Lopes v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't

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CHRISTIAN LOPES, Plaintiff, v. LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-503-DJH

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

September 17, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

David J. Hale, Judge United States District Court

Plaintiff Christian Lopes sued Defendants Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government (Metro), Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC) Director Lt. Col. Jerry Collins in his individual and official capacity, and various LMDC officers (the Defendant Officers) in their official and individual capacities,^[1] alleging assault and battery, negligence and negligent supervision and training under Kentucky law, as well as violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1-2) Metro moves for dismissal of the § 1983 claims against it for failure to state a claim and for dismissal of all state claims against it on sovereignimmunity grounds. (D.N. 8) The remaining defendants move for dismissal of the official-capacity claims against them. (D.N. 5; D.N. 7) After careful consideration the Court will grant in part and deny in part Metro's motion and grant the remaining defendants' motions for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court “take[s] the facts only from the complaint, accepting them as true as [it] must do in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Siefert v. Hamilton Cnty., 951 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 2020).

Lopes alleges that on September 1, 2022, he attended a probation hearing in Jefferson County where he was ordered to serve seven days of home incarceration for failure to provide an address change and corresponding report. (D.N. 1-2, PageID.12 ¶ 16-17) After the hearing ended, LMDC officers transferred Lopes to LMDC's booking area to be processed. (Id., PageID.13 ¶ 20) Once transferred to the LMDC booking area, Lopes asked LMDC officers about the homeincarceration process. (Id., PageID.13 ¶ 21) Officers Trowell and Cardwell then approached Lopes in the booking area, and as he rose to meet them, Trowell “grab[bed] his arm.” (Id., PageID.13 ¶ 23) When Lopes began to “back[] away” from the officers, Cardwell “rushed” Lopes and pinned him against the back row of a set of chairs. (Id., PageID.13 ¶¶ 24-25) While Lopes remained “pinned” against the chairs by Cardwell, Trowell placed Lopes in “a rear neck chokehold” and used his body weight to swing Lopes onto the ground. (Id., PageID.13 ¶ 26) Once Lopes was on the ground, Officers Ray and Kenney arrived and “kne[lt] down” on Lopes's body while Trowell continued to execute a rear neck chokehold, leaving Lopes “unable to move” and in pain. (Id., PageID.14 ¶¶ 28-29) Despite one or more officers “ordering Officer Trowell multiple time[s] to release [Lopes]” from the chokehold, Trowell did not immediately do so. (Id., PageID.14 ¶¶ 30; see id., PageID.13-15 ¶¶ 26-35) Next, while Lopes remained pinned to the ground, the Defendant Officers “took turns” with their closed fists to deliver “at least eight” violent blows to Lopes's face and body. (Id., PageID.14 ¶ 31; see id., PageID.14-15 ¶¶ 31-34) The blows “were delivered with such a force that, from the impact of the punches, Mr. Lopes'[s] head would move from one direction to another causing physical injury to Mr. Lopes.” (Id., PageID.14 ¶ 32) Officer Ray, in particular, “pushed another officer off” Lopes's body and “reposition[ed] himself to an optim[al] position” to punch Lopes with his full strength at least four times “in a very strong and vigorous manner.” (Id., PageID.14-15 ¶¶ 33-34)

After this incident, the Defendant Officers handcuffed Lopes and escorted him to a cell. (Id., PageID.15 ¶ 35) Once Lopes was inside, he asked the Defendant Officers why he had been beaten. (Id., PageID.15 ¶ 36) In response, the Defendant Officers “pushed” Lopes, who was still handcuffed, against the brick cell wall and “bent him over and threw him [headfirst]” into the cell's corner. (Id., PageID.15 ¶ 37) The Defendant Officers then lifted Lopes's legs off the ground, forcing his head to hit the cell wall again, before “slamm[ing]” Lopes to the cell floor and leaving him “immobile and helpless.” (Id., PageID.15 ¶¶ 38-39)

Lopes alleges that LMDC officers routinely engage in excessive and unlawful force against persons in their charge. (Id., PageID.16 ¶ 44) According to Lopes, Metro and Defendant Collins have “knowingly allowed [LMDC] officers to ignore” excessive-force guidelines by failing to properly investigate excessive-force incidents and declining to enforce city policy. (Id., PageID.16 ¶ 46; see id., PageID.16-18 ¶¶ 44-53) Lopes claims that these longstanding practices have created a “custom of excessive force” within LMDC (id., PageID.16 ¶ 44), citing an investigative report commissioned by Metro (the GAR Report) that found “dangerous” customs and practices regarding LMDC use of force alongside systemic “poor policy, training and supervision” of LMDC correctional officers.^[2] (Id., PageID.18 ¶ 53 (quoting D.N. 1-2, PageID.40)) The GAR Report concluded that “bad management, substandard practices, and a ‘disturbing' tolerance of poor performance and misconduct by staff have created safety risks for the people incarcerated” within LMDC. (Id. (quoting D.N. 1-2, PageID.32)) Lopes alleges that LMDC's systemic indifference to excessive force is further demonstrated by several incidents involving excessive force by LMDC officers since 2018. (Id., PageID.16-18 ¶¶ 48-52)

In his complaint, Lopes alleges violations of state and federal law across six counts. (Id., PageID.19-28 ¶¶ 54-100) The first three counts assert federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Count I asserts a Monell custom-of-tolerance claim against Metro and Collins; Count II alleges Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations by the Defendant Officers; and Count III asserts a Monell failure-to-train/failure-to-supervise claim against Metro and Collins. (Id., PageID.19-25 ¶¶ 54-79) The final three counts assert state-law claims: Count IV alleges negligent supervision and training by Collins; Count V alleges negligence by all defendants^[3]; and Count VI alleges assault and battery by the Defendant Officers. (Id., PageID.25-28 ¶¶ 80-100)

Metro moves for dismissal of all claims against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), invoking sovereign immunity as to all state-law claims and contending that any federal claims fail as a matter of law. (D.N 8) The Defendant Officers and Collins move to dismiss the official-capacity claims against them on the grounds that those claims are duplicative. (D.N. 5; D.N. 7) The Court addresses each argument below.

II. ANALYSIS

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Factual allegations are essential; “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and the Court need not accept such statements as true. Id. A complaint whose “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” will not withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. When considering a motion to dismiss, “a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)).

Generally, courts may consider only the factual allegations in the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss. Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020). If matters outside the pleadings are presented on a motion to dismiss and not expressly excluded by the Court, the Court must treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); see also Bates, 958 F.3d at 483. There are a few exceptions, however. Courts may consider documents attached to the complaint, documents attached to the motion to dismiss “so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein,” and public records without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2011). Because the GAR Report is attached to Lopes's complaint, the Court may consider the report when deciding the defendants' motions to dismiss. See id.

A. Louisville Metro

Lopes asserts two § 1983 claims against Metro, alleging a custom of tolerance regarding excessive force (Count I) and a failure to adequately train and supervise LMDC officers as to the proper use of force (Count III). (D.N. 1-2, PageID.19-25 ¶¶ 54-62, 69-79) Lopes also asserts various state-law claims, including negligence against all defendants. (Id., PageID.25-28 ¶¶ 80100) Metro contends that the § 1983 claims are factually insufficient and that it is entitled to sovereign immunity on the state-law claims to the extent such claims are asserted against Metro. (D.N. 8, PageID.100-04)

1. Federal Claims

a. Custom of Tolerance

Lopes alleges that Metro has tolerated a “custom of excessive force” within LMDC by failing to enforce city policies regarding excessive force, to sufficiently investigate and document instances of force, and to discipline LMDC officers who use excessive force. (D.N. 1-2, PageID.19-21 ¶¶ 54-62) Lopes further alleges a custom of...