Lopez-Sanchez v. State

843 A.2d 915

155 Md. App. 580

Oscar Antonio LOPEZ-SANCHEZ v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 936, Sept. Term, 2003.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 8, 2004.

Neil F. Quinter (McDermott, Will & Emery on the brief), Washington, DC, for Appellant.

Gloria Wilson Shelton (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. on the brief), Deborah S. Richardson (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.

Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, BARBERA, and GREENE,¹ JJ.

DEBORAH S. EYLER, Judge.

Oscar Antonio Lopez-Sanchez, the appellant, was a victim of a delinquent act by DeShawn C., in Howard County. In the delinquency case, the State and DeShawn agreed to a Consent Order for Restitution ("Consent Order"), by which DeShawn would reimburse the appellant for some medical expenses, but not for lost wages. A few days after the Consent Order was docketed, the appellant filed a motion to reconsider or, in the alternative, to alter or amend. The juvenile court held a hearing on the motion and thereafter issued a memorandum opinion and order denying it, on the ground that the appellant lacked standing.

The appellant filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, which was granted. The State and DeShawn are participating as the appellees.

The appellant has posed six questions for review:

I. Did the juvenile court err in concluding that the victim lacks standing to assert his right to restitution from the respondent for the permanent, crippling injuries the respondent inflicted upon him?

A. Must a person be a party to have standing to assert rights in legal proceedings?

B. Does the Victims' Rights Act of 1997 give victims standing to seek restitution in juvenile proceedings?

II. Did the juvenile court improperly deny the victim's presumptive right to restitution for his lost earnings under Article 27, § 807 by approving the State and respondent's proposed order that contained no restitution for the victim's lost earnings?

III. Did the juvenile court err by holding that the State must join in the victim's request for restitution for lost earnings in order for the court to entertain the request?

IV. Did the juvenile court violate its mandatory duty under Article 27, § 781(d) to consider the victim impact statement in entering the judgment of restitution by approving the State and respondent's proposed order without taking the victim's impact statement into account?

V. Did the juvenile court improperly deny the appellant his right under Article 27, § 780 to address the judge at a disposition hearing by signing the State and respondent's proposed order without hearing from the victim?

VI. Did the juvenile court improperly ignore the State's Attorney's Office's failure to provide the victim with a copy of the proposed "consent order" prior to its being submitted to, and signed by, the judge, in violation of the victim's right under Article 27, § 770 to receive prior notice of all court proceedings in the case?

DeShawn filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that it is not permitted by law. The State then joined in that motion.

For the following reasons, we shall grant the motion to dismiss the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In the early morning hours of February 29, 2000, in Columbia, Maryland, the appellant was returning home from work at a Wendy's restaurant when he was shot in the back. He sustained serious wounds that caused him to become permanently paralyzed from the chest down.

DeShawn, then age 16, was apprehended in connection with the shooting, and was charged in the Circuit Court for Howard County with attempted murder, first and second degree assault, reckless endangerment, attempted robbery, attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.² The circuit court granted a reverse waiver motion and transferred the matter to the juvenile court.³ On August 23, 2000, the State filed a petition for delinquency against DeShawn. DeShawn was placed by the Department of Juvenile Justice ("Department") at the Hickey School. In September 2000, the Department transferred DeShawn to Bowling Brook Academy ("Bowling Brook"), in lieu of other detention options. The Bowling Brook program was time-limited, with DeShawn's placement to last between 10 and 12 months.

An adjudicatory hearing before a juvenile master took place on October 25, 2000. Two days later, the master issued a report and recommendation, finding that DeShawn was involved in the shooting and had committed an act that in the adult criminal justice system would constitute the crimes of attempted murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and reckless endangerment. The master made certain recommendations about placement.

DeShawn filed exceptions to the report, but withdrew them, on February 26, 2001. That same day, the juvenile court accepted the report and recommendation of the master, and issued an order adjudicating DeShawn a delinquent child and committing him to the custody of the Department, at Bowling Brook.

On May 16, 2001, the Howard County State's Attorney's Office filed in the juvenile proceeding a certification that the crime victim notification request form, as described in Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), article 27, section 841(9),⁴ had been mailed or otherwise delivered to the appellant. On May 25, 2001, the appellant filed the completed crime victim notification request form in the juvenile court.

DeShawn was scheduled for release from Bowling Brook on July 28, 2001. On July 24, 2001, the juvenile court held a disposition review hearing, which was devoted to the question whether the Department's request to move DeShawn to a "step down" juvenile facility should be approved. The appellant was present at the hearing, and his written victim impact statement was read into the record. The statement is as follows:

I was born in El Salvador. My mother died when I was 8 years old, and I lived with my father. There was a civil war in my county [sic] when he was growing up. I never went to school. My family was very poor. We raised corn and beans to eat. I came to this county [sic] with one goal, to work and send money home to my family. I worked for more than two years at Wendy's in Columbia and sent as much as I could to my father. He supports my brother and four sister [sic], including one whose husband was killed. I was happy to do a good job and help my family. I never gave this young man (meaning DeShawn C.) any reason to hurt me. All I did was work and go home at night.

This shooting has left me a prisoner in my own body. I am paralyzed from the chest down. I can't walk, and I am in pain. The bullet is still lodged in my spine. This young man did not manage to kill me but he did kill the person I was. Since I was a boy, I have always been independent, even as a child I hunted and fished to help feed my family. Now I have to depend on my uncle and other relatives for everything [sic] little thing. I hope to work again, but I will still need help with transportation to the job, and there will be many jobs that I can not do. This young man has robbed me of the dreams I had until only God knows when.

Your Honor, my parents never learned to read or write, but they did teach me right from wrong. You don't need a lot of education to know not to steal, not to lie, not to kill. My parents did teach me how to respect other people. Since I was shot, I have learned to write in my own language. Now I need to learn how to work from my wheelchair.

Finally, Your Honor, I believe the law gives me the right to ask that this young man eventually make restitution to me for the harm he has done. I ask you to order him to pay restitution. Thank you, Your Honor.

A statement by the appellant's uncle also was read into the record.

DeShawn called as witnesses counselors who described the Bowling Brook facility and program, recounted DeShawn's progress, and advocated his being moved to a "step down" program, in which he would live in society but in a supervised setting. The prosecutor responded that the appellant and his family would have preferred the case to have remained in the adult criminal justice system, and a "lengthy incarceration" to have been imposed; but, that not having happened, the appellant at least wished to see "continued consequences."

The court interjected, commenting that the appellant's statement had referred to "some type of restitution," and asking whether that issue had been adjudicated before the master. The prosecutor responded that it had not. The court then inquired whether restitution was "still an open possibility ... at this stage? Is that not available or what?" The prosecutor said it was not, in her view:

Your Honor, I don't know that [restitution is still available]. I don't believe that it is. My understanding is the initial—all the hospital bills and medical bills have been taken care of, that is still an attempt for the Criminal Injury's Compensation Board that requires certain documents that [the appellant] does not have at this particular point in time. It did not cover the continuing medications, and I take full responsibility for that, Your Honor.

The court's focus then returned to the issue of placement. There was no more mention of restitution at that hearing.

On July 26, 2001, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order committing DeShawn to the Department for further placement as designated by the Department, i.e., allowing the Department to place DeShawn in a "step down" program.

Two days later, the appellant, through private counsel, filed a written request for restitution and for a hearing. He attached documentation of the losses for which he was seeking restitution, including pay stubs from his job at Wendy's. The documentation showed that, on account of the injuries he sustained in the shooting, the appellant lost wages totaling more than $21,000.⁵ On August 1, 2001, DeShawn filed a motion to dismiss the...