Loomis v. Unum Grp. Corp.

539 F.Supp.3d 898

Kerry Ann LOOMIS, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.UNUM GROUP CORPORATION, Defendant.

Case No: 1:20-CV-251

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Southern Division, at Chattanooga.

Filed May 13, 2021

Hillary Diana LeBeau, Pro Hac Vice, McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP, Molly A. Elkin, Pro Hac Vice, Woodley & McGillivary, Washington, DC, Jack Siegel, Pro Hac Vice, Stacy W. Thomsen, Pro Hac Vice, Siegel Law Group PLLC, Dallas, TX, Nicholas Chase Teeples, Charles P. Yezbak, III, Yezbak Law Offices PLLC, Nashville, TN, Travis M. Hedgpeth, Pro Hac Vice, The Hedgpeth Law Firm, PC, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Charles B. Lee, Jenna W. Fullerton, Miller & Martin, PLLC, Chattanooga, TN, Julia G. MIX, Patrick William Shea, Pro Hac Vice, Paul Hastings, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CURTIS L. COLLIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are three motions: Plaintiff Kerry Ann Loomis's motion for step-one notice pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (Doc. 51), Defendant Unum Group Corporation's motion for oral argument on Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 86), and Defendant's motion for leave to file a sur-reply (Doc. 88).

I. BACKGROUND

On September 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, asserting Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. , by classifying its Disability Benefits Specialists as exempt employees, as well as other claims. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff brought her FLSA claim as a putative collective action (id. at 5–6) and moved for step-one notice, also known as conditional certification, on November 21, 2020 (Doc. 51).¹

Defendant is an employee-benefits provider that provides several categories of coverage to individuals and businesses. Defendant's Disability Benefits Specialists are responsible for processing disability claims submitted to Defendant. The Disability Benefits Specialists at issue in this case work in one of three departments: Short-Term Disability ("STD"), Long-Term Disability ("LTD"), and Individual Disability Insurance ("IDI").² (See Doc. 84 at 7.)

In support of her motion for conditional certification, Plaintiff attaches declarations of eight Disability Benefits Specialists, including her own. (Docs. 53-1–8.) Kristen Harvey was a Disability Benefits Specialist in the STD department between December 2015 and January 2019. (Doc. 53-1 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Adrine Gadakian worked as a Disability Benefits Specialist in the LTD department from February 2017 to March 2019. (Doc. 53-2 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Arbi Haghverdian worked as a Disability Benefits Specialist in the LTD department from June 2017 to May 2019. (Doc. 53-3 ¶¶ 1, 4.) John Ochira worked as a Disability Benefits Specialist in the LTD department from July 2016 to July 2018. (Doc. 53-4 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Peter Park worked as a Disability Benefits Specialist in the LTD department from February 2017 to July 2019. (Doc. 53-5 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Luis Salas worked as a Disability Benefits Specialist in the LTD department from December 2017 to December 2018. (Doc. 53-6 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Alexandria Savini worked as a Disability Benefits Specialist in the STD department from June 2017 to December 2018. (Doc. 53-7 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Finally, Plaintiff worked as a Disability Benefits Specialist in the STD department from January 2015 to January 2019. (Doc. 53-8 ¶¶ 1, 4.)

These eight declarants state that, regardless of job title, their primary job duty was "processing disability insurance claims in accordance with predetermined guidelines within specified time frames." (Docs. 53-1–8 ¶ 2.) To do so, their daily job duties included requesting and gathering medical and employment information, sharing information and documents with supervisors and other specialized staff to receive processing guidance, inputting information into Defendant's computer system and into template approval or denial forms, reviewing claims against approval criteria and policies, and calling claimants to inform them of decisions, among other tasks. (Id. ¶ 6.) Each declarant states he or she had little authority to make the decisions on the claims independently and, instead, performed duties pursuant to Defendant's policies, procedures, and guidelines. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) These declarants aver they regularly worked over forty hours per week but were not paid overtime compensation by Defendant. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff asks the Court to conditionally certify the following class:

All salaried Disability Benefits Specialists ("Benefits Specialists") who worked for Unum at any time since [insert date three years prior]. Benefits Specialists include STD Benefits Specialist, LTD Benefits Specialist, and IDI Benefits Specialists regardless of level (i.e., "Core", "Senior", or "Lead") and any other employee, however titled, whose job duties included processing disability claims using the guidelines in Unum's Benefit Center Claims Manual ("Collective Action Members").

(Doc. 85 at 2 (brackets in original).) Plaintiff has attached a proposed notice to be sent to this collective class. (Doc. 85-1.)

Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification. Defendant asserts the FLSA's administrative exemption applies and therefore precludes conditional certification. (Doc. 84 at 19–22.) Defendant also contends Plaintiff is not similarly situated to the collective class based on department assignments, seniority level, and need for supervision. (Id. at 2.) If the Court conditionally certifies a collective class, Defendant notes Plaintiff's proposed notice is defective in several respects. (Id. at 28–30.)

Plaintiff has filed a reply. (Doc. 85.) Defendant has filed motions for oral argument and for leave to file a sur-reply, contending Plaintiff's reply raises new issues and mischaracterizes Defendant's position and the law. (Docs. 86, 88.)

Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification (Doc. 51), Defendant's motion for oral argument (Doc. 86), and Defendant's motion for leave to file a sur-reply (Doc. 88) are now ripe.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the FLSA, an employer must pay an employee time-and-a-half for labor exceeding forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Section 216(b) of the FLSA allows an employee to maintain a collective action against an employer for violations of the FLSA on behalf of herself and "other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). A plaintiff bears the burden of showing she is similarly situated to the potential opt-in plaintiffs. O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc. , 575 F.3d 567, 584 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez , 577 U.S. 153, 136 S. Ct. 663, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016).

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit uses a two-stage process to determine whether a particular group of plaintiffs are "similarly situated" under the FLSA. Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 454 F.3d 544, 546–67 (6th Cir. 2006) ; see also Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC , 860 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 2017) ("Courts typically bifurcate certification of FLSA collective action cases."). "The purpose of the first stage, or conditional certification, is to provide notice to potential plaintiffs and to present them with an opportunity to opt in." Lindberg v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC , 761 F. Supp. 2d 752, 757–58 (W.D. Tenn. 2011). "The threshold issue in deciding whether to authorize notice to the proposed class members is whether the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they and the proposed class members are ‘similarly situated.’ " White v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc. , 236 F.R.D. 363, 366 (E.D. Tenn. 2006). "The second stage is final certification, which occurs toward the end of discovery and must satisfy a stricter standard." Saddler v. Memphis City Schs. , No. 12-CV-2232-JTF-tmp, 2013 WL 12100720, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant's motions for oral argument and for leave to file a sur-reply affect the Court's consideration of Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification, so the Court will address Defendant's motions before addressing Plaintiff's motion.

A. Defendant's Motions for Oral Argument and for Leave to File a Sur-Reply

The Court typically does not hold oral arguments on motions. See Judicial Preferences, available at https://www.tned.uscourts.gov/content/curtis-l-collier-senior-united-states-district-judge (Preference No. 5). Even so, a party may move for oral argument if it "believes oral argument would be of particular benefit." Id. Defendant moves for oral argument on Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification, arguing Plaintiff's reply raises new arguments to which Defendant needs to respond. (Doc. 86.) Plaintiff has responded that oral argument would not be useful and that a sur-reply is more appropriate to address any alleged new arguments. (Doc. 87.) The Court finds oral argument is not necessary to adequately address Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification. The parties have provided sufficient briefing on all relevant issues and to hold oral argument would provide little to no benefit. Thus, Defendant's motion for oral argument (Doc. 86) will be DENIED .

Defendant also moves for leave to file a sur-reply to Plaintiff's conditional-certification motion. (Doc. 88.) Defendant asserts Plaintiff's reply "contains new arguments, mischaracterizes [Defendant's] position, and misstates the [Department of Labor] Opinion Letters applicable to claims handlers." (Id. at 2.) In general, "sur-replies are ‘highly disfavored, as they usually are a strategic effort by the nonmoving party to have the last word on a matter.’ " Crenshaw v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC , 433 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1063 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (quoting Disselkamp v. Norton Healthcare, Inc. , No. 3:18-CV-00048-GNS, 2019 WL 3536038, at *14 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2019) ). However, a sur-reply may be appropriate when the movant raises new issues in its reply brief, and the decision to permit a sur-reply is one within the Court's discretion. Id.

After reviewing the...