Lopez-Mieres v. Soto

DR. ADOLFO DANIEL LOPEZ-MIERES Plaintiff, v. CARMEN YULIN CRUZ SOTO, IN HER OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL CAPACITY;

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, ET AL., Defendants.

CASE NO. 18-1588 (GAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

September 5, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER

Dr. Adolfo Daniel López-Mieres ("Plaintiff") filed the present suit against Carmen Yulín Cruz Soto in her personal capacity ("CYC"), the Municipality of San Juan ("MSJ"), Carmen Yulín Cruz Soto in her official capacity as the mayor of MSJ ("Mayor Cruz"), Jane Doe, and insurance companies X and Y (Docket No. 5) alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff further invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction alleged violations of Article II sections 1,4,6, and 7 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and pursuant to Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141-42, Puerto Rico Law 426 of November 7, 2000, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 601, Puerto Rico Law 14 of April 11, 2001, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29 § 194, Puerto Rico Law 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29 § 194, and the Autonomous Municipalities Act, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 21 § 4554, 4560, and 4562. Id., ¶ 3,4.

Before the Court are CYC, the MSJ, and Mayor Cruz (collectively, "Defendants"). Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Nos. 13; 14). CYC argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity in her personal capacity and that Plaintiff is not legally entitled to the relief he seeks. (Docket No. 13 at 1). MSJ and Mayor Cruz posit that Plaintiff has failed to meet the requisite elements under section 1983 and that the claim against Mayor Cruz is redundant and duplicative. (Docket No. 14 at 17).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.

I. Relevant Factual Background

Plaintiff served as the Vice-President of the Medical Faculty of the San Juan Municipal Hospital ("Hospital") since 2010. (Docket No. 5, ¶ 15). At the time Plaintiff filed the complaint, he was also the Medical Director of the Hospital's Emergency Room. Id., ¶ 16. At some point during 2017, Plaintiff was consulted at the Hospital regarding a patient with extreme and morbid obesity. Id., ¶ 17. Plaintiff performed physical examinations on the patient and, in view of the patient's obese condition, informed the patient that the Hospital's CT-Scan could not be used to perform the required examination because it had a maximum permissible weight of 350 pounds. Id., ¶ 20. Plaintiff advised the patient that it would probably be necessary to look for other places that could perform the examination. Plaintiff suggested the CT-Scan facilities available at the hippodrome, for Plaintiff had suggested that option to other patients before. Id. Plaintiff alleges that at all times he acted in his usual professional demeanor. Id., ¶ 21.

On August 21, 2017, Plaintiff met with Mr. Cabrera, the Executive Director of the Hospital, to communicate the medical staff's concern related to the sudden termination of employment of the Medical Director, Dr. José Martínez, and its possible repercussions on the medical residencyprograms. Id., ¶ 27. Dr. Martínez was also the Director of the Hospital's Endocrinology Program. Id. Plaintiff alleges that his comments were done in his individual capacity, as well as in his official capacity as the Vice-President of the Medical Faculty. Id., ¶ 28. Plaintiff classified his expressions as matters of public concern. Id., ¶ 30.

On that same day, around 10:00 pm, Defendant Mayor Cruz called Plaintiff to let him know that she would impose sanctions against him, for having recommended a patient get a CT-Scan at the hippodrome several months earlier. (Docket No. 5, ¶ 31). Later that night, Defendant Mayor Cruz informed Plaintiff via text message that he was dismissed from his duties. Id., ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges that following the August 21st conversations with Defendant, Mayor Cruz started making public defamatory statements against him, although she knew that the public comments were false. Id., ¶ 36. Two days later, Plaintiff received a letter from MSJ's Office of Human Resources notifying the intention of dismissing him from his position. Id., ¶ 41. The letter also summoned Plaintiff to appear before the Office of Human Resources on August 30, 2017 to expose any reasons why he should not be dismissed. Id. Plaintiff had the opportunity to present his version of the events before the Examining Officer. Id., ¶ 46. On December 20, 2017, Plaintiff received his dismissal letter. Id., ¶ 46. Plaintiff contends his dismissal was is in retaliation for his previous comments protesting the dismissal of his fellow coworker. Id., ¶ 50.

II. Standard of Review

when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the Court analyzes the complaint in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by the Supreme Court. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) which discusses Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). First, the court must "isolate andignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Id. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Second, the court must then "take the complaint's well-[pleaded] (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Plausible, means something more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that compels the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). This "simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" the necessary element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). If, however, the "factual content, so taken, 'allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,' the claim has facial plausibility." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

III. Discussion

Defendants argue Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, (2) that Defendant CYC is entitled to qualified immunity in her individual capacity, and that (3) Plaintiff's factual allegations involve actions taken by Defendant in her capacity of Mayor of SJ, not in her personal capacity.

1. Section 1983: Generally

Plaintiffs claims violation of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Title 42 Section 1983 of the Unites States Code provides, in pertinent part, that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Said statute "creates a private right of action for redressing abridgments or deprivations of federally assured rights." Centro Médico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005). The statute does not create independent substantive rights. Caraballo v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 990 F. Supp. 2d 165, 172-73 (D.P.R. 2014). Rather, it creates a cause of action to vindicate constitutional and federal statutory rights infringed upon by state actors. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).

To establish section 1983 liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted under color of state law and that defendant violated his or her federal constitutional rights, thereby causing the complained of injury. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). There are two aspects to the second inquiry: "(1) there must have been a deprivation of federally protected rights, privileges, or immunities and (2) the conduct complained of must have been causally connected to the deprivation." Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir. 1989); Figueroa-Garay v. Municipality of Rio Grande, 364 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (D.P.R. 2005).

A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff was not deprived of a protected property interest and due process was provided. Plaintiff received a notice from the Human Resources Department and got the opportunity to defend himself from the charges.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part, that "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To state a procedural due process violation, Plaintiff must plausibly plea that he was: "(1) deprived of a...