Lopez-Flores v. Douglas Cnty.

IRENE LOPEZ-FLORES, Plaintiff, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY and JOHN HANLIN, sheriff of Douglas County,in his official capacity, Defendants.

Case No. 6:19-cv-00904-AA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION

May 30, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

AIKEN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Irene Lopez-Flores ("plaintiff") brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim (doc. 1) against defendants Douglas County and John Hanlin, sheriff of Douglas County seeking damages for violation of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.¹ (doc. 14). For the reasons below, defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc. 14) is denied.

BACKGROUND

The factual background is brief and drawn from the allegations in plaintiff's complaint. On December 4, 2017, plaintiff was arrested in Douglas County with probable cause for alleged violations of Oregon law. Plaintiff's arrest resulted in her detention in the Douglas County Jail ("Jail"). On December 5, 2017, plaintiff was arraigned on the alleged Oregon law violations, and Douglas County Circuit Court set bail at $15,000. That same day, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agent sent the Jail an immigration detainer (Form I-247A) as well as a warrant for removal/deportation (Form I-205) requesting that the Jail or Sheriff notify ICE before plaintiff was released and maintain custody of plaintiff for a period not exceed 48 hours beyond when she would otherwise have been released to allow the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to assume custody of her. By 10:15 a.m. on December 7, 2017, plaintiff had posted bail for the Oregon law violations. Defendants maintained custody of plaintiff until 12:30 p.m., at which time DHS agents took custody of plaintiff for immigration violations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 8(a)(2) allows for a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).While the complaint does not need "detailed factual allegations," the complaint must provide "more than labels and conclusions." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In assuming the facts in the complaint as true and viewing them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court "determine[s] whether [the factual allegations] plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acting "pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature [that] cause[d] a constitutional tort." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A local government can only be sued when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id. at 694. Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Hanlin, a county employee, acted "pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standing operating procedure of the local governmental entity," Gillette v. Delmore, 972 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted), violating plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from unlawful seizure guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff further alleges that the Jail has a "practice, policy, or custom of detaining inmates, solely due to the existence of an immigration detainer," regardless of whether they have probable cause to extendplaintiff's detention after she posted bail. Compl. ¶ 16-17.

Defendants do not dispute that they extended plaintiff's detention based on the detainer request and administrative warrant. Defendants, however, move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that (1) plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts to show defendant have a practice, policy, or custom of unlawfully detaining inmates based on an immigration detainer and (2) plaintiff's detention was based on probable cause and does not constitute a valid Fourth Amendment violation claim. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

I. Judicial Notice

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of several documents not included in plaintiff's complaint. "A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. But a court may not take judicial notice of a fact that is subject to reasonable dispute." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Specifically, defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of Douglas County Sheriff's Office Jail Procedures No. 1411 ("Jail Procedures"), Warren Decl. Ex. 2 16:3, ICE detainer (Form I-247A), and the warrant for removability (Form 1-205). Wildlund Decl. Ex. 1 15:4-5. The Court declines to take judicial notice of the Jail Procedures. Plaintiff alleges defendants acted contrary to any written policy. Thus, there exists a dispute as to whether defendants' detention of plaintiff was based on the Jail's written policy or some other practice or custom and if this submitted policycomports with requirements of the Fourth Amendment.²

The Court, however, does take judicial notice as to the existence of the ICE detainer (Form 1-247A) and the warrant for removability (Form 1-205). Wildlund Decl. Ex. 1 15:4-5. Neither party disputes these forms existed at the time of the incident. The Court does not take judicial notice of any of the facts contained within either of these documents, only that they exist.

II. Practice, Policy, or Custom

Because the Court does not take judicial notice of the Jail Procedures, there exists a reasonable dispute as to what the Jail's practice, policy, or custom is based on plaintiff's allegations. Thus, the Court finds there are sufficient facts to reasonably infer the Jail has a practice or custom of extending detention of inmates without a specific finding of probable cause, as outlined below.

Defendant's primarily argue that the detention which occurred here did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, meaning that there was no violation of Monell. Whether probable cause extended from federal officials to defendants is discussed more fully below.

III. Probable Cause for Detention

It is well-established that "[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures ofthe person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Under the Fourth Amendment, "a fair and reliable determination of probable cause" must be provided "as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). "If an individual is kept in custody for a new purpose after the individual is entitled to release, that individual was subjected to a new seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes—one that must be supported by a new probable cause justification." Roy v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 2018 WL 914773, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018) (internal citations omitted) Thus, where a "continued detention exceed[s] the scope of the Jail's lawful authority over the released detainee," the detention "constitute[s] a new arrest, and must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment." Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., 2014 WL 1414305, at *10 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).

"As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012). Therefore, removal of an alien is a "civil, not criminal matter." Id. at 396. It is constitutionally permissible for federal executive officials to rely on the probable cause for civil removability provided in an administrative warrant to arrest deportable aliens. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 232-34 (1960). ICE officers are federal executive officials who can arrest and detain aliens on probable cause of removability. 8 U.S.C. § 1226. ICE officers "who have successfully completed basic immigration law enforcement training" are authorized to arrest removable aliens. 8 U.S.C. §287.5(c)(1); see e.g. 8 U.S.C. § 236.1(b)(1) (only authorized immigration officers may take aliens into custody "under the authority of Form I-200").

It is well established ICE officers must have probable cause of removability to be able to detain an alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 236.1(b)(1); Abel, 362 U.S. at 232-34. Courts in this District have previously held that the existence of an ICE detainer alone does not provide probable cause. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11. Defendants correctly noted that ICE policy changed in 2017 so that "ICE immigration officers must establish probable cause to believe that the subject is an alien who is removable from the United States before issuing a detainer . . ." Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers, ICE Policy No. 10074.2: § 2.4 (April 2, 2017).³

These detainers must also be accompanied by an administrative warrant, codifying an ICE officer's probable cause of removability. Id. Thus, the existence of an ICE detainer and administrative warrant here suggests that ICE officers had probable cause for plaintiff's removal. However, the question in this case is not whether ICE agents had probable cause to detain the...