minn.App. 2017), foreclosed appellant's primary claim. Appellant argued his case is distinguishable from Favors, sought permission from the district court to request reconsideration on its TRO decision, moved for special accommodations to have internet access to prepare for this case, and moved to strike statements from respondents and respondents' memorandum of law supporting dismissal because he claimed they were perjured. After oral arguments, the district court granted respondents' motion to dismiss, determining PBR does not create a private cause of action and appellant's claimed injuries did not rise to the level of constitutional violations. The district court also denied all of appellant's other motions determining there were "no compelling circumstances to allow a motion to reconsider the TRO denial." Granting respondents' motion to dismiss made appellant's request for special access and motion to strike moot.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellant challenges both the district court's dismissal of his complaint and denial of his TRO, and also asserts several arguments in his reply brief. We address each issue in turn.

I. The district court did not err by dismissing appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

"We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo to determine whether the pleadings set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief." Abel v. Abbot Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Minn. 2020) (citations omitted). "The reviewing court must consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003). We also review the legal sufficiency of the claim de novo. Graphic Commc'ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Minn. 2014).

a. The district court did not fail to liberally construe appellant's complaint.

Appellant claims the district court failed to liberally construe his pro se pleadings to identify his personal injury, and to identify his implication that the Minnesota Human Rights Acts (MHRA) functions with PBR to create a private cause of action.

We have recognized that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. State ex rel. Farrington v. Rigg, 107 N.W.2d 841, 841-42 (Minn. 1961) (stating "great liberality" is extended to pro se pleadings). Even so, "[p]ro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys." Heinsch v. Lot 27, Block 1 For's Beach, 399 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn.App. 1987). "The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure require that a civil complaint 'contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' A complaint should put a 'defendant on notice of the claims against him.'" Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01; Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Minn. 2006)).

In its dismissal order, the district court stated it could not consider any claims under MHRA because appellant did "not make reference to [MHRA], nor common law torts, beyond 'Common Law international Human Rights'" in his complaint. Like the district court, we find no reference or argument based on MHRA in appellant's complaint. The district court did not fail to liberally construe appellant's complaint.^[2]

b. PBR does not create an implied private cause of action.

Whether a statute creates a private cause of action is a question of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo. Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Minn. 2007). A statute creates a private cause of action only if "the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication." Id. We consider the Cort factors to determine whether a statute creates an implied private cause of action: "(1) whether the plaintiff belongs to the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether the legislature indicated an intent to create or deny a remedy; and (3) whether implying a remedy would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative enactment." Favors, 902 N.W.2d at 95 (citing Flour Exch. Bldg. Corp. v. State, 524 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn.App. 1994) (referencing the "Cort factors" and citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995)).

Appellant argues the legislature created a private cause of action by implication based on the special relationship between appellant and respondents, and PBR's language. PBR gives patients a "right to independent personal decisions and knowledge of available choices shall not be infringed." Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subd. 1. Appellant seems to argue this right to personal decisions combines with PBR subdivision 24 to create a right for patients to choose from any supplier or vendor to purchase goods. See Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subd. 24 (stating patients can buy goods not already provided "from the supplier of their choice unless otherwise provided by law"). Under his interpretation of the statute, appellant contends MSOP's failure to allow him his choice of vendors violates PBR and causes a personal injury, and because he alleged the necessary facts in his pleadings to show a personal injury, his claim should not have been dismissed.^[3] Respondents, relying on Favors, contend that PBR does not create a private cause of action. See 902 N.W.2d at 92.

Favors is instructive and precedential. Favors, like appellant, was civilly committed to MSOP and filed a complaint against MSOP employees alleging they violated PBR by denying his request for a cassette recorder. Id. at 94. The respondents in Favors moved to dismiss the...