Long v. Noland

DE WITT LAMAR LONG, #A1024631, Plaintiff, v. CHAPLAIN CHARLES NOLAND, JR.; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER HAMADA; SERGEANT LEAIALAIMATAFAO; CHIEF OF SECURITY LYLE ANTONIO; WARDEN SCOTT O. HARRINGTON, Defendants.

CIVIL No. 21-00205 HG-RT

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

September 13, 2021

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT IN PART AND DIRECTING SERVICE

Helen Gillmor United States District Judge

Before the Court is Plaintiff De Witt Lamar Long's (“Long”) first amended prisoner civil rights complaint (“FAC”) brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. ECF No. 7. Long is a practicing Muslim who alleges that prison officials^[1] at the Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”)^[2] violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection in 2019. Id. at 7-25. Long claims that Defendants did not purchase and provide him religious literature, denied him religious meals on two occasions, and cancelled religious services. Id. For the following reasons, Long's First Amendment claims in Count IV against COS Antonio and Count V against Warden Harrington based on the cancellation of religious services may proceed.^[3] His remaining claims are DISMISSED.

I. STATUTORY SCREENING

The Court is required to conduct a pre-Answer screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, or in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a). During this screening, the Court must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) “are directed at screening out meritless suits early on”); see also Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)-(b)).

In determining whether a complaint or any portion thereof should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) or 1915A(b), the Court applies the same standard as that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12”). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although this plausibility standard does not equate to a “probability requirement, ” “it asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Dent v. Nat'l Football League, 968 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020) (same).

Rule 12 is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (“Rule 8”). Rule 8 “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (citation omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (citation omitted) (brackets in original); see also Woods v. U.S. Bank N.A., 831 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016) (same).

The Court construes pro se litigants' pleadings liberally and affords them the benefit of any doubt. See Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Liberal construction of a pro se civil rights complaint, however, “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nor do district court judges have an “obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.” Pliler v. Ford, 42 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Eblacas v. Agbulos, Civ. No. 18-00376 DKW-RLP, 2018 WL 5621954, at *2 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2018) (“While the court construes [the plaintiff's] allegations liberally and affords him the benefit of any doubt, it will not speculate about [the plaintiff's] claims, and has no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The Court cannot dismiss a pro se litigant's pleading without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Before dismissing a pro se complaint, the Court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint “to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. BACKGROUND^[4]

Long is a practicing Muslim who arrived at the HCF from the Saguaro Correctional Center (“SCC”) on March 6, 2019. ECF No. 7 at 7, 9. Long practices his faith by praying, attending Jumʻah services, ^[5] participating in Ramadan, ^[6]reading and reciting the Qur'an, ^[7] and abstaining from eating pork. Id. at 7. Upon arriving at the HCF, Long asked Chaplain Noland to add his name to three separate lists of prisoners who (1) observe Ramadan, (2) “attend Islamic Services, ” and (3) consume a “Halal/Kosher diet.”^[8] Id. at 8. Long's name was added to the three lists. Id. at 23.

Long alleges in Count I that he repeatedly asked Chaplain Noland for a Qur'an and Islamic literature, but Chaplain Noland gave him neither. Id. at 9. On May 1, 2019, Long filed a grievance complaining that he was not given a Qur'an. Id.

Long alleges in Count II that CO Hamada refused to provide him with a “Halal/Kosher” meal on May 2, 2019, when the meal being served to inmates included pork. Id. at 11-14. After Long was given a non-Halal/Kosher meal, he asked CO Hamada to resolve the issue. Id. at 13. CO Hamada told Long to “take [his] tray and go.” Id. When Long asked to speak with the head cook, as he had been previously told to do if there was an issue with his food, CO Hamada allegedly refused Long's request. Id. According to Long, he was forced to wait approximately twelve hours between meals. Id.

Long alleges in Count III that Sgt. Leaialaimatafao failed to provide him with a double-portion meal one evening. Id. at 15-18. During Ramadan, Long generally received a double-portion meal each evening. Id. at 16. On May 7, 2019, Long reported to the “control box” to receive his evening meal. Id. Long received a standard meal tray with two pieces of chicken instead of a double-portion tray with four pieces of chicken. Id. Long asked Sgt. Leaialaimatafao to call the kitchen, but she refused. Id. at 17. Sgt. Leaialaimatafao told Long “that there was nothing that she could do about it.” Id. When Long asked Sgt. Leaialaimatafao to call the lieutenant on duty, as he had been previously instructed to do, Sgt. Leaialaimatafao allegedly said, “I'm not gonna bother him with this.” Id. at 18.

Long alleges in Count IV that Jumʻah services were not available at the HCF during the month of Ramadan in 2019. Id. at 19-21. When Long inquired why the services were unavailable, a correctional officer directed Long's attention to a memorandum on the wall from COS Antonio stating that no Jumʻah services were being held. Id. at 20. Long claims that, during the same period, Christian services were held. Id. Long sent several “inter-unit requests” to COS Antonio that went unanswered. Id. at 21. On May 30, 2019, Long also submitted a formal grievance regarding the lack of Jumʻah services. Id.

Long alleges in Count V that Warden Harrington failed to protect his “religious rights.” Id. at 22-25. Long alleges that he submitted “several Grievances, ” and Warden Harrington was therefore “well aware” of the events described above. Id. at 23. Although Warden Harrington responded to the grievances, Long alleges that the “issues were not resolved” and “the incidents and violations got worse.” Id. According to Long, his “problems” continued until he returned to the SCC on or around July 18, 2019. Id. at 23-24.

Long seeks “[compensatory, consequential, special, ” and punitive damages, restitution, attorney's fees and costs, and interest. Id. at 26.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework for Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020). Section 1983 requires a connection or link between a defendant's actions and the plaintiff's alleged deprivation. See Monell v Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010,...